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Strengthening civil society and increasing citizens’ participation in policy-making are 
widely discussed matters within political science, international relations and 
sociology. There is abundant scholarship advocating thoroughgoing collaboration 
between government and citizens, but the literature focusing on Mexico has become 
much stronger in theorising than testing. Equally, the co–production of policy has 
been politically debated or attempted, but too infrequently realised across the 
different levels of government in Mexico’s current dangerous democracy.  This has 
given rise to various assumptions on the functioning of the normative wheels of 
democracy. In the middle of Mexico’s rising insecurity, this PhD thesis empirically 
explores the challenges for civil society’s development and citizens’ role in policy-
making. By focusing on two contrasting cases of government–society collaboration 
in the sphere of public security, this research contributes to the understanding of 
policy co–production in young democracies.  The core finding is that, although an 
elite continues to dominate the main channels of public expression and key political 
negotiations, an engaged citizenry is gnawing at small cracks in Mexico’s semi–
clientelist system and achieving tangible influence on policy-making. The analyses 
that underpin this finding shed new light on the complex relationships and inter–
dependencies that define the development of civil society, public sphere and 
governance in Mexico. Furthermore, they close down the gap between ‘politics as 
practice’ and ‘politics as theory’ in the study of participative practices in political 
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Security and justice are both foundations of healthy democracies and essential components of 
public governance.1 For this reason, in Mexico, a country that became a new democracy just in 2000, 
but which shortly afterwards established itself as one of the world’s most dangerous ones, securing 
the adequate provision of public security is a priority for government and society. With Mexico’s 
government seeming to be incapable of fulfilling its public security tasks, citizens are currently 
building on Mexico’s incremental democratic openness to challenge the boundaries of society’s 
involvement in public security making and take control of their community. Nevertheless, different 
from mature democracies, Mexico is immersed in a public security crisis in which criminal groups 
have captured the incipient democratic and media institutions and are obstructing social activism.2  
The purpose of this thesis is to study and expose the challenges that citizens face in their 
attempts to constitute organised forms of civil society capable of influencing political decisions in 
Mexico’s young and dangerous democracy. Being immersed in extreme conditions of insecurity, 
Mexicans face very dissimilar conditions for social activism than their counterparts in developed 
democracies, to the extent that conventional democratic approaches work differently in the 
country’s particular scenario. This is why, this thesis aims to tackle one of the biggest political 
themes in the ‘utterly unique’ Mexican case: the rebirth of civil society and its capacity to influence 
public security policy in Mexico’s dangerous public sphere. It does so by building on theoretical 
experimentation and risky research across the study of two distinctive and contrasting cases of 
government–society cooperation: the First Citizen Summit to Build a Prosperous and Fair Mexico 
                                                             
1 OECD and IMCO, “Stregthening Evidence–Based Policy-making on Security and Justice in Mexico” (Paris, 
2012), 5, https://www.oecd.org/centrodemexico/Strengthening Evidence–based Policy-making Security 
and Justice.pdf (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
2  Héctor Aguilar, “La Captura Criminal Del Estado,” Nexos (Mexico City, January 2015), 
http://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=23798 (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
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and the autodefensas vigilante movement. Both of them involved on public security related issues. 
The analytical focus on the sphere of public security is not only pertinent due to the country’s 
current insecurity scenario, it is also one of the best approaches to bring new light on the importance 
of what Habermas describes as communication rationality in the generation of socially legitimate, 
beneficial and effective policies.3  
As the available scholarship, based on orthodox theoretical approaches, fails to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the emergence of citizen–centric ideals and their impact on policy-
making, this thesis applies a more fluid and nuanced approach. Rather than studying the emergence 
of social demands and the primacy of the state in public policy development as two homogenous 
but isolated spheres, this thesis analyses them as part of an interrelated dynamic process: both are 
socially constructed and politically disputed. In this vein, Habermas’ public sphere is one of the most 
suitable frameworks to study the first phases of citizens’ involvement in policy generation, whilst 
McCombs’ agenda setting provides the adequate tool to pinpoint the public’s influence over political 
decisions and evidence the extent to which social demands are transformed into public policy.  
This thesis is based on the argument that the existence of organised forms of organised civil 
society, the public pressure they create and the media presence they acquire are not guarantors of 
citizen–oriented policies, as it tends to be assumed. 4  In this vein, it intends to illustrate that 
democratic governance does not always follows from electoral change, and not all the good 
democratic things go hand by hand, just as Jonathan Fox has already argued.5  
                                                             
3 J Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 1st Ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1981), 86. 
4 Fay Lomax et al., “Media and Agenda Setting: Effects on the Public, Interest Group Leaders, Policy Makers, 
and Policy,” Public Opinion Quarterly 47, no. 1 (1983): 16–35; Michelle Wolfe, B. Jones, and Frank 
Baumgartner, “A Failure to Communicate: Agenda Setting in Media and Policy Studies,” Political 
Communication 30, no. 2 (2013): 175–92. 
5 Jonathan Fox, “Sociedad Civil y Políticas de Rendición de Cuentas,” Perfiles Latinoamericanos 13, no. 27 
(2006): 43, http://perfilesla.flacso.edu.mx/index.php/perfilesla/article/view/225 (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
Jonathan Fox, “The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico,” World Pol 
7 
Through the study of two contrasting scenarios, this research found that dissimilar public sphere 
set–ups can deter, constrain and mould civil society’s organisation and its policy-making impact, 
from symbolic to substantive political results. However, Mexico’s progressive democratic openness, 
not necessarily favoured by government but promoted by a more educated and critical public 
sphere, is allowing an engaged citizenry to gnaw at small cracks in Mexico’s semi–clientelist political 
system to exercise a more tangible influence on policy-making. In such a scenario the public does 
have the capacity to position its demands on the media and political agendas – at least in matters 
concerning the provision of public security –, however, an elite continues dominating the main 
channels of public expression and key political negotiations with government. When this domination 
reaches a point in which the system does not allow for any input from the general public, a 
government legitimacy crisis arises, politically–radical and violent forms of social discontent emerge, 
and a redefinition of power relationships takes place.  
The implications of this core findings are twofold. Firstly, as illustrated by the First Citizen Summit 
to Build a Peaceful and Fair Mexico, Mexico’s current societal depoliticization is both a consequence 
of the narrowness of the channels for citizens’ participation in politics and an enhancer of an elitist 
model of social activism. Secondly, citizens’ involvement in policy-making is not only desirable, but 
necessary for the sustainability of a young democracy like Mexico, a condition evidenced by the 
autodefensas vigilante movement that emerged due to the lack of government attention to citizens’ 
demands and the lack of government-society channels for political collaboration.  
 
 
                                                             
46, no. 2 (1994): 152, 155, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2950671?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents 
(Accessed 22–12–2017). 
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1.1 What? The focus of this research. 
 
This thesis does not aspire to unveil the entire black box of civil society development, even less 
to build a general theory of social policy-making, as this would be – Peter John would say – an 
unrealistic task.6 Nevertheless, with limited research on civil society’s impact on policy-making, this 
research attempts to break with established debates and develop what Amparo Casar and Claudia 
Maldonado regard as political science’s obligated task: to study the social construction of political 
problems and the citizenry raised policies to solve them.7 For this reason, it looks at the utterly 
unique case of Mexico, a young electoral democracy where: a) the progressive enforcement of 
political rights has favoured a boom of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), b) a rising violence has 
pushed CSOs to get involved in the definition of public security policies, but where c) the lack of rule 
of law, political disaffection and mistrust in media seems to imperil the rebirth of a politically 
effective civil society. 
In 2000, Mexico’s Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) lost the presidency against the National 
Action Party (PAN). It was the first alternation of presidential power in Mexico in nearly 100 years.8 
Internationally, analysts rushed to say ‘Mexico had evolved from being the longest governing 
authoritarian regime in the world to becoming a functioning electoral democracy.’9 With the new 
                                                             
6 Peter John, Making Policy Work (London: Routledge, 2011). 
7 Amparo Casar and Claudia Maldonado, “Formación de Agenda y Procesos de Toma de Decisiones: Una 
Aproximación Desde La Ciencia Política,” Documentos de Trabajo Del CIDE 207 (2008): 2–4; David Easton, 
The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science., 1st Ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953); 
Wyn Grant, “Is the Study of Pressure Groups a Fading Paradigm? Paper Delivered at the 60th Annual 
Conference of the Political Studies Association of the UK, Edinburgh,” (Edinbugh, 2010), 
http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2010/325_469.pdf (Accessed 22–12–2017); Adrian Bua, “Agenda 
Setting and Democratic Innovation: The Case of the Sustainable Communities Act,” Politics 32, no. 1 (2012): 
10–21; Paul Burstein, “The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an Agenda,” Political 
Research Quarterly 56, no. 1 (2003): 33. 
8 V. Fox was the first candidate to defeat the PRI after its 71 years in the presidency. 
9 Roderic Ai Camp, “The Democratic Transformation of Mexican Politics,” in The Oxford Handbook of Mexican 
Polticis, ed. Roderic Ai Camp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 3–30; Denisse Dresser, “Mexico: 
From PRI Predominance to Divided Democracy.,” in Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America, 
9 
government ‘the rule of law will prevail, the sins of the past will be punished and Mexico will elude 
its existential condition as an underdeveloped nation’, journalists stated.10 Nevertheless, as pointed 
out by Brenton Holmes, building a democracy is a never-ending task, and the price of democratic 
freedom is eternal vigilance. 11 Mexicans soon realised about the truth of this. 
Like other Latin American democracies, Mexico now holds competitive and inclusive elections 
that lead to peaceful alternations of power. However, whilst in its 70 years of rule the PRI 
constrained antagonistic forces across criminal and corrupt political groups, the new democratic era 
blurred these stable power relations and broke established chains of allegiance between criminals 
and a single and united political force. Drawing an analogy between Matthew Flinders’ Explaining 
Democratic Disaffection article and Mexico’s context, if the early 2000s witnessed the triumph of 
electoral democracy in Mexico, then the early 2010s appeared wedded not only to a failing 
democracy, but to a dangerous one.12 For instance, in 2014 Mexico was ‘the western hemisphere’s 
deadliest country for journalists’.13 That same year, being a Municipal President in Mexico was the 
third most dangerous profession in the world, and corruption was so rampant that Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index ranked Mexico 103 among 174 countries.14 In fact, 17 of 
                                                             
ed. Jorge Domínguez and Michael Shifter, 2nd Ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 
321–50; Joseph Klesner, “The End of Mexico’s One–Party Regime” (Ohio: Kenyon College, 2003), 
http://www2.kenyon.edu/Depts/PSci/Fac/klesner/apsa97_Table1.htm (Accessed 22–12–2017); J Diez, 
Political Change and Environmental Policy-making in Mexico, 1st Ed (New York: Routledge, 2012). 
10  M. Baer, “Mexico at an Impasse,” Foreign Affairs (MEXICO, February 2004), 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59536/m–delal–baer/mexico–at–an–impasse (Accessed 22–12–
2017). 
11 Breton Holmes, “Citizens’ Engagement in Policymaking and the Design of Public Services” (Canberra, 2011), 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp
/rp1112/12rp01#_ftn2 (accessed 22–12–2017). 
12  Matthew Flinders, “Explaining Democratic Disaffection: Closing the Expectations Gap,” Governance: An 
International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 27, no. 1 (2014): 2. 
13 Reporteros sin Fronteras, “2015 : Periodistas Muertos.” (Mexico, 2015), http://es.rsf.org/el–barometro–
de–la–libertad–de–prensa–periodistas–muertos.html?annee=2015 (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
14 Viridiana Rios, “Tendencias y Explicaciones Al Asesinato de Periodistas y Alcaldes En Mexico: El Crime 
Organizado y La Violencia de Alto Perfi.,” in Las Bases Sociales y Políticas Del Crimen Organizado y La 
Violencia En México, ed. Jose Aguilar (Mexico City: CIES, 2012), 389. Peter Smith, “Mexican Democracy in 
Comparative Politics,” in The Oxford Handbook of Mexican Polticis, ed. Roderic Ai Camp (Oxford: Oxford 
10 
its 32 states were regarded as ‘virtual narco–republics’ by scholars like Philip Caputo.15 With a 
government that was neither steering nor rowing in public security tasks, new actors aimed to 
transform the politically passive citizens into a pro–active and influential policy force. In this vein, a 
reinvigorated organised civil society (OCS) is now attempting to regenerate the social element of 
the public sphere, gain access to the governmental agenda setting process and take control of their 
communities, particularly in the sphere of public security.  
In theory, this mission should not be difficult. According to the OECD and Mexican think tank 
IMCO, public security policy must be a joint task: governments should exercise strong leadership in 
public security provision while responding to a good governance rationale, actively mobilising 
society against crime and involving actors, at all levels, in the definition of policy.16 What is more, 
governments around the globe express their willingness to encourage and facilitate civil society’s 
involvement in public security policy-making. In the UK, for instance, the current Government has 
pledged to ‘enable civil society to play a greater role in the running of public services’ and has 
recognised ‘the value and strengths of civil society to Police and Crime Commissioners.’ 17 
Nevertheless, these premises assume and function under the existence of a democratic 
environment and safe socio–political context that allows the development of an ideal deliberative 
process – as the one envisaged by Stanley Cohen.18 By ignoring the fact that these conditions are 
                                                             
University Press, 2012), 22; Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2014” (Berlin, 
2014). 
15 Philip Caputo in Smith, “Mexican Democracy in Comparative Politics,” 22, 90.  
16 OECD and IMCO, “Stregthening Evidence–Based Policy-making on Security and Justice in Mexico,” 6, 7. 
17 Office for Civil Society, “Making It Easier for Civil Society to Work with the State. Progress Update” (London, 
2014), 21, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/287779/2901952_Mak
ingItEasier_CivilSociety_acc.pdf (Accessed 22–12–2017); Home Office and Rt Hon Theresa May MP, “Home 
Secretary at the Police Reform Summit” (London, 2015), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home–secretary–at–the–police–reform–Summit (Accessed 
22–12–2017). 
18 Joshua Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,” in The Good Polity, ed. Alan Hamlin and Philip 
Petit, 1st Ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 72–75. 
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not present in every country, not even in all democratic countries, they fail to address the challenges 
that citizens and bureaucrats face in young and dangerous democracies like Mexico. Therefore, 
there is an urgent need for evidence–based research that promotes the development of an OCS 
capable of influencing political decisions in young or non–democratic scenarios.19  
Focusing on the Mexican case, this thesis intends to overcome the lack of systematic research 
outside the European and US cases, and tackle the lack of public evaluations of the impact of OCS 
in government actions.20 It aims to address the relationship between a civil society intending to 
rebirth in Mexico’s newly democratic – yet dangerous – public sphere, and its achievements in 
influencing the political agenda according to the public’s needs. The reasons to do this are fourfold.  
First, as argued by think tank FUSDA, Mexico is experiencing the progressive awakening of a civil 
society demanding more social, economic, cultural and political rights. 21  With Mexico’s 
democratisation in 2000, citizens’ participation in the public sphere has rapidly stopped being 
considered a concession and is now regarded as a public right. This puts important pressure over 
governmental institutions to manage genuine social needs and to contain – what Pollard and Court 
describe as – uncivil non-legitimate and non-representative movements.22 Secondly, as citizens’ 
                                                             
19 OECD and IMCO, “Stregthening Evidence–Based Policy-making on Security and Justice in Mexico”; US 
Department of State, “Merida Initiative,” US Department of State, 2017, 
https://www.state.gov/j/inl/merida/ (Accessed 22–12–2017); The White House, “U.S. Commitment to 
Afghanistan,” Rebuilding Afghanistan, 2005, https://georgewbush–
whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/afghanistan/us–commitment.html (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
20 For discussion see Alfonso Leon, “La Seguridad Publica y Las Organizaciones Civiles En México,” ed. M. 
Editores, Veredas, no. 24 (2012): 104; Teun van Dijk, News as Discourse (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, 1988), 6; P. Bernhagen, “Who Gets What in British Politics – and How? An Analysis of Media 
Reports on Lobbying around Government Policies, 2011–7,” Political Studies 60 (2012): 558; Wyn Grant, 
“Pressure Politics: The Role of Pressure Groups,” Political Insight (London, August 2014), 29, 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/2041–9066.12055/abstract (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
21 In FUSDA, “Las Organizaciones de La Sociedad Civil,” Sociedad En Movimiento (Mexico City, March 2010), 
29, https://doi.org/ISSN:2007–0101. 
22 Amy Pollard and Julious Court, “How Civil Society Organisations Use Evidence to Influence Policy Processes: 
A Literature Review” (London, 2005), 9, https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi–
assets/publications–opinion–files/164.pdf (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
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trust in the political system is declining, and with the channels for public–political interaction 
seeming to be unilaterally blocked by government, an increasing section of the population is turning 
away from politics, whilst another section is reverting to violent means that can lead to a major crisis 
of government legitimacy and a redefinition of power relationships. Thirdly, little –if any– attention 
has been given to the analysis of civil society–media–government power interactions in Mexico. 
Although Mexican theorists tend to presume that public pressure leads to policy change, very few 
have conducted empirical analyses to validate this argument (see chapter 2), to the extent that no 
scientific analysis of the hidden politics of social activism in Mexico has been conducted. Fourthly, 
it is clear that ‘media is not politics, but nowadays it is not possible to make politics without the 
media’, Esteinou says. 23 However, despite the fact that 73% of Mexicans use media outlets as their 
main source of political information and that CSOs’ activists acknowledge that media management 
is an indispensable requisite for influencing public and governmental agendas (see Chapter 5), CSOs 
still do not develop adequate assessments of their media impact. 24  Taking this into account, as well 
as the insecure socio-political context that prevails in Mexico, this thesis is not only relevant and 
distinctive, but well timed to assist with the construction of a more politically engaged, 




                                                             
23 Javier Esteinou, “Hacia La Ciudadanización de Los Medios de Comunicación En México,” Razón y Palabra 23, 
no. NA (2001): NA, http://www.razonypalabra.org.mx/anteriores/n23/23_jesteinou.html (Accessed 22–
12–2017). 
24 D. Stevens and J. Karp, “Leadership Traits and Media Influence in Britain,” Political Studies 60 (2012): 788; 
F. Abundis, Los Medios de Comunicación En México, 2006, http://www.amai.org/pdfs/revista–
amai/AMAI–13_art8.pdf.  
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1.2 Why? Thesis’ relevance and distinctive theoretical framework.   
 
This thesis is distinctive and valuable because it is one of the first empirical analyses looking at 
civil society’s political influence in Mexico: it allows understanding how different public sphere set–
ups mould public–media–government relations and citizens’ involvement in policy-making. 
Focusing on – what Smith regards as – the inimitable Mexican case, it tests bottom–up democratic 
premises and breaks with some established research patterns.25 In this vein, as ‘researchers and 
policy influencers are often said to inhabit parallel universes, debating the same matters but never 
fully engaging with each other’s work’, this thesis differentiates from existing scholarship by not 
studying civil society as a standalone issue, but as part of a broader struggle over political influence 
and power.26 Neither does it consider the analysis of the creation of social demands and the primacy 
of the state in the establishment of public policies as two homogenous but isolated spheres.27 On 
the contrary, it departs from the premise that these public and governmental spheres are socially 
constructed and politically disputed, and that the emergence of public demands and generation of 
public policies must be studied as an interrelated dynamic process where media plays a pivotal role. 
For this reason, it brings together Jurgen Habermas’ Public sphere theory with Maxwell McCombs 
and Donald Shaw’s Agenda setting work through the use of media analyses as a bridge between 
both theoretical frameworks. By bridging these streams of thinking, this thesis aims to answer: What 
does the analysis of public security policy suggest about the rebirth of civil society and its capacity 
to influence political decisions in Mexico’s dangerous public sphere?  
                                                             
25  Smith, “Mexican Democracy in Comparative Politics.” 
26 Pollard and Court, “How Civil Society Organisations Use Evidence to Influence Policy Processes: A Literature 
Review,” 4. 
27 Based on arguments from, for instance, Fox and Imke Habers. Fox, “The Difficult Transition from Clientelism 
to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico”; Fox, “Sociedad Civil y Políticas de Rendición de Cuentas”; Imke 
Harbers, “Democratic Deepening in Third Wave Democracies: Experiments with Participation in Mexico 
City,” Political Studies 55, no. 1 (2007): 38–58. 
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In this vein, as noticed by Amy Pollard and Julius Court, debates around civil society have often 
focused on the nature of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs).28 For this reason, the studies on the 
topic have mainly followed two theoretical lines: a) theories of transition to democracy or b) theories 
of civil society.29 Despite both spheres being inherently related to the analysis of civil society as a 
key political actor, both follow an ‘inside–out’ research perspective. That is, by closely tying, if not 
equating, the concept of OCS with CSOs, these studies tend to solely look at the CSOs’ 
characteristics, structure and work, but neglect the study of more nebulous forms of activism and 
their influence over political processes. What is more, by delimiting their scope of analysis, each line 
of study isolates the processes it studies from other interdependent variables, reason why they 
provide isolated or non-comprehensive conclusions on the importance of civil society as an agent 
of political power. On the one hand, the theories of transition to democracy focus on political 
negotiations between elite-power holders across traditional democratic processes and institutions 
(i.e. political parties, government and elections), they ignore the importance of other players (e.g. 
the media) whose existence is vital for an effective democracy. On the other hand, theories of civil 
society ‘have often focused on the nature of the organisations themselves’, presuming the existence 
of a set of rights, democratic institutions and conditions that allow for the flourishing of civil 
society. 30  Therefore, by functioning in an uncoordinated manner, none of these lenses can 
effectively pinpoint the influence that an OCS has in political processes, even less address the 
challenges faced by civil society in dangerous democracies.31  
                                                             
28 Pollard and Court, “How Civil Society Organisations Use Evidence to Influence Policy Processes: A Literature 
Review,” V. 
29  Alberto Olvera, “The Elusive Democracy: Political Parties, Democratic Institutios, and Civil Society in 
Mexico.,” Latin America Research Review 45 (2010): 78–107; A Olvera, “Civil Society and Political Transition 
in Mexico,” Constellations 4, no. 1 (1997): 105–23. 
30 Pollard and Court, “How Civil Society Organisations Use Evidence to Influence Policy Processes: A Literature 
Review,” 1. 
31 Pollard and Court, V. 
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This situation prevails across the scholarship dealing with the generation of social demands and 
bottom-up policy-making.32 In this vein, some studies tend to focus on established democratic 
institutions (i.e. political parties) or look at traditional forms of democratic expression (i.e. electoral 
processes), leaving aside more nebulous but richer forms of bottom–up democracy.33 Others state 
that civil society is the essential component, even trigger of key socio–political changes.34 Yet, only 
a small group of them go beyond descriptive analyses to provide strong empirical evidence about 
civil society’s specific input in policy changes. More importantly, Walgrave et al argue, the majority 
of ‘studies tend to focus on symbolic rather than on institutional political agendas, merely reflecting 
on policy changes that are largely rhetorical rather than assessing tangible legislative or 
                                                             
32 J Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984), 4. 
33 For instance, the available studies on the agenda setting process in Mexico between 1975 and 2000 (a total 
of 11 studies) are mainly related to the news coverage of political parties and government institutions 
during electoral processes. Seem for instance, Sebastian Valenzuela and Maxwell McCombs, “Agenda–
Setting Effects on Vote Choice: Evidence from the 2006 Mexican Election” (Texas, 2007). Olvera, “The 
Elusive Democracy: Political Parties, Democratic Institutios, and Civil Society in Mexico.”; Peter Ward, “De 
Clientelimso a Tecnocracia: Cambios Recientes En La Gestión Municipal de México,” Política y Gobierno V, 
no. 1 (1998), http://www.politicaygobierno.cide.edu/index.php/pyg/article/view/511 (Accessed 22–12–
2017); Joaquín Osorio–Goicochea, “Partidos Políticos, Poder Legislativo y Sociedad Civil En México (Una 
Correlación Asimétrica),” Análisis Plural 1 (2008): 1–15, 
https://rei.iteso.mx/bitstream/handle/11117/802/AP 2008–1 SEM_Partidos 
políticos.pdf?sequence=2  (Accessed 22–12–2017); Alejandro Natal and Carlos Chavez, “The Agenda on 
Civil Society Studies in Mexico,” Documentos de Discusión Sobre El Tercer Sector 42 (2007): 9, 
http://www.cmq.edu.mx/index.php/docman/publicaciones/documentos–de–discucion/123–
dd0420442/file (Accessed 22–12–2017).   
34 See for instance, the works of Alberto Olvera, Shannan Mattiace, Jorge Volpi and Peter Smith. On the one 
hand, Mattiace, Volpi, Ward and Smith argue that social movements like the student mobilisation of 1968, 
and the social solidarity that emerged after the earthquake of 1985 promoted Mexico’s transition to 
democracy. To the extent that Olvera argues that although the country’s democratic achievements have 
been discursively kidnapped by political parties, the real initiators of these victories were civil society 
movements34. Olvera, “The Elusive Democracy: Political Parties, Democratic Institutios, and Civil Society in 
Mexico.”; A Olvera, “Las Tendencias Generales de Desarrollo de La Sociedad Civil En México,” in Sociedad 
Civil, Esfera Pública y Democratización En América Latina, ed. A Olvera (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 2003), 460; Jorge Volpi, La Imaginación y El Poder, Una Historial Intelectual de 1968. (Mexico 
City: Ediciones Era, 1998); Jonathan Fox and Luis Hernandez, “Mexico’s Difficult Democracy: Grassroots 
Movements, NGOs, and Local Government,” Alternatives 17, no. 2 (1992): 165–208; Ward, “De 
Clientelimso a Tecnocracia: Cambios Recientes En La Gestión Municipal de México”; Smith, “Mexican 
Democracy in Comparative Politics,” 80; Shannan Mattiace, “Social and Indigenous Movements in 
Mexico’s Transition to Democracy,” in The Oxford Handbook of Mexican Polticis, ed. Roderic Ai Camp, 1st 
Ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 824, https://catalyst.library.jhu.edu/catalog/bib_4113908 
(Accessed 22–12–2017); Natal and Chavez, “The Agenda on Civil Society Studies in Mexico,” 8. 
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administrative consequences.’35 In fact, some studies are now avoiding this important task by simply 
warning they ‘do not aim to deal with any formal decision–making process by which citizens 
influence government’s actions.’36 
With scholars having become much stronger in their theorising than in their testing, a shift in the 
research approach is needed: thinking of the rebirth of civil society and its influence in democratic 
policy-making processes requires more radical ways of theorising. Therefore, in order to break with 
– what Grant frames as – ‘established debates on political science’, this research builds on 
theoretical experimentation to produce new empirical evidence that validates, complements and 
takes forward existing knowledge on civil society influence on policy making.37 Firstly, Habermas’ 
public sphere explains the emergence and positioning of demands in the social realm: how, where 
and under which conditions do members of society form an association to deliberate and engage in 
matters of common interest, and influence political decisions? Secondly, McCombs and Shaw’s 
agenda setting permits studying the transfer of salience among the public, media and government 
                                                             
35 Stefaan Walgrave, Michiel Nuytemans, and Lieven De Winter, “Specifying the Media’s Political Agenda–
Setting Power.” (Cambridge, USA, 2004), 12, https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/ef8cb67a–5ec5–
472a–8c43–6e7c7b3cc830.pdf (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
36 See for instance the works of Chavez, Dahlberg and Leon. In ‘The transformation of the Public sphere: 
Channel of Congress and Public Opinion’, one of the very few studies on the public sphere in Mexico, 
Chavez provides an interesting and strong argument that serves as starting point for many analyses: 
‘democratization depends on the strengthening of organized societal actors and their progressive control 
over the state and society.’ However, Chavez’s study mainly looks at the government’s communication 
strategies from the government’s perspective, failing to address how the public sphere –allegedly the main 
topic of his study– contributes to, and related to, civil society’s empowerment. Dahlberg, on the other 
hand, clearly limits the scope of his work. And Alfonso Leon proposes not too complete classification of 
CSOs based on their information and assistencialism practices, ignoring the existence and valuable 
contribution of CSOs directly involved on advocacy and representation tasks, therefore, the scholarly 
knowledge produced by over 100 works on the topic (see Pollard and Court’s study). Octavio Ruiz Chavez, 
“Transformación de La Esfera Pública: Canal Del Congreso y La Opinión Pública” (Mexico City, 2009); L 
Dahlberg, “The Habermasian Public Sphere: A Specification of the Idealized Conditions of Democratic 
Communication,” New Media & Society 9 (2007): 10; Leon, “La Seguridad Publica y Las Organizaciones 
Civiles En México,” 98–101; Pollard and Court, “How Civil Society Organisations Use Evidence to Influence 
Policy Processes: A Literature Review,” 2. 
37 Grant, “Is the Study of Pressure Groups a Fading Paradigm? Paper Delivered at the 60th Annual Conference 
of the Political Studies Association of the UK, Edinburgh,.” 
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agendas: how, when and under which circumstances do the media allow key social activists to 
achieve policy influence? Thus, while some incompleteness here is inevitable, by applying this 
distinctive theoretical approach this thesis aims to shed some light on the functioning of the public 
sphere as a mechanism by which civil society can influence the political agenda and participate in 
the definition of bottom-up public policies.   
1.2.1 Research Questions and Hypothesis 
 
The hypothesis of this research is that Mexico’s progressive democratic openness, not 
necessarily favoured by government but promoted by a more educated and critical public sphere, 
is allowing an engaged citizenry to gnaw at small cracks in Mexico’s semi–clientelist political system 
and exercise a more tangible influence on policy-making. Nevertheless, it argues that when the 
mechanisms for society-government negotiation are abruptly interrupted, a government legitimacy 
crisis takes place, politically radical and violent forms of social discontent emerge, and a redefinition 
of power relationships takes place. Building on these premises, this thesis aims to answer the 
following main question: What does the analysis of public security policy suggest about the rebirth 
of civil society and its capacity to influence political decisions in Mexico’s dangerous public 
sphere? Furthermore, it seeks to solve a number of secondary questions:  
Table 1. Thesis’ secondary questions 
What does the analysis of public security policy-making suggest about the rebirth of civil 















How do the processes occurring within the public sphere contribute 
to the generation of a bottom–up political change? How much power 
does the public have? 




Case Studies / 
Tools 
Do public policy changes obey society’s demands? 
Is a thicker model of democracy, built around social capital, allowing 
civil society to set the agenda? Or does a top–down process continue 
dominating the agenda setting of public security policy in Mexico? 
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1.3 Thesis structure. 
 
Dealing with two interconnected theoretical notions (i.e. the public sphere and agenda setting) 
and studying two very dissimilar case-studies of civil society’s involvement in public security policy 
making, this thesis is divided into seven chapters, each one addressing key components of this work 
(Table 2). Chapter one has already provided the Introduction, briefly outlining this thesis’ main 
objects of study, key questions to be addressed and the reasons that make this research both 
distinctive and well timed.  Chapter two provides the Methodological framework. In this vein, simple 
specifications of linear models tend to be the preferred research method across agenda setting 
studies, but as Michelle Wolfe et al, Stefaan Soroka and other scholars have stated, ‘numbers can 
only tell part of the story.’38 In the particular case of Mexico, where there is limited available 
information on the topic, a simple awareness of interaction and feedback effects can in fact provide 
more valuable and comprehensive insights than the scattered quantitative data. Therefore, the 
methodology applied in this thesis distinguishes itself from available studies by not only relying on 
either quantitative or qualitative analyses, but on a mix of them that feed into a comprehensive 
comparative case study method. Chapter three focuses on the Theoretical Framework. Claiming the 
need for a shift in the research approach towards civil society, bottom–up policy-making and the 
inherent communication and negotiation practices surrounding them, this section studies and 
connects the state of the art on public sphere with than on agenda setting studies.  
                                                             
38 Wolfe, Jones, and Baumgartner, “A Failure to Communicate: Agenda Setting in Media and Policy Studies,” 
180. Soroka, “Policy Agenda–Setting Theory Revisited: A Critique of Howlett on Downs, Baumgartner and 
Jones, and Kingdon”; Stefaan Walgrave and Peter Van Aelst, “The Contingency of the Mass Media’s 
Political Agenda Setting Power. Towards a Preliminary Theory,” Journal of Communication 56, no. 1 (2006): 
88–109. 
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Table 2. Thesis structure. 
Chapter Relevance Question(s) addressed 
2. Methodology. 
 
Hallin and Mancini argue current analyses tend to make limited attempts to develop new 
empirical research and heavily rely on available scholarship.39 This section is important as 
it describes this thesis’ research methods of theoretical experimentation and risky 
fieldwork, to challenge orthodox and unorthodox views on the public sphere, agenda 




Existing empirical scholarship fails to address the challenges faced by democratic public 
spheres and OCS in dangerous democracies. Theoretically, the main lines of research 
neglect the study of nebulous forms of activism that surround civil society, including the 
political processes it defines. This section is relevant as it introduces a shift in the research 
approach to the rebirth of civil society and its influence in democratic policy-making 
processes. 
How do the processes occurring in the public sphere 
contribute to bottom–up political changes? How much 
power does the public have?   /   Is media the surrogate 
of the public agenda or a mechanism for public 
domination? 
4. Mexico’s public 
sphere and politics: 
triggering the rebirth of 
civil society. 
April Johnson has illustrated how Westernised theoretical and practical constructs 
transplanted into countries with less developed traditions of media and civil society 
research have proved to operate very differently.40 As Jose Tejeda has correctly pointed 
out, ‘there are so many discussions about what civil society entails that it is now easier to 
define what it does not entail.’41 Therefore, the relevance of this chapter lies in the fact 
that it provides the set–up to understand what Smith defines as the utterly unique 
Mexican case, and delimited this thesis’ object of study by defining OCS in Mexico and 
describing its main involvement in the political sphere so far. 
Is a thicker model of democracy allowing OCS to set the 
agenda? Or does a top–down democratic set–up 
dominate the agenda setting of public security policies 
in Mexico? 
5. Case Study 1: Causa 
en Comun: First Summit 
to Build a Peaceful and 
Fair Mexico 
Building on Chapter 4, this section looks at a stereotypical form of OCS, yet still unseen in 
Mexico: formally established, legally recognised, following a top–down management 
structure and conducting thin cooperation with government. 42 This section is relevant as 
it empirically tests existing scholarship on the functionality, relevance and representative 
character of CSOs in Mexico.  
What does the analysis of public security policy suggest 
about the rebirth of civil society and its capacity to 
influence political decisions in Mexico’s dangerous 
public sphere? /   Do public policy changes obey 
society’s demands? 
6. Case study 2: 
Hopelessness in the 
public sphere: 
autodefensas VS crime 
OCS tends to be equated to CSOs. 43  This chapter is relevant as it focuses on the political 
achievements of more nebulous and non– government sanctioned –even illegal– forms of 
OCS in Mexico. By doing so, it breaks with existing research paradigms and pre–
conceptions of citizenry’s political effectiveness.  
                                                             
39 Hallin and Mancini, Comparing Media Systems, 16. 
40 April Johnson, “Ambivalence, Political Engagement and Context,” Political Studies 62, no. 3 (2014): 502–21. 
41 Jose Tejeda, “Las Dimensiones de La Sociedad Civil,” POLIS 10, no. 1 (2014): 133–56. 
42 Maria Morera in Garcia J, “Interview to Maria Elena Morera, President of Causa En Comun CSO.” (Mexico City, 2013), pt. Minute 23:00; Grupo RadioFormula, 
“Crean Organizaciones Sociales Frente Común Por Un México Pacífico y Justo,” Grupo RadioFormula, May 14, 2012, 
http://www.radioformula.com.mx/notas.asp?Idn=243415 (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
43 See, for instance, the reports produced by the World Bank, in which civil society is equated to CSOs.World Bank, “The Public Sphere, Communication for 




Chapter four provides the contextual set–up that surrounds civil society, public sphere and 
policy-making in the ‘utterly unique Mexican case’.44 This chapter is key to the understanding of 
this thesis relevance and potential socio–political implications. It looks at multiple indicators of 
crime, media freedom and democratic development in Mexico, but also evaluates the role of 
an active OCS in the development of the country’s public sphere.  
 Chapter five focuses on this thesis’ first case study: the First Citizen Summit to Build a 
Peaceful and Fair Mexico Mexico (from now on, ‘the Summit’). As an institutionalised, 
government–sanctioned and cooperative non-governmental inactive joined by more than 100 
CSOs from all over Mexico, the Summit is one of the best case studies to assess CSOs’ capacity 
to represent civil society in the public sphere, influence the media agenda and act as agents of 
political change.  Chapter six looks at the second case study: the autodefensas self-defence 
movement in Michoacan, Mexico. Intending to develop a contrasting, contemporary and 
thought provoking research with potential policy implications, this chapter looks at a more 
nebulous, non-institutionalised, politically antagonistic, even illegal form of organised civil 
society.  
Lastly, chapter seven provides the main conclusions of the thesis. First, it summarises this 
thesis’ main empirical insights and the similarities and differences found between both case 
studies, translating the theoretical discussions into empirical findings. Secondly, it outlines the 
original contributions to knowledge that the study represents. Finally, it presents policy 
recommendations related to government–civil society collaboration and a suggested agenda 
for future research. 
 
                                                             
44 Smith, “Mexican Democracy in Comparative Politics,” 77. 
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Chapter 2. Methodology.  
 
The main focus of this thesis is the analysis of a re–invigorated civil society and its capacity to 
influence policy in Mexico, one of the world’s most dangerous public spheres and democracies. 
Intending to answer the question: What does the analysis of public security policy suggest about 
the rebirth of civil society and its capacity to influence political decisions in Mexico’s dangerous 
public sphere?, this thesis follows a multifaceted approach in order to study a large set of variables 
and the political input of dissimilar actors. This is why, this thesis applies an array of quantitative 
and qualitative tools that feed into a more comprehensive case study research method. 
2.1 Case Studies Selection. 
 
 First of all, this thesis acknowledges Huascar Pessali and Richard Rose’s arguments: ‘policy-
making does not follow a one–size–fits–all approach’. 45 Dealing with the relatively unexplored case 
of Mexico and its dangerous public sphere, this thesis cannot exclusively rely on existing Eurocentric 
studies on public sphere or participative democracy. On the contrary, due to its research 
particularities, this thesis uses case studies as its main research method, as it represents a unique 
tool to learn about real–world behaviour and the meaning of the public sphere in real–world 
contexts. The case studies method not only permits identifying and using multiple sources of 
evidence in natural settings, it also increases the reliability of the results and provides more 
insightful explanations of the social construction of public security policy. More importantly, in the 
case of agenda–setting analyses like this thesis, Stefaan Walgrave and Peter Van Aelst argue, case 
                                                             
45 See, for instance, the works of Huascar Pessali, “Public Policy Design in Developing Societies. Beyond 
Transplantation,” Journal of Developing Society 27, no. 1 (2011): 11–28; Richard Rose, “The Job at the Top: 
The Presidency in Comparative Perspective,” in The Presidency and Public Policy-making, ed. G Edwards, 
S. Shull, and Thomas Norman, 1st Ed (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985), 3. 
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studies permit researchers to ‘detangle when and why politicians react to certain types of news 
coverage and take into account both the amount of attention and the framing of the topic.’46 
In order to make the best of use of the case study method, this thesis conducted a thorough 
selection of cases of analysis by delimiting, first, the scope of this research regarding civil society 
and public sphere. In this vein, whilst ‘civil society’ and public sphere are two broad terms, it is 
possible to find similarities and coincidences in their empirical application. For instance, the World 
Bank ties the concept of the public sphere to that of civil society.47 Michael Edwards, former Director 
of Ford Foundation’s Civil Society Unity, also equates ‘civil society to the public sphere’, and 
recognises that voluntary organisations and media are vital to the latter.48  What is more, Luis Reyes 
states that CSOs are the most recognisable embodiment of society in Mexico’s public sphere.49 
Building on this, this thesis chose to focus on the study of CSOs, arguably the most tangible 
expression of civil society in Mexico. To develop an in–depth and innovative analysis that produce 
new and specialist knowledge, rather than a broad study to deliver generic findings, the researcher 
decided to focus on two case studies.  With 35,000 CSOs registered in Mexico and over 50 of them 
working on public security related subjects, the researcher conducted an initial filer to identify what 
he considered were the 8 most influential CSOs working on public security in Mexico in the 2010s:50  
                                                             
46 Stefaan Walgrave and Peter Van Aelst, “Political Agenda Setting and the Mass Media,” Politics: Oxford 
Research Encyclopedias, 2016, https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.46. 
47 The World Bank, “The Public Sphere,” Communication for Governance and Accountability Programme, 
2009, https://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGOVACC/Resources/PubSphereweb.pdf (Accessed 22–12–
2017). 
48 An statement that is echoed by James Sater and Nancy Fraser – although Fraser equates civil society with 
weak public sphere. Michael Edwards, “Civil Society,” Pedagogies for change, 2005, 
http://78.31.105.177/~infed/association/civil_society.htm (Accessed 22–12–2017). James Sater, Civil 
society and Political Change in Morocco (London, 2007); Fraser Nancy, “Theorie Der Öffentlichkeit– 
Strukturwandel Der Öffentlichkeit,” in Habermas Handbuch, ed. Hauke Brunkhorst et al. (Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp, 2002), 184–155. 
49 Luis Reyes, “La Ciudadania En Mexico. Un Beve Recuento Historico.,” POLIS 9, no. 2 (2013): 113–50. 
50 According to INDESOL's last official census (2013), in 2013 there were between 20,000 and 35,000 registered 
CSOs in Mexico. However, according to public estimations based on multiple data, in 2015 there were 
30,674 CSOs in the country. Regarding the number of CSOs working on public security, please refer to 
OECD and IMCO’s analysis.  
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- Common Cause (Causa en Comun).  
- Mexico United Against Delinquency (Mexico Unido Contra la Delincuencia). 
- Stop Kidnapping (Alto al Secuestro). 
- Illuminate Mexico (Iluminemos Mexico). 
- Mexico Evaluates (Mexico Evalua). 
- Mexico City’s Citizens Council for Public Security and Justice Provision (CCCDMX in 
Spanish). 
- UNAM – Colectivo de Analisis de la Seguridad con Democracia (UNAM–CASEDE). 
- S.O.S Mexico. 
 
After conducting face–to–face interviews with directors and representatives from these 8 CSOs, 
and having analysed the documentation provided by the organisations themselves, it was noticed 
that most of them were being involved, either as convenors or participants, in a high–level national 
forum on public security policy organised by Causa en Comun. Furthermore, the initial filter also 
revealed that six of them have noticeably reduced their involvement in Mexico’s politics (e.g. 
Iluminemos Mexico), had now a limited focus on public security policies (e.g. UNAM–CASEDE), or 
lacked interest in contributing to this research (for instance, S.O.S Mexico did not provide any 
response to further information requests). Taking this into account, the researcher selected two 
different types of CSOs for this research: 
1. Causa en Comun and the First Citizens Summit to Build a Peaceful and Fair Mexico: Causa en 
Comun and its Director have been two of the most active actors in Mexico’s political sphere 
in the last decade. Due to the national scope of Causa en Comun’s programmes as well as 
the undisputable political importance of the First Citizen Summit to Build a Peaceful and Fair 
Mexico (i.e. the only ‘citizens’ forum that has engaged engage all the presidential candidates 
                                                             
Public Policy as defined by Wyn Grant. Based on an annotated bibliography of 5 previous studies on the 
topic See, Leon, “La Seguridad Publica y Las Organizaciones Civiles En México”; Lorena Cortes et al., “A 
Snapshot of Civil Society in Mexico, Analytical Report on the CIVICUS Civil Society Index” (Mexico City, 
2011), http://civicus.org/images/stories/csi/csi_phase2/mexico acr.pdf (Accessed 22-12-2017); Lorenzo 
Fioramonti, “Methodological Note on the CIVICUS’ Civil Society Enabling Environment Index (EE Index)” 
(Mexico, n.d.); Shaila Rosagel, “Dinero y Poder, Anzuelos Del Sistema Para Activistas,” SinEmbargo.Mx, 
April 7, 2015, http://www.sinembargo.mx/07-04-2015/1302704 (Accessed 22-12-2017). Wyn Grant, 
Pressure Groups and British Politics (Great Britain: MacMillan Press Ltd, 2000), 14; María Zuniga, 
“Activismo Vive Un Boom Gracias a Dinero Público,” SIPSE.COM, October 19, 2015, 
http://sipse.com/mexico/mexico–organizaciones–sociedad–civil–reciben–mas–dinero–publico–
174726.html (Accessed 22–12–2017); INDESOL, “SCP Register of Beneficiaries” (Mexico City, 2013), 
http://www.indesol.gob.mx/en/web_indesol/Registro  (Accessed 22–12–2017); OECD and IMCO, 
“Stregthening Evidence–Based Policy-making on Security and Justice in Mexico,” 39. 
24 
and presidents of Mexico’s political parties in discussion tables with over 100 CSOs from all 
over the country), the researcher considered this to be an ideal case–study for this research.  
 
2. Mexico City’s Citizens Council for Public Security and Justice Provision (CCCDMX in Spanish): 
selected due to its –arguable– quasi quango character, capacity to influence public security 
policy from within the local government structure and key role in large–scale and local (i.e. 
Mexico City) programmes that have evolved into national security initiatives. Furthermore, 
from the eight CSOs initially selected, this was the only one not participating in the First 
Citizens Summit.   
 
Although both CSOs represented interesting and unstudied cases of social activism in Mexico, by 
the time their selection was being completed, important socio–political changes, including the 
sudden appearance of a radical form of social activism, took place in Mexico. In this vein, in February 
2013, a vigilante or self–defence movement (autodefensas in Spanish) emerged in Mexico's state of 
Michoacan. Being unacknowledged as a legitimate form of social activism by government, but as an 
exemplar organised civil society movement by academics and the general public, the autodefensas 
prompted this thesis to adapt to new circumstances, re–evaluate the analytical appropriateness of 
the CSOs previously chosen and select the most interesting, challenging and thought–provoking 
cases of civil society activism in Mexico. 51 Therefore, to produce a good contrast thesis that allows 
understanding the rebirth of civil society and its capacity to influence political decisions in Mexico’s 
                                                             
51   Enrique Guerra, for instance, equated the self–defence movement to an autonomous form of civil society. 
Similarly, Iliana Rodriguez stated that ‘whilst the self–defence groups defied the rule of law, they 
represented a form or organised civil society defending itself’ from organised crime. Senator Marcela 
Torres (from PAN) declared that ‘one of the best examples of citizens’ organisation was the self–defence 
movement, integrated by citizens defending their integrity.’ In Erick Juarez, “Al Fortalecer a Las 
Organizaciones de La Sociedad Civil, Se Empodera a La Ciudadanía: Legisladores,” RRC, March 17, 2014, 
http://rendiciondecuentas.org.mx/al–fortalecer–a–las–organizaciones–de–la–sociedad–civil–se–
empodera–a–la–ciudadania–legisladores/ (Accessed 22–12–2017); Enrique Guerra, “Las Autodefensas de 
Michoacán. Movimiento Social, Paramilitarismo y Neocaciquismo,” Política y Cultura 44 (2015): 7–31, 
http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0188–77422015000200002 (Accessed 22–




dangerous public sphere, the researcher decided to re–focus this thesis into the study of two 
contemporary, and more importantly, distinct, if not opposing forms of civil activism in Mexico: 
1. Causa en Comun and the First Citizen Summit to Build a Peaceful and Fair Mexico (as 
previously selected): a top–down, formally constituted, government sanctioned CSO, with a 
a long record of collaborative interaction with Mexico’s national government.  
2.  The autodefensas in Michoacan: a more nebulous, bottom–up and semi legal form of civil 
activism with a regional focus and an antagonistic approach towards government.  With 
sufficient firearms, people and funding, the self–defence groups had the means to expel 
municipal government officials, challenge the state government authority and proved to be 
an influential actor in national public security policy-making.  
 







Actors Intended socio–political change 
Case Study 1: ‘The 
First Citizen 
Summit to Build a 














2.– Mexico’s national 
political parties. 
3.– Office of the President 
of Mexico. 
– To achieve the inclusion of a series of 
their citizen demands into the political 
commitments (and actions) of the then 
Presidential Candidates (and latter 
President of Mexico) ahead of the 2012 
elections.  
Case Study 2: 









1.– Citizens in the form 
of ‘Self–defence groups.’ 
2.– Government of the 
State of Michoacan. 
–To expel organised crime from the 
state and achieve the capture of the 
leaders of the Caballeros Templarios 
Drug Trafficking Organisation (DTO). 
–To be legally recognised as the 
‘legitimate providers of public security 
in their communities.’ 
 
Different from most of the literature on the topic, focusing on the usual –and easier to study– 
cases of institutionalised Civil Society Organisations, by focusing on the Autodefensas and Citizen 
Summit case–studies this thesis took a riskier but also –expectedly– richer and fulfilling approach. 
On the one hand, the study of the Autodefensas movement, its organisation and achievements 
implied undertaking new risks not involved when researching about CSOs located in Mexico’s capital 
26 
city such as Causa en Comun and the First Citizens Summit. For instance, travelling to one of the 
world’s riskiest towns, organising interviews with members of criminal groups (as labelled by 
government) and joining police and military operations against drug–trafficking organisations 
(DTOs) (see sub–chapter 2.3). However, on the other hand, the researcher expected that 
undertaking these risks could also lead to find new evidence about the functioning of the public 
sphere in dangerous environments, and the political achievements of civil society in the face of an 
allegedly democratic but corrupt government.  
Having said that, this thesis also differentiates from existing studies in that it not only looks at 
symbolic political outcomes from civil society activism (e.g. speeches, public questionings, etc.), but 
also assesses their substantive and tangible forms of political influence (e.g. legislative changes or 
implementation of new public programmes). In order to do so, this thesis looked at four main units 
of analysis:  
1) level of public representation/interaction,  
2) media presence,  
3) level of political contact and, 
4) degree of legislative influence.  
 
Considering this and that a single research method ‘does not allow uncovering the power 
relations that permit or prevent groups from effectively affecting policy-making’, and that the study 
of social movements across the public sphere and agenda–setting frameworks is ‘better addressed 
by embracing multiple methods’, this thesis applies a set of quantitative and qualitative tools as 
described in chapters 2.2. and 2.3.52   
                                                             
52  Robert Yin, “Case Study Methods,” in Handbook of Complementary Methods in Education Research, ed. 
Judith Green, G. Camilli, and Patricia Emlore, 2nd Ed. (London: SAGE Publications, 2006), 111–22; R Yin, 
Applications of Case Study Research, 3rd ed. (London: SAGE Publications, 2012); Bernhagen, “Who Gets 
What in British Politics – and How? An Analysis of Media Reports on Lobbying around Government Policies, 
2011–7,” 562; Kevin Carragee and Wim Roefs, “The Neglect of Power in Recent Framing Research,” Journal 
of Communication 54, no. 2 (2004): 228. Christina Hughes, “Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches” 
(Warwick: University of Warwick, 2017), 
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2.2 Quantitative Analysis.  
 
This thesis builds on the public sphere and agenda–setting to study how a re–energised civil 
society can create public demands, position them into the political sphere and influence the 
generation of public policies inside the alleged new bottom–up democratic governance in Mexico. 
With the two lines of thought considering media a main influence, and with the Mexican media 
being still regarded a powerful tool of political messages, this study develops a quantitative analysis 
to measure the salience and identify the transmission of agendas between the public and 
governmental spheres.53 In this vein, as stated by Joseph Uscinski, existing agenda–setting studies 
‘do not intend to investigate the influence of the public's agenda over the media's agenda; they 
merely control for it as a means to buttress the claims of media influence over the audience.’54 
Similarly, current ‘audience–driven–based’ studies work under the assumption that audience’s 
concerns drive media content, only explain the effects on that direction and obviate the mutually 
influential relation among both agendas. Therefore, in order to conduct an innovative and 
academically valuable research, this thesis builds on Uscinski’s work to look for evidence of a causal 
relationship between the media and public agendas over time. To do so, and conduct a longitudinal 
time lag study, this research not only builds on news archival records, but also studies poll analyses. 
2.2.1 News archival records’ analysis. 
 
Firstly, to analyse media coverage patterns, this thesis solely studies printed media reports due 
to three main reasons:  
                                                             
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/sociology/staff/academicstaff/hughes/researchprocess/quantitativ
e_and_qualitative_approaches.docx (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
53   José Antón, “¿Por Qué Sobreviven Los Periódicos?,” Forbes, September 4, 2014, 
https://www.forbes.com.mx/por–que–sobreviven–los–periodicos/#gs.1UUlx5c (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
54 Joseph Uscinski, “When Does the Public’s Issue Agenda Affect the Media’s Issue Agenda (and Vice–Versa)? 
Developing a Framework for Media–Public Influence,” Social Science Quarterly 90, no. 4 (2009): 797. 
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v According to the available scholarship, traditional and newer media 
formats still reference newspapers.55  
v In the last decade, the frequency in which Mexican citizens read 
newspapers has increased in the last decade, whilst TV–viewing and 
radio–listening for political information has declined.56  
v Despite the importance of the ‘new media’, recent studies show that 
traditional media continues dominating the public sphere.57 In fact, in the 
specific case of Mexico 92% of citizens do not use the internet to learn 
about political matters.58  
 
Considering this, this thesis looks at three of the most influential newspapers in Mexico (i.e. El 
Universal, Reforma and El Norte) each one with a different ‘social personality’ and political line.59 
Furthermore, due to the particularities of case–study 2 (i.e. the Autodefensas in Michoacan, see 
Chapter 6), it also analyses the news reports of Cambio de Michoacan newspaper. For case study 1 
(i.e. Causa en Comun and the First Citizen’s Summit), the research focused on those news reports 
published between the 1st of January 2010 (i.e. when the movement started to be organised) and 
the 31st of December 2014.For case–study 2 (i.e. self–defence groups), it looked at the news reports 
from the 1st of March 2011 (i.e. date of the first news report on autodefensas) to the 31st of June 
2015, when –government argued– the organised movement came to an end.  
Secondly, as each one of the newspapers uses a different electronic filing system, this research 
developed a systematised – and replicable – analysis through the use of Lexis Nexis news database 
                                                             
55 Temple, for instance, argues that many bloggers are only ‘bleating in cyberspace’ as ‘independent citizen 
journalism news sites do not offer radical alternatives to the mainstream media.’ ‘Most blogs – Temple 
continues – are banal nonsense read by a handful of people.’ In Mick Temple, “Civic and Audience 
Empowerment: The Role of Citizen Journalism,” in Agents of (Dis)Empowerment Media and Civic 
Engagement, ed. R Scullion et al. (London: Routledge, 2013). 
56 INEGI/Ministry of the Interior, “Quinta ENCUP 2012” (Mexico City, 2012), 
http://www.encup.gob.mx/en/Encup/Quinta_ENCUP_2012 (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
57  Jose Candon, “Movimientos Sociales, Internet y Medios de Comunicación,” Estudios Sobre El Mensaje 
Periodístico 18, no. 2 (2010): 683; Alejandro Cardenas, “Agenda–Setting 2.0: En Las Estrategias… Pero No 
de La Sociedad Civil,” Forbes, November 23, 2015, https://www.forbes.com.mx/agenda–setting–2–0–en–
las–estrategias–pero–no–de–la–sociedad–civil/ (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
58  INEGI/SEGOB, “ENCUP 2008: Resultados de La Encuesta Nacional Sobre Cultura Política y Prácticas 
Ciudadanas” (Mexico, 2008). 
59   Verenise Sanchez, “Los 10 Periódicos Online Más Influyentes En México,” Merca2.0, June 13, 2013, 
http://www.merca20.com/los–10–periodicos–mas–influyentes–en–mexico/ (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
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(for the national newspapers) and Cambio de Michoacan’s newspaper electronic and physical 
databases.60  Using Lexis Nexis database this research identified N number of articles with a headline 
containing descriptive elements linked to both case–studies (see Table 4). However, reading through 
them, a u number of results were not related to this thesis’ case studies.61 Hence, an additional 
control analysis was conducted to improve the accuracy of the analysis of media salience (n) for 
each case study (N – u = n). By only considering those ones related to this thesis, a total of 10,854 
(8,823 on autodefensas and 2,031 on Causa en Comun) news reports were analysed to study media 
salience of social and governmental actions across time (see Chapters 5 and 6). Having cleaned the 
newspaper articles database, this research built on Yin and Abrajano and Branton’s work to 
transform the news reports’ descriptive and qualitative elements into quantifiable data that allows 
measuring media salience and summarising the logic, sense and relation of each case study with this 
thesis’ main research question.62 
Table 4. Search–terms for media salience analysis 
* Search-terms marked with a star (*) denote fixed terms that needed to be contained in the news results in 
order to be considered in the study. The other search phrases were used as ‘and/or’ in each one of the 
searches. Using Lexis Nexis database and software. 
                                                             
60 For more information refer to https://www.nexis.com/ and http://www.cambiodemichoacan.com.mx/.  
61 For instance, on case–study 1 the Lexis Nexis database provided multiple results containing the search term 
“Causa en Comun”, however, the news reports were not related to the First Citizen Summit. On case–study 
2, Cambio de Michoacan’s search engine retrieved numerous articles containing “autodefensas” on their 
headlines, but they were related to similar social movements taking place across Central America, not in 
Michoacan (this thesis’ main topic of analysis).  
62 J Dunaway, M. Abrajano, and R. Branton, “Agenda Setting, Public Opinion, and the Issue of Immigration 
Reform” (San Diego, 2007); Yin, Applications of Case Study Research, 132. 














































Although the media coverage analysis here described provides a good starting point to identify 
part of the reasons behind public opinion, perceptions and demands on public security related 
issues, it does not reveal the hidden politics of government–society interaction in the definition of 
public security policy. Therefore, to enrich its quantitative element, this research made us of 
additional analytical tools, including poll analysis, and qualitative methods like focus groups and 
semi–structured interviews (see sub–chapter 2.3). 
2.2.2 Poll Analysis. 
 
In order to assess the feasibility of civil activism and its impact on public security policy-making 
it is not sufficient to analyse the media’s representations of citizen movements, it is eminently 
necessary to study and fully understand the political culture that prevails in Mexico. This is why, this 
thesis made use of, and analysed multiple datasets from different polls on convergent topics, 
including:  
v National Poll on Insecurity (ENSI) (in 2005, 2009, 2010). With an average of 70,200 
answers each year, it provides useful information on criminal activity across Mexico, 
particularly on the black figure of crimes.63  
v National Poll on Political Culture and Citizen Practices (ENCUP) (from 2001 to 2012), 
providing data on citizens’ (i.e. +18 years old) political participation in Mexico.64  
v Continuous National Poll on Public security Perception (ECOSEP) (April 2009 to June 
2013). With an average of 2,336 families interviewed each year (all interviewees being 
18 years old or older), it evaluates people’s perceptions of insecurity. 65 
                                                             
63 INEGI, “No Encuesta Nacional Sobre Inseguridad (ENSI)” (Mexico City, 2010), 
http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/encuestas/hogares/especiales/ensi/default.aspx 
(Accessed 22–12–2017). 
64 INEGI, “ENCUP Resultados de La Encuesta Nacional Sobre Cultura y Prácticas Ciudadanas 2008” (Mexico, 
2008), http://www.encup.gob.mx/ (Accessed 22–12–2017). 




v National Poll on Urban Public security (ENSU) (September 2013 to December 2014). A 
quarterly poll conducted across just one year that substituted the ECOSEP poll, focusing 
solely on highly populated urban areas and on citizens 18 years old and older.66  
v National Poll on Victimization and Perception on Public Security (ENVIPE) (from 2011 
to 2014). Replacing the ENSU to allegedly comply with international methodological 
standards. 67  
v National Polls on Political Culture (ENCUP), and the monthly Continuous Polls on 
Perception of Public Security (ECOSEP), measuring society and politicians’ perceptions 
on politics, insecurity and government efficiency.  
v the National Polls on Victimisation and Public Security (ENVIPE), conducted on an 
annual basis from 2011 to 2014. 
 
This part of the quantitative research posed important data limitations, though. For instance, 
different from the U.S.A., where government and multiple NGOs have historically conducted 
monthly polls in different matters; in Mexico polls are conducted on an irregular basis (e.g. ENCUP), 
or have been substituted by new ones following different methodologies. This not only impedes a 
consistent sampling, but also makes of accurate historical comparisons a difficult task to achieve. 
Taking this into account, as well as the fact that existing literature heavily relies on contingency 
tables, time–series and, Michelle Wolfe et al say, ‘simple specifications of linear models’ that do not 
permit uncovering the subtler parts of the agenda setting and bottom–up policy-making 
processes,68 this research implemented what is considers is a more complete analytical approach. 
In this vein, in order to avoid falling in the common error of ‘making theoretical assumptions based 
                                                             
66  INEGI, “Encuesta Nacional de Seguridad Pública Urbana (ENSU)” (Mexico City, 2014), 
http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/encuestas/hogares/regulares/ensu/default.aspx 
(Accessed 22–12–2017). 
67  INACIPE, “Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción Sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE)” (Mexico City, 
2014), http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/encuestas/hogares/regulares/envipe/ 
(Accessed 22–12–2017). 
68 Additionally, Yue Tan and David Weaver, who have systematically applied a quantitative approach to their 
work, have also regarded their findings as ‘simple speculations about the order in which the three agendas 
influence each other.’ Yue Tan and David Weaver, “Local Media, Public Opinion, and State Legislative 
Policies,” International Journal of Press/Politics 14, no. 4 (2009): 454, 470; Wolfe, Jones, and Baumgartner, 
“A Failure to Communicate: Agenda Setting in Media and Policy Studies,” 180; Soroka, “Policy Agenda–
Setting Theory Revisited: A Critique of Howlett on Downs, Baumgartner and Jones, and Kingdon,” 771. 
Walgrave and Van Aelst, “Political Agenda Setting and the Mass Media.” 
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[solely] on data, as if all people and situations were the same’,69 this thesis builds on Walgrave and 
Van Aelst, Soroka and Wolfe et al’s work to also develop the following set of interconnected 
qualitative analyses that allow identifying interactions, feedback effects and policy windows.70 
2.3 Qualitative analysis. 
2.3.1 Semi–structured interviews. 
 
In addition to the quantitative methods previously described, this research made use of elite 
interviews, as they represent a unique mechanism to learn from longings and experiences from 
those ones making, and those ones being affected by the politics here studied. In this vein, the 
researcher initially aimed to conduct 25 interviews:  
- Eight CSOs’ representatives: This group was part of the eight initially selected CSOs (see 
Chapter 2.1.) and was selected based on their level of presence in national media, perceived 
influence in national policy-making and participation in high–level political Summits on 
public security policy. However, as the research evolved, the list of pre–selected 
interviewees also changed (see Table 5 for the final list). These interviews provided first hand 
and up–to date (although not necessarily the most accurate) information on some of the 
most pressing societal demands in the sphere of public security.  
- Five Senators and Deputies member of the Congress’ commissions on public security: 
Different from the few existing studies on the topic, like Rogelio Hermosillo’s work, this thesis 
did not focus on the Presidential figure and its impact in policy-making. On the contrary, 
considering that ‘Mexico’s constitution makes of Congress the most powerful actor in law–
making,’ 71  it looked at the perceptions and actions of the Congress’ Parliamentary 
Commissions on Public Security towards citizens’’ involvement in public security making.72  
 
                                                             
69 Steve Hilton, Scott Bade, and Jason Bade, More Human : Designing a World Where People Come First, 1st 
Ed. (WH Allen, 2015), sec. Government. 
70 Wolfe, Jones, and Baumgartner, “A Failure to Communicate: Agenda Setting in Media and Policy Studies”; 
Soroka, “Policy Agenda–Setting Theory Revisited: A Critique of Howlett on Downs, Baumgartner and Jones, 
and Kingdon”; Walgrave and Van Aelst, “Political Agenda Setting and the Mass Media.”     
71  Benito Nacif, “Policy-making under Divided Government in Mexico,” 2003, 3, 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.472.9021&rep=rep1&type=pdf (Accessed 
22–12–2017). 
72 Rogelio Hermosillo, “Desarrollo de La Institucionalidad Pública Para La Participación de Las OSC En Políticas 
Públics,” in Agendas Ciudadanas Para El Fortalecimiento de La Sociedad Civil, 1st Ed. (Mexico City: Iniciativa 
Ciudadana y Desarrollo Social, Incide Social, A.C., 2007). 
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- 12 news reporters covering the Autodefensas and First Citizens Summit case–studies.  This 
would allow to identify and evaluate the role of the media as a mediator figure between 
bottom–up and top–down democratising forces. More importantly for this research, this 
would allow to contrast how key players in each sphere (politicians, activists, media and 
citizens) defined and perceived civil society’s effectiveness in each one of the case studies – 
information that is obviated through pure quantitative research. 
In order to conduct such interviews, this research built on Ricardo Bucio et al’s and Nick Fox and 
William Harvey’s’ work to pursue and arrange one to one meetings via e–mail and telephone.73 
Telephone interviews were discarded as, as noticed by Nick Fox and William Harvey, it is difficult to 
secure their appropriate recording and, therefore, their adequate a posteriori analysis.74 Having said 
this, securing all the initially aimed interviews proved to be particularly difficult, most especially in 
the case of politicians as they systematically rejected the interview requests for such a sensitive 
topic. Nonetheless, this research managed to conduct a total of 24 interviews with politicians, 
opinion makers and civil society leaders (see Table 5).  
Table 5. List of interviewees. 
Politicians 
Name Political Party Post Date 
1)Deputy Elizabeth 
Oswelia Yáñez Robles 
Partido Accion Nacional 
Secretary of the 
Legislative Commission 
on Public Security. 
4 October 2013 
2)Deputy Ana Isabel 
Allende Cano 
Partido de la Revolución 
Democrática 
Secretary of the 
Legislative Commission 
on Public Security. 
29 October 2013 
 
News Reporters 
Name Media Code Name in Thesis Date 
1)Juan Perez BBC Juan Perez 13 January 2014 
                                                             
73 Ricardo Bucio, Moises Rodriguez, and Ana Maria Sanchez, “Fondos Publicos a Organizaciones de La Sociedad 
Civil,” in Agendas Ciudadanas Para El Fortalecimiento de La Sociedad Civil, 1st Ed. (Mexico City: Iniciativa 
Ciudadana y Desarrollo Social, Incide Social, A.C., 2007), 152; Nick Fox, “Using Interviews in a Research 
Project” (Sheffield, 2009); William Harvey, “Strategies for Conducting Elite Interviews,” Qualitative 
Research 11, no. 4 (2011): 431–41. 







27 and 29 January 
2014. 




DD1 28 January 2014 
5) Raul Lopez Mendoza 
(murdered in Sept 
2014) 
Cambio de Michoacan Raúl López 28 January 2014 
6) Pablo Madriz Rojas 
(deceased in Sept 2013) 
La Ranchera Pablo Madriz 23 November 2012 
**Due to security risks, the interviewees explicitly requested their anonymity.    
CSOs’ representatives 
Name CSO / Institution (Post) 




México Unido Contra la 
Delincuencia (Programme 
Coordinator) 
Lisa Sánchez 10 October 2013 
2)Alejandro Martí S.O.S. México (President) Not included 4 November 2012 
3)Elías Kurí 
Iluminemos México  
(Director) 
Kurí 27 November 2012 
4)María Elena Morera 
Causa en Comun 
(President) 
Morera 4 November 2012 
5)Luis Wertman 
Consejo Ciudadano de 
Seguridad Pública de la 
Ciudad de México 
(President) 
Not included 6 November 2012 
6)Natalia Armijo CASEDE Not included 23 November 2012 
7) Homero Tapia Diaz 
Mexico Unido Contra la 
Delincuencia 




Homero Tapia 22 November 2012 
8) Edgar Baltazar 









All semi–structured face–to–face interviews, of 1 hour each on average, were conducted in the 
interviewees’ office, some of them were recorded (depending on the interviewees’ preference), in 
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order to create a trustable environment where they felt free to speak openly. Each one of the 
Interviewees was asked about his/her objective, utility and input towards state and society, opinion 
with regards to the relation between OCS and government, and policy proposals related to the two 
case studies (See Annex 1). Each interview was transcribed and analysed through NVIVO software.  
Having said this, it is necessary to acknowledge at least two facts related to the use of the 
information collected through the elite–interviews method. First, as argued by Catherine Pope and 
Nicolas Mays, ‘what people say might not necessarily be what they do.’75 By dealing with the 
politically controversial and sensitive matters of public security and bottom up–democracy, there is 
a risk that, on the one hand, civil society representatives could fall in the trap of providing misleading 
information, or exaggerating their political impact, in an effort to support their own existence.  On 
the other hand, whilst government officials of the political party(ies) in power are propense to 
supply positive pictures of government acting, those in opposition tend to provide negative 
accounts of government achievements. Therefore, the researcher needed to be cautious when using 
the information obtained through the above–mentioned interviews. Secondly, as pointed out by 
Prof. Michael Temple and Dr. Matthew Bishop, focusing the interviews on senior politicians, 
newspaper editors and Directors of CSOs could only reinforce the views of the Mexican elite in the 
country’s established top–down model of policy–making. In this vein, it is unfortunate to state that 
in Mexico’s scenario of political apathy (if not anti–politics), similar to that found in the UK by Paul 
Fawcett, Matthew Flinders et al., citizens’ passivity in public affairs (excluding social media 
experiences) has facilitated an inevitability of elites, where the elite does not encourage mass 
participation and where important decisions are being made at the highest levels.76 Therefore, as 
                                                             
75 Catherine Pope and Nicholas Mays in Jo Moriarty, “Qualitative Methods Overview” (London, 2011), 10, 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/41199/1/SSCR_Methods_Review_1–1.pdf (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
76 Paul Fawcett et al., eds., Anti–Politics, Depoliticization and Governance., 1st Ed (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2017). 
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this thesis seeks to analyse and understand how policy decisions are being made, it found it 
indispensable to take into account the opinions from – what could be regarded is – Mexico’s power 
elite: they (i.e. CSOs’ leaders) are the ones who have the financial capacity to organise social 
movements or manipulate political demonstrations, who define the continuity, expansion or 
shrinking of civil liberties (i.e. lawmakers), and the ones who – it has been argued – are capable of 
shaping, if not defying public opinion (i.e. journalists). Considering this unavoidable caveat, in order 
to prevent privileging particular insights over others as well as the elitization of this research, this 
thesis built on additional non–elite interviews (conducted between 2013 and 2014). Due to the 
sensitivity of the issue and the security risks that citizens faced when publicly expressing their views 
on the matter, it was only possible to conduct one focus group and a few one–to–one interviews 
with citizens in Michoacan: 
1. Vicar Gregorio Lopez, Apatzingan’s Vicar, and speaker of the Autodefensas movement.  
2. Member 1 of the Self–defence groups (SD1 from now on).**  
3. Member 2 of the Self–defence groups (SD2 from now on).**  
4. Focus group with five citizens from Apatzingan, Michoacan (FC1 from now on).** 
**Note: Due to security risks, the interviewees explicitly requested their anonymity.   
Nonetheless, each one of them provided first–hand data and inside knowledge on the structure, 
functioning and achievements of the autodefensas case–study, one of the most nebulous forms of 
citizens activism in Mexico’s recent history. Furthermore, in order to avoid the use of potentially 
biased information collected through elite–interviews, this thesis implemented complementary 
methods for data validation like direct observation through field work (see Chapter 2.3.2).  
Lastly, it is necessary to state that during the time this thesis was written, two of its valuable 
contributors (i.e. Journalist Raul Lopez Mendoza and Journalist Pablo Madrid Rojas) lost their lives, 
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and others subsequently requested their anonymity due to security concerns.77 Therefore, it is 
necessary to make sensible decisions about the information to be made public.  
2.3.2 Fieldwork: direct observation in a risky environment. 
 
The previous sub–chapters have described some of the research methods and tools applied in 
this work. For instance, similar to existing literature on the topic, this thesis builds on media 
accounts of citizens’ involvement in political discussions, national polls on citizens’ perceptions of 
insecurity and other reports from Mexican think tanks. Notwithstanding the value of the data 
obtained through this methods, Steve Hilton is correct when stating that ‘no set of data can 
substitute the intimated, nuanced knowledge that a policymaker should internalise by going out and 
experiencing the complexity of the world’ where politics is taking place, Steve Hilton says.78 To date, 
though, the existing analyses on Mexico’s public security problems make limited attempts at new 
empirical research.79 This is why, this thesis aims to make a distinctive contribution to the field by 
providing new evidence that informs public debates, but also challenges common assumptions of 
government-civil society interactions in policy-making, and one of the main routes to achieve this 
goal is through developing a more context-specific approach that captures the opinions not only of 
those who are making politics, but also of those who will be affected by their policies.  
For this reason, for Case Study 1 (i.e. the First Citizen Summit) the researcher travelled to Mexico 
City to experience and understand the security context in which the Summit was organised and took 
place. For example, which were the main social challenges, facilities provided or constrained 
                                                             
77  Francisco Castellanos, “Hallan Muerto a Reportero Gráfico Del Diario ‘Cambio de Michoacán,’” Proceso, 
September 21, 2014, http://www.proceso.com.mx/382697/hallan–muerto–a–reportero–grafico–del–
diario–cambio–de–michoacan (Accessed 22–12–2017); Redacción, “Michoacán: Muere En Accidente 
Periodista Que Presenció Asesinato de Diputado,” Proceso, September 15, 2013, 
http://www.proceso.com.mx/352878/michoacan–muere–en–accidente–periodista–que–presencio–
asesinato–de–diputado (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
78  Hilton, Bade, and Bade, More Human : Designing a World Where People Come First, sec. Government. 
79 Hallin and Mancini, Comparing Media Systems, 16. 
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imposed by government, or citizens’ attitudes towards the Summit? For Case Study 2, the 
autodefensas vigilante movement, where there is very limited academic scholarship on the matter, 
the researcher went out into the real world to blend in with the local communities affected by the 
armed movement. Across four weeks (12th–24th May 2013 – 19th to 31st January 2014) the researcher 
lived with journalists in the city of Apatzingan, joined public security officials during their 
reconnaissance missions across the towns of Nueva Italia and Uruapan, Michoacan, Mexico; and 
met with local citizens to understand their main needs and perceptions of bottom-up policy-making 
at a municipal and state levels. This fieldwork allowed the researcher to go beyond obtaining 
mediatised – and limited – representations of reality, to actually produce new information on: a) 
the socio–political conditions under which the autodefensas movement emerged, b) the impact that 
the autodefensas had on citizens and government decisions, and c) the role of government, media 
and civil society in the conflict.  
Overall, the unique blend of quantitative and qualitative research methods applied in this thesis 
not only permits analysing the ‘software’ (i.e. content, meaning and reasoning) of social action in 
politics, but also its ‘hardware’ component (i.e. actions and mechanisms) in policy-making.  More 
importantly, the conjunction of these analytical methods represents one of the most suitable 
mechanisms to link and study the relationship between Public sphere and Agenda setting theories 






                                                             
80 Some of the limited works on the matter include that from David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow. David Meyer 
and Sidney Tarrow, The Social Movement Society, ed. David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow (Oxford: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1996), 31. 
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Chapter 3. Theoretical Framework. 
 
This chapter details and analyses the state of the art in relation to two of the most relevant 
theoretical discussions through which scholars seek to understand the relationship between the 
public and political spheres, i.e. Habermas’ Public Sphere and McCombs and Shaw’s Agenda Setting 
frameworks. To do this, it departs from two major arguments:  
1. Public sphere: Public debate across an engaged citizenry is an essential 
component of both the public sphere and bottom–up policy-making, 
and media’s acting in these processes is of vast importance.  
 
2. Agenda setting: Social, media and government agendas are mutually 
influenced. Media, however, is a key determinant mediator. 
Therefore, the more salient a matter is to the media, the more it will 
be to the public (sphere) agenda and the more responsive government 
will be. 
This chapter is important in that it critically analyses existing westernised theoretical 
generalisations on civil society development, democratisation and media effects, as they have 
proved to operate very differently in dissimilar environments.81 For instance, the vast scholarship 
on media and civil society is mainly focused on the United States, France, Great Britain and Germany 
cases, nevertheless, Daniel Hallin and Pablo Mancini argue, there is a tendency to apply it in 
countries with less developed traditions of media research.82  With ‘few theoretical attempts having 
been made to investigate potential linkages between a broad range of theories on agenda setting 
and policy creation’, even less to test them in young democracies in developing countries like 
Mexico, this chapter builds on two theoretical lenses: the public sphere and agenda setting 
theories.83  Whilst this thesis does not attempt to create a grand theory of public policy, it does aim 
                                                             
81 Johnson, “Ambivalence, Political Engagement and Context,” 518. 
82 Surprisingly, the authors themselves focus their research on the usual cases of Europe and U.S.A. Daniel 
Hallin and Paolo Mancini, Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 1–20.  
83 Christoph Knill and Jale Tosun, Public Policy: A New Introduction (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 285. 
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to advance in the understanding of the production of social demands, their communication to the 
political sphere and transformation into public policy by government institutions. 
3.1. Public sphere 
 
The idea of a communal, civil or popular life has been at the core of political analyses throughout 
time. Aristotle, for instance, stated that man is by nature a political animal and that all persons 
achieve the highest sense of purpose to the polis by means of their fullest possible engagement in 
it. Cicero envisaged the notion of a res publica, where the people’s political involvement impacted 
on the discussion and implementation of ideals of justice, equality and democracy. Contemporary 
scholars like Manuel Castells, Eamonn Callan and Catherine Martin, continue acknowledging the 
importance of forums for political engagement in the development of modern societies. 84 
Therefore, the analysis of Mexico’s and any other contemporary public sphere requires 
understanding its connection to the basic principles of democratic and inclusive public discussions, 
civil society’s development and public–government interactions, all of them connected through the 
media. 
3.1.1 The defining foundations of the public sphere 
 
The public sphere emerged and, Habermas says, had its golden age in the XVIII century. 85  With 
the State apparatus beginning to absorb socio political functions and responsibilities, and citizens’ 
financial contributions becoming indispensable for its survival, the public felt the need to restrain 
the State’s power and develop its capacity to demand governmental accountability. This not only 
                                                             
84 Cathie Martin and Duane Swank, The Political Construction of Business Interests: Coordination,Growth and 
Equality, ed. Margaret Levi (Mexico City: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Eamonn Callan, Creating 
Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
85 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 86. 
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moved the decision-making power from an the absolute ruling monarch to the nation–state 
institutions, but also promoted the appearance of new forms of political participation. 86 
Furthermore, Celia del Palacio argues, the emergence of coffee houses and the invention of printing 
favoured the creation and dissemination of knowledge and opinion.87 Citizenry gradually stopped 
being defined by terms of ownership and social class, and progressively became engaged in politics 
and started fighting for more civil rights.88 With increasing public discussions among ordinary people 
(i.e. every tax payer) in a common space, separated and independent from the state, a public sphere 
started to flourish.  
The public sphere, therefore, emerged as the link between communities and polities, where 
members of society started to understand themselves,  form an association –not constituted by its 
political structure– to deliberate, discuss and engage in matters of common interest, and produce a 
common mind, public opinion, or public agenda about them.89 However, it should not only be 
regarded as a communicative practice, it goes beyond, as it encompasses and intends to put the 
State in touch with the needs of society, and vice versa. It is the space where society reaffirms its 
leadership, control or predominance over the State:  
‘It is the space of communication of ideas and projects that emerge from 
society and are addressed to the decision makers in the institutions of 
society.’ 90  It allows ‘ordinary people to become involved in making 
decisions about how a country should be run.’ 91 It is the only channel by 
                                                             
86  Celia Del Palacio, “Esfera Pública y Prensa: Inicios de Periodismo En Guadalajara (1809–1835),” 
Comunicación y Sociedad 31 (1997): 131. 
87 Del Palacio, 131. 
88 J Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public sphere: An Inquiry Into a Category of Bourgeois 
Society. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989). 
89 Nitoiu, “The European Public Sphere: Myth, Reality or Aspiration?,” 28; Stuart Hall et al., Policing the Crisis. 
Mugging, the State and Law and Order., ed. Jock Young and Paul Walton, Policing the Crisis (London: The 
Macmillan Press Ltd, 1978), 63, https://colectivociajpp.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/stuart–hall–etc–
policing–the–crisis–mugging–the–state–and–law–and–order–critical–social–studies–1978.pdf (Accessed 
22–12–2017); a. Linklater, “Public Spheres and Civilizing Processes,” Theory, Culture & Society 24, no. 4 
(July 1, 2007): 31–37, https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276407080091. 
90 Dahlgren, Television and the Public sphere: Citizenship, Democracy and the Media, 8. 
91 D Alan McKee, The Public sphere: An Introduction (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 4–8, 7.  
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which citizens can shape the policies of the state and the development of 
society as a whole.’92  
 
Therefore, Cristian Nitoiu and Hans–Jörg Trenz consider the public sphere a central feature of 
any democracy, ‘a promoter of good and accountable governance.’ 93  It is the communication 
structure – Charles Taylor would say ‘common space’ – ‘where anybody with a certain degree of 
knowledge and a critical capacity participates in public discussions, deliberates without being 
subject to coercion and contributes to the formation of public opinion to set what is just for the 
general interest and influence political decisions’ –an opinion also echoed by Alan McKee.94 In other 
words, the public sphere is where the public agenda is created. 
 
In sum, the notion, definition and scope of the public sphere has evolved throughout time and 
contexts. Whilst, during the XVII century the idea of ‘public’ was almost a synonym of ‘state–related’ 
or ‘public authority’, 100 years later it involved a bourgeoisie vision including only an enlightened 
minority, or literate–educated strata.  Currently, Habermas states, it is understood as, and it is 
formed by, a larger group of uneducated people, to the extent that it has become a certain type of 
plebeian public sphere. 95  Notwithstanding the variations on its understanding and scope of 
expression, it is undeniable that the basis of the public sphere is a top–down democratic 
development that recognises the existence of an autonomous society.  Many arguments accompany 
                                                             
92  Manuel Castells, “The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, and Global 
Governance.,” Annals 616 (2008).  
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and support this statement. Carl Boggs, for instance, states that the public sphere is the supreme 
space where ‘social movements and transformative politics, civic discourse and an engaged 
citizenry’ converge with emancipator visions and emergent forms of self–governance; two of the 
main engines and characteristics of a bottom–up and participative democracy’.96  For this, however, 
other democratic conditions, need to co–exist:97 
1) Aligned to what Peter Dahlgren considers the ‘civic culture’, Nitoiu and 
Trenz state that ‘information should be free’.98  
2) For a ‘citizenly raised’ decision to be valid, it must be assured that 
everyone affected by it can understand and accept the consequences 
of its observance.99  
3) In order to guarantee the above, government should be an active 
promoter of open citizen debates.100 This, as the functions, institutions 
and instruments of the public sphere de facto ‘spelled out by law’, as 
it is law who sets the basic rights concerning the sphere of the 
public.’101  
 
Similarly, Habermas and Cohen describe a sort of ‘ideal deliberative process’ involving the 
following key aspects:102  
1) Ideal speech situation: all speakers should enjoy an equal 
opportunity to speak; the exchange of arguments should be free, 
equal, plural and inclusive and, in principle, any deliberation should 
be considered procedurally democratic, fair and legitimate.  
2) Discourse ethics: Impartial deliberations should justify positions by 
means of arguments, be open to the participation of other 
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deliberators, be truthful, frame arguments in terms of the common 
good and aim to eventually achieve rational consensus. 
3) Free and reasoned agreement among equals. 
 
These conditions or processes indicate that – firstly – in order to influence, force concessions, or 
make a change in agreements and actions from the ruler; citizens, organised in society, need to be 
exposed to and be capable of exchanging, rational–critical, but also antagonistic arguments.  
Therefore, with only a very limited number of citizens having direct access to political actors, the 
media becomes ‘the best proxy and location of expression of the public sphere’, even its ‘chief 
institution’, Hall et al argue.103 In other words, the media becomes the main accessible source of 
‘information on public affairs and discussions.’ 104 This is why, Claes Vreese argues, ‘any study of the 
public sphere  should have the media as an inevitable component.’105 Secondly, for the public sphere 
to develop, it is not sufficient that citizens passively receive information, there needs to be an 
engaged citizenry and citizens need to create their own public agenda.  They need to identify 
problems across the information they receive, amplify their social relevance and dramatize them in 
order to engage expressive action, appeal to the generality of the population and champion 
common sense from technocrats and bureaucrats.106  
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Yet, these processes presuppose the existence of democratic top–down and bottom–up forces 
that trigger and facilitate the rise of an energetic society capable of working alongside government 
in policy decisions. Part of this assumes the prevalence of an independent press providing ‘an 
agenda that fosters enlightened democratic participation and citizenry.’107 A media that fulfils what 
Stefaan Walgrave et al, Roger Cobb and Elder Charles would see as its raison d’être: provide 
unbiased newsworthy information, educate the people and connect the public with the political 
sphere as part of a cyclical process of reinforcement of the public sphere.108 Conditions that seem 
perfectly adequate in ‘free’ and full democracies like the UK, home country to the second most 
trusted news source in the world, where civil rights are fully respected, almost 9% of the 
economically active population (EAP) work in the third sector and were media freedom ranks among 
the top best 40 countries in the globe. 109  However, in developing, partially free and flawed 
democracies the panorama is a different one. In Mexico, civil society is so constrained that less than 
0.5% of its EAP works in the not-for-profit sector, media freedom is ranked as one of the worst in 
the world and the main news outlets are perceived are considered to be Latin America’s second 
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most officialism media.110 Cases like Mexico, thus, have led to criticisms of the effectiveness of a 
public sphere.  
3.1.2 Empirical challenges and criticisms to established theoretical notions. 
 
Important empirical and theoretical arguments present important challenges to the 
development of a public sphere like the one described in the previous sub-chapter. Some of the 
most important ones include: 
1) The formal rules of the old public sphere are now part of the informal 
ones of the contemporary public sphere. 
2) The commercialisation of the media could lead to elite monologues. 
3) Opinion leaders not challenging but contributing to the inevitability 
of the elites. 
 
3.1.2.1 The formal rules of the old public sphere are now part of the informal ones of the 
contemporary public sphere. 
 
Although it is true that the notion of the public sphere has expanded throughout time (i.e. in 
terms of who can and is capable of being part of it), it seems that the formal rules of the old public 
sphere are now part of the informal ones of the contemporary public sphere. In this vein, political 
discussions, Carl Boggs says, ‘have always been [and continue to be] the domain of elites, quite 
remote from the life rhythms of ordinary citizens.’111 While in the XVII century only those propertied 
–or in Mexico’s case those who knew how to read and write– were able to participate in public 
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debates; in the XXI century, Werner Holly states, the same power elites continue dominating the 
flow of political communication, debates and the public sphere.112 Bureaucrats and the deputies of 
the State continue being the political actors par excellence. With better access to political 
participation schemes, Dan Bulley and Victor Perez–Diaz argue, these actors leave the secondary 
players (e.g. peasants, workers, masses) with only limited access to public opinion.113 Referendums, 
popular votes and consultations by which citizens expect to decide the fate of major issues are 
already dominated by these rich, powerful and established political actors, Todd Donovan says.114 
For this reason, Manuel Castells says, the notion and impact of citizenry has been reduced to 
election periods which – going back to Perez–Diaz and Matthew Crozat’s work –  are nevertheless a 
blunt instrument of political participation.115 They are shaped by political interest groups with the 
power of narrowing the available political options at their convenience, Castells says.116 A condition 
that becomes even more pronounced in countries with fragile democratic institutions like Mexico, 
where key political –and exclusionist– players continue occupying a privileged role in defining the 
country’s economic and political agendas. 117  Therefore, contrary to Coleman, Hall, Taylor and 
Akman’s arguments (see Section 3.1.1) it seems that, as stated by Peter Dahlgren, ‘the role of the 
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public is currently being displaced by private and government forces, and the public sphere is in 
decline.’118 
Regarding the media’s input in the democratic development of the public sphere and the 
‘triangular relation’ between democracy, public opinion and media of which Octavio Ruiz talks 
about, Perez–Diaz and Richard Sparks state that a free unrestricted press plays a prominent role in 
the public sphere and in any modern society. 119 In fact, both argue, the media is ‘one of the main 
ways in which our kind of society talks about itself and its future.’120 It is ‘the most tangible and 
immediate expression of political attention to the public sphere,’121 it influences, structures, and 
shapes public opinion, legitimises different patterns of behaviour and rules within the ‘political 
public sphere.’122 Nevertheless, there is not always a positive linkage between media development 
and the strengthening of the public sphere.  In fact, contemporary studies point towards the 
existence of a restrictive media, with predetermined outcomes, acting in detriment of the public 
sphere. Temple, for instance, argues that the media has passed from being a ‘provider of 
information’ and an ‘educator or instructor’ of the public, to ‘a dealer of public opinion’, ‘tickling the 
public’ and –Habermas would say– allowing privileged private interests to invade the public 
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sphere123.  With media being ‘the field of cultural production most susceptible to money and power’, 
elite groups are now also capable of developing a ‘top down’ flow of political opinion, and Mexico 
is clear example of this.124 Although there are 297 public channels across the country, only 8.9% of 
TV viewers regard them as their preferred one(s), whilst the private media duopoly, with over 532 
channels across Mexico (i.e. 94% of the commercial channels in Mexico), dominates the population’s 
preferences.125 With the preponderance of commercial channels, Mexican scholars and politicians 
have expressed their concern about the media’s capacity to ‘manipulate public opinion’ and provide 
‘disguised political propaganda.’126  
3.1.2.2 . The commercialisation of the media could lead to elite monologues. 
 
In its constant search for accurate, up–to date and relevant information, media tends to give 
preponderance to the opinions of those in high–status and powerful socio–political positions who, 
it is assumed, have more accurate and specialised information. Nonetheless, by recruiting the 
powerful, Jessica Erbe, Peter Madsen and others argue, media reproduces and reinforces the 
                                                             
123 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public sphere: An Inquiry Into a Category of Bourgeois 
Society., 185; Temple, “Civic and Audience Empowerment: The Role of Citizen Journalism,” 233–47. 
124 Bessant, “The Political in the Age of the Digital: Propositions for Empirical Investigation”; Temple, “Civic 
and Audience Empowerment: The Role of Citizen Journalism”; R Benson and E Neveu, Bourdieu and the 
Journalistic Field, ed. Rodney Benson and Erik Neveu (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0196859906287771; Bulley, “Producing and Governing Community.” 
125 Zocalo, “Quiénes, Cuántos y En Dónde Controlan La Televisión Mexicana,” Zocalo, November 3, 2011, 
https://mediocracia.wordpress.com/2011/11/03/quienes–cuantos–y–en–donde–controlan–la–
television–mexicana/ (Accessed 22–12–2017); Ruy Alonso, “9 Datos Sobre El Consumo de TV En México,” 
El Economista, August 11, 2016, http://eleconomista.com.mx/industrias/2016/08/11/9–datos–sobre–
consumo–tv–mexico (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
126 Claudia Sheinbaum, “La Réplica Es Un Derecho Social, Plantean Las Adelitas a Televisa,” La Jornada, April 
12, 2008, http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2008/04/12/index.php?section=politica&article=006n1pol 
(Accessed 22–12–2017); Rocío Galarza, “Clase Política y Medios: Explorando El Fenómeno de La Publicidad 





existing structure of power.127 This not only makes of the already powerful the primary definers of 
public discussions, but also produces serial monologues between elite groups rather than a real 
dialogue between all actors. 128  As a result, Bessant argues, the elite groups are capable of 
developing a top–down flow of political opinion, promoting or championing a specific view of 
politics and economics.129  
These arguments not only dispute those who ensure that ‘the role of the press is always to 
challenge dominant ideologies’ and that ‘media has certain duties within democracy.’130 They also 
show that in systems where far more people receive opinions than define them, a public sphere 
cannot produce anything else than what Habermas describes as a ‘quasi–public sphere’.131  There 
is, therefore, a clear need to reflect on the understanding and study of the public sphere, its socio–
political effects and scope, and the players that conform to it and interact within it, particularly when 
studying policy-making processes in relatively unstudied political scenarios like Mexico. It is 
necessary to question whether the public sphere acts as a method of enlightenment (linking 
communities and polities), or as a control mechanism over the disadvantaged through simulacrums 
of political engagement – as argued by Temple, Conaghan and Mancini. Consequently, it is 
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mandatory to consider the mutually influential relations across a variety of players, including civil 
society itself, which, Thomas Risse argues, can also fall into the trap of an inevitability of elites.132  
3.1.2.3 . Opinion leaders not challenging but contributing to the inevitability of the elites. 
 
Although no study on the subject has been conducted in Mexico, according to Risse’s analyses on 
‘European transnational identities and public spheres’, opinion leaders – regarded by society as part 
of the non-political community and independent from entrenched groups – tend to consume and 
respond more to media reports than average citizens. By doing so, Risse argues, they inadvertently 
become ‘socially legitimate transmission agents’, or interpreters of the media, shaping the public 
sphere in accordance to the messages they receive and seize from media and the powerful groups 
behind them.133 With the media and social activists being immersed in this vicious circle, where elite 
defines the information shared, it seems that influencing the public sphere is almost an unattainable 
task for the disadvantaged groups. Therefore, it is imperative for this thesis to explore whether the 
disadvantaged citizens and the ‘non–unified’ social movements can influence the public sphere in 
Mexico as elite does (see Chapters 5 and 6).  
 
Having analysed the evolution of the public sphere throughout time, as well as pinpointed the 
main challenges for its adequate functioning as an influential force over the public and government 
agenda, the next sub-chapter contextualises this theoretical analysis by looking at the few studies 
on the public sphere that have been conducted in Mexico.  
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3.1.3 Studies on the public sphere in Mexico. 
 
Mexican scholars of the public sphere have attempted to study some of the matters outlined in 
the previous section.  Nonetheless, by conducting isolated studies that focus on singular processes 
(e.g. communication practices) or actors (e.g. CSOs), their conclusions do not permit understanding 
the relation between the public sphere, a rebirth of civil society and the development of a bottom-
up democratic governance.  
To begin with, Celia Del Palacio’s work provides an interesting historical assessment of the public 
sphere in the City of Guadalajara, Mexico, between 1809 and 1835. Recognising that the notion of 
public opinion is linked to the public sphere, Del Palacio describes how during the XIX century media 
regarded itself as the ‘speaker, representative, even creator of public opinion’ in Mexico. 134 During 
the 1800s the printer was, she says, ‘the tribune for ideological combat’ in Mexico. It was through 
news journals that outrage against the establishment and citizen involvement in the battle for 
Independence were instigated and coordinated, but at the same time, it was through these 
specialised texts that an informal but entrenched distinction was created between non–readers and 
readers, actors and spectators (Table 6): 
Table 6. Media: differentiating between inhabitants and citizens in Mexico’s public sphere. 
Readers: who use media as an instrument for 
opinion formation and faction consolidation. 
Non–readers 
Public: where thinking and reasoning are 
necessary conditions. 
Multitude: anyone empathetic with the cause. 
Actors: those attempting to directly influence 
the course of political events, identify 
problems, propose solutions and mould others’ 
opinions. 
Spectators are those who follow the actors’ 
decisions, and whose acts are aligned to them.  
 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from Del Palacio, “Esfera Pública y Prensa: Inicios de 
Periodismo En Guadalajara (1809–1835),” 124. 
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Building on the importance of the media as information disseminator but also as trigger of debates 
and organiser of the public sphere –at least during times of Independence;  Del Palacio concludes 
that the Mexico of the XIX century was divided in two main groups: a) the people, forming ‘the 
plebs’, and b) government owned by ‘the patricians’, the most illustrious, richest, and socially 
influential members.135  Through her analysis, Del Palacio’s study provides an interesting picture of 
the development of the public sphere of Mexico of the XIX century. Her conclusions on the degree 
of citizens’ involvement and importance in the public sphere, depending on their level of 
understanding and usage of the media, represent an interesting point of departure for this thesis: 
whilst the notion and scope of the public sphere in Mexico have evolved throughout time, it seems 
that Mexicans have not yet transcended their role as spectators to become active citizens in policy-
making processes.  
In contrast to Del Palacio, Octavio Ruiz focuses on contemporary Mexico, offering a brief 
comparative assessment of the public sphere’s communication function. Ruiz’s work is important as 
it tacitly recognises some of the theoretical pillars of this thesis:  
a)  ‘talking about public opinion without referring to Habermas and his 
model’, is almost impossible.136  
b) civil society and public opinion affect the usefulness and 
effectiveness of public policies, and ‘democratisation depends on the 
strengthening of organised societal actors and their progressive 
control over state and society.’137  
 
Maria Varela interestingly followed a different path by focusing on the socio–political freedoms 
and limitations surrounding the public sphere in Mexico. Looking at women’s civil and political 
empowerment, Varela states that equal gender participation in the public sphere in Mexico is still 
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regarded a concession rather than a right.138 By comparing the levels of education, poverty and 
political participation between men and women, Varela argues that although Mexico’s current legal 
framework has been designed to topple the barriers for women’s political participation, informal 
practices sustain political inequality. Varela’s work is relevant for this thesis in that it illustrates the 
importance of inclusive channels of socio-political participation in the consolidation of a truly public 
– rather than ‘quasi-public’– sphere.  
Few other scholarly accounts have focused on the Mexican case. Yet, as noticed by Fox, most of 
them concentrate on traditional forms of democratic expression (i.e. electoral competition), rather 
than looking at richer and more nebulous forms of bottom–up democracy.139 For instance, despite 
explicitly recognising this problem at the beginning of their work, Alberto Olvera and Peter Ward  
end by almost entirely focusing their work on the study of electoral processes in Mexico.140 Similarly, 
although Joaquín Osorio–Goicochea entitles his work Political parties, legislative power and civil 
society in Mexico, the scholar devotes most of his work to develop a sustained criticism of the 
political parties system, and only briefly analyses the importance of civil society in the legislative 
processes.141 
 
The theoretical challenges outlined in the first part of this chapter, as well as the limited literature 
on the public sphere in Mexico evidence the need for new and contextualised studies that not only 
reflect on the public sphere’s capacity to influence political decisions, but also analyse the conditions 
that hinder or promote its development in non-democratic scenarios. In this vein, whilst Habermas’ 
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Public Sphere theory permits studying the mutually influential relation between public and media 
agendas, and its impact on the definition of social demands, it does not allow uncovering how these 
citizenly-raised demands become matters of public policy. Therefore, it is necessary to create a 
theoretical bridge that permits closing the cycle between the generation of public demands and 
their implementation through governmental action. This is why the next sub-chapter looks at the 
McCombs and Shaw agenda setting framework. 
3.2. The Agenda setting. 
 
‘Not every matter becomes public and not all public issues become subject to governmental 
action’, Amparo Casar and Claudia Maldonado say.142 Therefore, understanding how certain events 
and demands become public problems and government concerns helps to fill the knowledge gap on 
policy-making that the public sphere theory does not address. Building on this, this section seeks to 
cover the most relevant components of the agenda-setting theory to illustrate its key value for this 
thesis.  
3.2.1 Foundations of the agenda–setting theory. 
 
The agenda setting framework was envisaged as a ‘highly detailed map of the mass media agenda 
and its effects.’143 Having its origins on Lippmann’s Public Opinion work, stating that ‘news media 
acts as our window to the vast world beyond direct experience, determining our cognitive maps of 
that world’, it was expanded by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw to convert it into ‘one of the 
most influential approaches in political communication studies.’144  
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The media ‘plays an important part in shaping political reality, readers learn not only about a 
given issue, but also how much importance to attach to that issue’, McCombs and Shaw said in their 
seminal work The Agenda setting function of the mass media.145 This connection made between 
social developments, media actions and governmental decisions, made of McCombs and Shaw’s 
framework one of the most suitable models to study ‘the process by which problems become salient 
as political matters meriting the attention of the polity.’146  
By bridging the agenda-setting framework with the works of Harold Laswell, Curtis MacDoughall 
and others, it becomes possible to understand the cycle by which public issues become newsworthy 
items and even subjects of discussion at government institutions, and the following two key maxims 
serve as the perfect introduction for the explanation of the agenda setting framework’s role in this 
thesis: 
- Who says what, to whom, in what channel, with what effect?147 
As argued by Curtis MacDougall, billions of events occur at any given moment, 
producing too much information that not all of it is known by the 
population. 148  Only the information (i.e. what) that receives preferential 
treatment and diffusion (channel) succeeds in becoming an ‘event’ capable of 
attracting socio–political attention (effect over whom).  
 
- Politics is about who gets what, when and how?149 
The political system is an ‘input–output model where demands are articulated 
by different groups, channelled into the political system by aggregators and 
transformed into outputs’ (policies, decisions and actions).150  
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Being a multi–faceted framework about the transfer of salience among agendas, it is necessary 
to analyse its characteristics layer by layer, just as proposed by McCombs. Therefore, the following 
sub-chapters obey the following order: 
3.2.2. media agenda  
3.2.3. public agenda  
3.2.4. political agenda  
3.2.2 The media agenda. 
 
The media agenda is perhaps the most well researched ‘unit’ of the agenda setting framework, 
particularly across western advanced democracies where freedom of expression is, or at least is 
assumed to be, guaranteed and actively promoted by government. Nevertheless, as noticed by 
McCombs, limited attention has been devoted to Latin American case studies, imposing barriers to 
the analysis of the topic, this is why this section is based on existing Anglo–Saxon literature.151  
Based on his analyses on the U.S.A. case, McCombs argues that the study of the processes and 
actors influencing the media agenda can be compared to the action of ‘peeling an onion’ made of 
four layers (see Figure 1):152  
1) news sources 
2) leading news media agencies 
3) news norms   
4) media agenda 
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Figure 1. The ‘peeling an onion’ metaphor of the agenda setting. 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with data from McCombs, Setting the agenda: the mass media and 
public opinion, 2008. 
 
1. News sources. In the USA case, McCombs argues, this layer is dominated by the Presidential figure 
as everything done by the person in office is considered newsworthy. However, other factors and 
actors influence this layer too. According to Brian Fogarty, Senators with important institutional 
positions also receive a high level of media attention.153 Through press releases, conferences and 
bills’ sponsorship, these actors reach the media and position a topic into its agenda, especially when 
running for higher office.154 Public information officers occupy a privileged position too, particularly 
during political campaigns, when they set up to 32% of the agendas of major newspapers like the 
New York Times and The Washington Post.155 Unsurprisingly, the political actors’ influence over 
media agendas varies from country to country. Considering the case of political parties, McCombs 
found that while in the 1984 U.S.A. presidential campaigns there was a correlation of +0.31 between 
the political parties’ agenda and the national television agenda, in the case of the 1983 British 
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general election, the correlation was much more relevant: +0.70. This, McCombs says, is a 
consequence of the differences in journalism traditions. While in the UK elections are automatically 
considered newsworthy, in the former the value or worthiness of the elections is compared with 
other matters of the day. 156  In the case of Mexico there is more limited scholarship and no 
equivalent data to compare with, but two of the few and more recent studies on the topic point 
towards a bigger correlation. First, Manuel Guerrero et al found that, notwithstanding Mexico’s 
democratic advances in the last 20 years, media outlets sustain a ‘conveniently pro–government’ 
approach, publishing up to 100% supportive news items that follow the government’s agenda.157 
Secondly, in their studies on Mexico and Colombia, Mary Alzate and Gerardo Romo identified that 
the political agenda dominated the agenda of local media.158 Overall, the scholarship suggests that 
politicians greatly lead the media on government matters (e.g. defence and foreign affairs) and 
prominent matters (e.g. economic and social policy ones), but the political agenda is led by the 
media on sensational matters (e.g. law and order and the environment).159 
Politicians, though, are just one of many sources of information. In fact, as explained in the next 
point, bigger media corporations can also define the agenda of smaller and more local media 
outlets. 
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2. Leading news media agencies. According to Fogarty ‘inter-media agenda-setting’ model, 
leading/elite news corporations influence the agenda of local or smaller news agencies.160 Through 
news agencies’ dispatches, leading agencies not only share their articles with others, but can also 
reach a wider audience by being quoted by other media.161 For instance, The New York Times 
influences the U.S.A. Associated Press, and consequently other newspapers and television 
networks, whilst in Spain, the Spanish newspaper El Pais has developed a collaborative relation with 
the Spanish edition of the American Herald Tribune.162 
 
3. Social norms and traditions of journalism. Questions about what happened, but also where did 
‘that’ happen and how close ‘that’ is to the outlet’s audience, play an important part in determining 
what editors would consider newsworthy. In this vein, for an item to be considered newsworthy, it 
should involve unusual information, come from the correct and reliable channels, relate to famous 
or high status persons and be ratified by one major newspaper as newsworthy.163 As a result, crime 
news are ‘a gift to all the news–hungry editors, engravers and others who depended on exciting the 
public’s imagination to turn a profit’. Crime stories are news worthy by definition.164  
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3.2.2.1 Influencing the media agenda. 
 
‘Information control is the key for the exercise of power’, a control that, José Candon argues, is 
dominated to the largest extent by media outlets. ‘Media is where power is created’, he adds.165 
With the media framing public and political discussions, politicians, social movements and power 
groups are engaged in a struggle to attract the media’s attention, influence its agenda and define a 
social reality.166 Nevertheless, as noticed by Pamela Shoemaker and Stephen Reese, and Karen 
Lancerdorfer and Byoungkwan Lee, very little scholarly attention has been devoted to this part of 
the process.167  Some of the few studies on the matter includes those of Candon, Lydia Valera, and 
Kevin Carrage and Wim Roefs. Focusing on civil society’s impact on the media agenda, the scholars 
found that ‘access to media is an unequally distributed good: whereas political elites generally 
obtain access almost automatically, social movements face many obstacles.’ 168  Nevertheless, 
Candon argues, there is room for manoeuvre. With media being inclined to cover ‘programmed 
events in which a visible leader of a formal organisation clearly expresses its position towards a 
specific policy’, CSOs – particularly the more critical of government – could find an entry point to 
influencing the media agenda.169 Anne Russell also found that CSOs can gain further media coverage 
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by simplifying their message and developing a close coordination with government officials, a 
conclusion that challenges Candon’s argument suggesting that large collective actions that 
challenge the status quo enjoy a better media coverage.170 In addition to this, Shoemaker and Reese 
have also produced a sort of ‘blueprint’ for influencing the media agenda:171  
v Using people who are already prominent across social and political 
spheres;  
v Approaching newspapers and magazines over television and radio, as 
the latter are more sensitive to the need to make a profit;  
v Reaching to upper level media managers living close to the actor’s 
(CSO, politician, etc.) geographic zone of influence, as they are more 
prone to transmit local news and editorials; 
v Knowing and adapting to the media’s organisation routines, from 
production of media releases to timing of press conferences; 
v Approaching media in ‘slow news days’ and months.  
 
Few, though, would claim that media influencing really works in such an orderly, linear way.  
3.2.2.2 Summing up. 
 
Building on the arguments presented in this sub-chapter, it could be argued that it would be 
reductionist to assume that media builds its agenda free from any social or political influence. In 
other words, neglecting the influence of external sources (e.g. elites, advocates and movements) in 
the build–up of the media agenda would be simply an exaggeration of journalistic autonomy.172 
‘Journalists frame matters, but indubitably, their interpretations are shaped by discourses external 
to the news organisation.’173 Therefore, it could be argued, ‘the best way to understand the role of 
the news media, including its agenda, is to view it as a part of a larger contest among political 
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antagonists for the control of the public agenda.’ 174  This is why the following analysis of the 
theoretical functioning of the public agenda becomes crucial for understanding the medullar 
connection between the public sphere and agenda setting frameworks, one of the key elements of 
this research. 
3.2.3 Public agenda setting. 
 
The public agenda ‘is comprised of all the matters that the members of a political community 
deem as sufficiently important to attract public attention or interest and which fit within the 
legitimate jurisdiction of the existing government authority.’175 For Mary Alzate and Gerardo Romo, 
it needs to be understood as a construction process composed of two intrinsically connected 
relations, one bottom–up (i.e. from citizens to government) and another top–down (formed by 
socio–political relations that incentivise social and governmental action). As such, the public agenda 
is the inevitable starting point of any political agenda and public policy. 
With the public agenda being defined by popular sentiments, social demands and institutional 
frameworks,176 the processes involved in communicative practices, the generation of consensus for 
topic prioritisation and transmission of complex messages also become important determinants of 
the public agenda.177 Consequently, a vast literature demonstrates that media is the main source of 
information for citizens, society and government, illustrating that, to a large extent, the public 
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agenda is determined by the media.178 In the UK, for instance, about 9 in 10 people regard television 
as their main source of information, whilst in Mexico 73% of the population is of the same opinion.179  
The media is, then, ‘perhaps the most important space in which communicative interaction 
among citizens can take place, and the mechanism by which citizens can influence each other.’180 
Therefore, ‘in an adequate information environment citizens enjoy more opportunities to learn 
about politics.’181 Yet, this environment heavily depends on media coverage, which, in turn, gives 
journalists the capacity to ‘significantly influence their audience’s picture of the world.’182 In other 
words, involuntarily and voluntarily media directors, editors and journalists are capable of limiting 
public deliberation and the development of an informed and broader public opinion. Involuntarily 
as, with limited available space, media editors, directors and journalists give preference to certain 
topics over others and decide which items are deemed to be considered newsworthy.183 Voluntarily, 
as marketing targets have become more important than editorial goals, reason why media directors, 
choose to focus on items that would sell more newspapers than on those that are more relevant for 
the public good.184  
Due to this voluntary and involuntary media bias, a scholarly debate has emerged on the 
relationship between media agenda and its positive or negative impact over public opinion and 
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public agenda-setting. On the one hand, scholars like Michael Howlett have emphatically stated that 
media content cannot be equated to, nor used as a surrogate for, public agenda, as not everything 
the public knows and is talking about is part of the media content.185 On the other hand, Joseph 
Klapper has challenged the media’s capacity to influence the public agenda, by arguing that 
‘personal experience can be a more powerful teacher than mass media when matters have a direct 
impact on people’s lives.’186 Klapper’s ‘minimal effects’ theory, however, has been regarded by 
some as ‘one of the most noticeable embarrassments of modern social science.’187 Harold Zucker, 
James Winter and Chain Eyal are some of the scholars who have refuted Klapper’s arguments by 
stating that ‘the agenda of the news media does become the agenda of the public’ to a considerable 
degree.188 McCombs’ studies have shown that the news media agenda has a long–lasting effect over 
the public agenda of up to 26 weeks (See Annex 2).189 For Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson and 
Hazel Gaudet – and to a lesser extent for Stevens and Karp – the causal relation also seems to be 
clear.190 Extensive literature around the U.S.A case study supports this premise too. Salma Ghanem’s 
study on the media coverage of crime in the US in the 1990s showed a positive correlation of +0.73 
between media agenda and public agenda.191 Others, such as David Weaver and Doris Graber have 
suggested that on the specific case of crime, media has more influence over public agenda and 
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public opinion than personal experiences.192 And Gross and Aday’s analysis of crime in Washington 
concluded that news reports exercised more influence on people than ‘local crime rates’, ‘direct 
experience as a victim’ or ‘knowing someone who has been victim of a crime’.193 In fact, an analysis 
of 90 empirical studies lead Wayne Wanta and Xalma Ghanem to conclude that the correlation 
between the media agenda and the public agenda was – on average – r=53.194  This not only 
validated Johanna Dunaway, Marisa Abrajano and Regina Branton’s work, it also refuted Klapper’s 
minimal effects theory and made clear that at least in the U.S.A. the news media is successful in 
telling their audiences what to think and how to think about it.195   
These arguments allow arguing that even though citizens are neither defenceless against the 
influence of the media nor ‘automatons waiting to be programmed by the news media’, the media 
does have an active role in setting the public agenda. By determining what is being said and how it 
is being said, the media tells their audiences what to think and how to think about.196. In other 
words, the media impacts on how its audience defines, interprets and evaluates information.197 All 
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this could lead to conclude that Lippmann, Kettel, and Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman are 
correct:  
‘There is both a reality outside and pictures in people’s heads, with those 
pictures not necessarily corresponding to reality but being largely 
determined by mass media and its framing of events.’198  
 
These findings, though, do not neglect in any way the influence that the public sphere exercises 
over the media agenda, but signal that the causal connection is asymmetrical or weaker when 
analysed in a one-way direction, i.e. from the public to the media agenda. As stated by Candon and 
Uscinski, ‘the public does have a role in shaping the national information environment’, and multiple 
analyses acknowledge this.199  Huckins, for instance, found strong correlations between the U.S.A’s 
Christian Coalition agenda and that from the U.S.A.’s main newspapers, suggesting that an interest 
group can make a purposeful impact over the media agenda.200 Candon, Shoemaker, Lancerdorfer, 
Valera, Russell and Uscinski’s works are only a sample of studies illustrating the influence of the public 
agenda over the media agenda, notwithstanding how weak or indirect this influence might be. What 
is missing, Huckins would argue, are more studies on the interest group’s capacity to influence the 
news agenda.  
3.2.3.1 Summing up. Media and public agendas: towards policy change. 
 
The theoretical and normative findings previously presented set the basis for the first part of this 
thesis. They illustrate the existence of a bridge between citizens’ attitudes, needs and realities with 
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those from government and elite: all of them converge in, nourish from and define the public sphere 
through the acting of the media. The literature review developed in this sub-chapter has revealed 
that the media has the capacity to initiate, if not direct, public discussions by shaping domestic and 
international public agendas. ‘The majority of agenda–setting studies, however, stop precisely at 
this point: they solely look at the impact that mass media has over the public.’201 Therefore, there is 
a policy disconnect in the agenda-setting studies: whilst political communication scholars dedicate 
little time to the study of the policy connection of media effects, policy researchers invest a limited 
energy in understanding the effects of the media.202  
It is due to this unconnected research that, on the one hand, Wolfe et al argue, there is a 
‘generalised assumption that policy is influenced just because there are media effects on the public’. 
Scholars, Wolfe et al add, rarely connect media effects back to policy or agenda setting.’203 On the 
other hand, researchers tend to presume that the normative wheels of democracy roll when public 
pressures arise, assuming that elected officials will be responsive and set to work to change policies 
and programs.204 Nevertheless, as Michelle Wolfe et al wonder, ‘how does one simply know that 
policy is influenced just because of society’s demands?’205   
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Figure 2. When the wheels of democracy do not work in policy-making 
 
 
Considering this, this thesis goes beyond traditional studies in order to explore whether political 
forces (using or not the media) can trigger symbolic and substantive (red box) politics. In this vein, 
it aims to understand the extent to which a reinvigorated civil society and democratic agenda setting 
process can be developed and subsist in Mexico. This is why, the following section describes the 
theoretical linkage between media agenda and governmental agenda. 
3.2.4 Political agenda. 
 
The previous section provided compelling arguments about the media’s impact on both public 
opinion and public agendas. This section continues with the agenda–setting analysis by focusing on 
the political agenda. Theoretical propositions point towards the existence of a mutually influential 
relation between the government and media agendas. Whilst the effect of the political agenda over 
the latter has been briefly discussed and acknowledged in this chapter (see chapter 3.2.2), it is of 
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bigger importance for this thesis to understand the influence that media has over government 
decisions. The literature review conducted in this sub-chapter helps understanding whether media 
could serve as a tool by which public issues defined by an OCS can reach, engage and trigger a change 
in the political sphere.  
3.2.4.1 Influencing the political agenda. 
 
As with the media and public agendas, there is no dearth of social matters or public problems 
intending to become part of the policy agenda, yet, only a few become part of government 
discussions. ‘The policy agenda is composed of the demands that policy–makers agree to consider. 
It is not the sum of all political demands, but the list of issues to which political actors pay attention 
to.’206 In the same tenor, John Kingdon explains, public policy is ‘a process that includes agenda 
setting, identification of alternative choices, and the implementation of one of those choices.’207 
Whilst in the UK, ‘policy’ is understood as the ‘translation of government’s political priorities and 
principles into government programmes and course of action to deliver desired changes’, in Mexico, 
it is seen as those ‘responses that the State, political regime or government execute towards socially 
problematic situations.’208 Notwithstanding these multiple definitions, two facts are undeniable:  
v Political agenda is politics’ priority list.209 
v Public policy implies a purposive course of action that results from, and 
defines, the relationship between government and its environment. 
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With ‘politics being the business of problem solving’; public policy and political agenda become 
‘outcomes of bargaining among interest groups.’ 210  They involve power struggles, formal and 
informal mechanisms, and negotiations across a large number of actors. Political parties, the 
president, public opinion, real–world events, media, severity of the problem and protests, are just 
some of the elements that drive the political agenda.211 However, a vast scholarship and political 
events suggest media plays one of the most critical roles in the process.212 In this vein, more than 
40 years ago Jock Young stated that ‘in the modern urban society information is obtained at second 
hand, through the mass media, rather than direct by face–to–face contact or interaction with the 
events.’213 Ten years ago, Tony Blair explicitly acknowledged the existence of an ‘inevitable and 
necessary’ relationship between politics/politicians and the media: 214  
Such interaction [media–government] is inevitable and necessary given 
the fact that the politicians rely on the media as the primary means of 
communication; and the media rely on the politicians for political stories… 
Of course, politicians will court the media because they need to be 
reported and reported… The relationship between political leaders and 
their counterparts in the media matters enormously... The media are 
obviously going to be a powerful part of society and in particular a 
powerful influence on political debate…  Politicians will therefore interact 
with them closely… I have identified the use of media as instruments of 
political power… But the [media’s] principal purpose of using such power 
is, in my judgement, as much political, Blair said. 215 
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 Scholars like Walgrave and Van Aelst have also supported Blair’s claims when stating that media 
coverage is used in politics because it is suitable for political elites. Politicians simply learn about 
society [,] problems and solutions but also about public opinion’ via the news. What is more, they 
continue, politicians vie for media coverage.216 
It is then apparent that media does play an important role in policy-making. Kingdon, 
Baumgartner and Jones, Dunaway, Abrajano and Branton’s works, for instance, have shown that in 
the U.S.A ‘public policy agenda fluctuates with the volume of media attention paid to particular 
issues.’217 Other scholars have similarly argued that public opinion plays an important role in setting 
the political agenda, to the extent that Kettel, Conaghan, Jacobs and Townsley suggest politicians 
are now more the followers of public opinion than its leaders.218 Hans–Jorg Trenz has also stated 
that journalists are ‘no longer the ones observing the performance of the political system; it is now 
the political actors who observe the media system to learn how to re–represent themselves and get 
more frequent and positive media coverage.’219  What is more, Ruth Sanz states that ‘the political 
system is now working under a mediatised democracy mobilised by a persuasive media’, in which 
major initiatives and public policies tend now to be revealed on television or newspapers rather 
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than in a legislative power.220 Bartels even argued that ‘by and large The Times leads and the U.S.A.’s 
politicians follow.’221 Overall, some of the main arguments supporting media’s political agenda–
setting effects can be summarised as follows: 
Table 7. Main theories supporting the media political agenda setting effects. 
Scholar Argument 
Roger Cobb (1972) 
Craig Trumbo (1995) 
Extraordinary/new events coverage bears more media impact 
John Kingdon (1984) The lengthier media attention, the more media impact 
David Protess (1987) 
The more an issue is already present on the political agenda, the 
more media impact. 
Frank Baumgartner (1997) Negative news bear more impact than others. 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from Walgrave, Nuytemans, and De Winter, 
“Specifying the Media’s Political Agenda–Setting Power.”  
Notwithstanding the soundness of these arguments, the existing literature presents two major 
constrains:  
a) ‘Little is known about the media’s political agenda–setting effects outside the United States, 
as very few studies have focused on other countries.’ 
b) There is limited scholarship studying ‘the media’s precise role in substantive – rather than 
symbolic – political agenda–setting.’222  
On the one hand, political  agenda-setting  processes are defined by the  specific  institutional 
contexts in which they occur, and media effects vary across  policy  domains. Therefore, the lack of 
studies focusing on non-western scenarios made it difficult to validate the media effects on 
government agendas in different socio-political contexts. In fact, even agenda setting studies 
focused on the same context offered contrasting results. For instance, Stefaan Walgrave and Peter 
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Van Aelst found diverging conclusions across 15 agenda-setting analyses on the U.S.A. polity.223 On 
the other hand, as pointed out by Walgrave et al, most studies focus on the media effects over 
symbolic, rather than substantive political agendas.224 In this vein, symbolic agendas are inherently 
more flexible than resource agendas. It is fairly simple for policy makers to hold a news conference 
or issue a press release, but it can be quite difficult for them to shift resources from one priority to 
another. Resource agendas seem to be more resistant to media influence than are symbolic 
agendas.225 This is why those analyses focusing on symbolic agendas do not provide new evidence 
for advancing the understanding of the public sphere and its influence on policy making. In Kingdon’s 
words: ‘newspapers might trigger press conferences but might have little impact in determining the 
policy priorities of policymaking elites.’226   
Therefore, as suggested by Walgrave et al, the field is in dire need of work on other political 
settings, particularly on substantive or hard policy outputs in new and fragile democratic setups.  
3.3 Addressing the theoretical challenges and summarising the thesis’ 
theoretical framework.  
 
The literature review developed in this chapter highlights that the vast amount of academic work 
on the Public sphere and Agenda setting is overwhelmingly focused on the U.S.A. and other Western 
advanced democracies.  With a particular focus on elites and the media’s influence over public 
opinion and public agenda, the literature overlooks the importance of other key political players and 
                                                             
223 Walgrave and Van Aelst, “The Contingency of the Mass Media’s Political Agenda Setting Power. Towards a 
Preliminary Theory.” 
224 Walgrave, Soroka, and Nuytemans, “The Mass Media’s Political Agenda Setting Power.,” 4; Walgrave and 
Van Aelst, “Political Agenda Setting and the Mass Media”; Walgrave, Nuytemans, and De Winter, 
“Specifying the Media’s Political Agenda–Setting Power.,” 13. 
225 Pritchard and Berkowitz in Walgrave, Nuytemans, and De Winter, “Specifying the Media’s Political Agenda–
Setting Power.,” 13. 
226 Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. 
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processes, disregarding the theories’ empirical implications and applicability in non–democratic 
countries, and understudying their connection with the political agenda. As such, the literature 
cannot be fully applied to young democracies like Mexico, where a public security crisis, security–
saturated public sphere and incipient democratic institutions demand the promotion of political 
initiatives stemming from the public sphere and their transformation into formal legislation. 
Therefore, the search for better mechanisms for a wider and more effective public sphere, capable 
of co–organising, co–determining and co–transforming the political agenda in public security – with 
the mediation of the media and other tools – is a pivotal task for political scientists and a pressing 
job for politicians in Mexico.227 
With ‘different theories telling different stories and emphasizing different elements’, this task 
can only be achieved by integrating the public sphere and agenda setting frameworks. Binding 
Habermas with Shaw and McCombs’ work allows this research to provide not only one of the first 
comprehensive analyses on the subject, but recommendations with potential implications on 
Mexico’s political and democratic institutionalism. First, it builds on Habermas’ Public sphere work 
to understand how socio-political interactions permit or hinder the rebirth of an OCS capable of 
influencing political decisions.228  Nevertheless, as not every interaction, decision or change in the 
public sphere translates into political action, it is necessary to use innovative methods to analyse 
the way in which public demands evolve into public policies. This is why, this thesis binds Habermas’ 
theory with the Agenda setting framework (see Figure 3). McCombs and Shaw’s Agenda setting 
framework complements Habermas’ theory in that it closes up the theoretical cycle of social 
                                                             
227 Jose–Angel Garcia, “Democracy and Political Participation in Mexico: Not a Matter of Magic but of Will,” 
The Crick Centre: Understading Politics, 2014, http://www.crickcentre.org/blog/democracy–political–
participation–mexico–matter–magic–will/ (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
228 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public sphere: An Inquiry Into a Category of Bourgeois 
Society.; McKee, The Public sphere: An Introduction; Lara, “Effective Participation in Latin America: From 
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construction of public policy (i.e. bottom–up or citizenly raised policies), starting in the public sphere 
and ending with political decision-making. In other words, the Agenda setting allows studying the 
hidden politics of the negotiation and incorporation of the public agenda into the political agenda.  
Figure 3. The model of social construction of public security 
 
Having described the theoretical basis of this research, the following three chapters look at 
Mexico’s political context and two different case studies of civil society activism in which this 
thesis’ social construction of public security policy model – as well as theoretical generalisations 
on civil society, democratisation and policy definition – can be tested. In this vein, Chapter 5 
looks at the First Citizen Summit to Build a Prosperous and Fair Mexico, an institutionalised, 
government–sanctioned and cooperative non-governmental inactive joined by more than 100 
CSOs that attempted to shape the President’s agenda on public security policy. Chapter 6 
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studies the development of the Autodefensas self-defence movement, a more nebulous, non-
institutionalised, politically antagonistic, even illegal organised civil society expression 
intending to dictate political decisions in the Mexican state of Michoacan. Through this, this 
thesis will shed new light on the development of the public sphere, civil society and bottom-up 



















Chapter 4. Mexico’s dangerous public sphere: triggering the 
rebirth of civil society.  
 
The theoretical review conducted in the previous chapter evidenced that the formulation of 
public policy, including public security, cannot be studied without understanding a country’s 
specific public and political spheres, including its institutional framework, socio–political 
context and media relations. In the particular case of Mexico’s dangerous democracy, where 
journalists, activists and politicians alike are subject to co–potation, intimidation, even 
assassination, it is necessary to pay special attention to the effects that public (in)security has 
over the development of an OCS. This is why this chapter conducts an evaluation of the public 
and political spheres in which policy-making was taking place in Mexico during the early 2010s. 
Furthermore, to weigh the importance of ‘the public’ in Mexico’s politics, it also studies the 
level of citizenisation of public security policy and government’s actions to promote citizens’ 
participation in policy-making.  
4.1 Mexico’s security trap: a new democracy and securitised public sphere 
calling for the public’s intervention. 
 
With the arrival of the new millennium and, coincidentally, electoral democracy to Mexico, 
Mexicans expected improvements in public security provision. Contrary to this, the country seems 
to have fallen into what John Bailey calls, a ‘security trap.’ 229  The elections of 2000 did bring 
alternation of power across executive and legislative branches of government at national and state 
levels, but also weakened government’s control over criminal organisations. With the end of the 
                                                             
229 John Bailey, “Drug Traffickers as Political Actors in Mexico’s Nascent Democracy,” in The Oxford Handbook 
of Mexican Polticis, ed. Roderic Ai Camp, 1st Ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 824, 
https://catalyst.library.jhu.edu/catalog/bib_4113908 (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
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PRI’s one–party rule, the corrupt agreements between politicians and criminals started to be 
fractured, producing a violent reconfiguration of power. Therefore, what was initially seen as the 
beginning of Mexico’s electoral democratic miracle, full of dreams of freedoms and progress, 
gradually transformed into a dangerous democracy.  
Whilst Mexico had experienced higher levels of violence than other similar industrialised nations, 
criminality in the country had been reducing markedly since the late 1930s. The homicide rate, for 
example, was declining 
uninterruptedly, passing from 19.7 
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 
1992, to just over 9 in 2006. 230 
However, this trend began to change 
at the end of Vicente Fox’s presidency 
(2000–2006). With the increasing influence of the DTOs over municipal political and economic 
spheres across Mexico, in 2006, the newly elected President, Felipe Calderon (2006–2012), launched 
a more direct confrontation against organised crime: a ‘war’ – in his own words – against drugs. In 
this vein, since arriving to the Presidency, Calderon pushed for a larger army’s involvement in 
counter–trafficking tasks.  For instance, from being responsible for public security tasks in 14 states 
and 32 municipalities in 2007, by 2013 the Navy was already operating in 24 states and 88 
municipalities.231  This militarisation of public security prompted Robert Bunker to suggest that 
                                                             
230 The homicide rate measures the totality of homicides denounced, not only intentional homicide (homicidio 
doloso in Spanish).  Guillermo González–Pérez et al., “Deaths by Homicide in Mexico: Trends, Socio–
Geographical Variations and Associated Factors,” Ciência & Saúde Coletiva 17, no. 12 (2012): 3198, 
http://www.scielo.br/pdf/csc/v17n12/05.pdf (Accessed 22–12–2017); David Vicenteño, “Baja Índice de 
Homicidios En México: Segob,” Excelsior, February 16, 2015, 
http://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/2015/02/16/1008565#imagen–7  (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
231 Auditoría Superior de la Federación / Cámara de Diputados, “Evaluación Número 1207 ‘Política Pública de 
Seguridad Pública’.” (Mexico City, 2013), 287, 
http://www.asf.gob.mx/Trans/Informes/IR2013i/Documentos/Auditorias/2013_1207_a.pdf (Accessed 
22-12-2017). 
Graph 1. Annual budget of the Ministry of Public Security, SSP, 2001–
2008 (prices in MXN, 2008) 
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Mexico was waging a war, not with armies, but with groups that advanced democracies still call 
terrorists, guerrillas, bandits and robbers.’232  
Rather than cleaning Mexico from corruption and drugs, President Calderon dismembered 
established DTOs into smaller but more refined groups, more flexible in their operations and more 
difficult to trace to control.  
Graph 2. Evolution of civil liberties (CL) and political rights (PR) in Mexico (2003–2015). 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from Freedom House. 233 
 
Civil liberties and political rights like freedom of expression were also negatively affected (see Graph 
2). For instance, by 2010 more than 20% of the population had been a victim of a crime and over 
35% of households have had at least one family member injured in a crime scene.234  In 2015, Mexico 
was one of only ten countries in the world where journalists had been murdered and the Latin 
America’s country with the ‘most dramatic case of violence against environmental activists.’235  The 
                                                             
232 R Bunker, “Ephocal Change: War Over Social and Political Organisation,” Parameters: US Army War College 
Quarterly 27, no. 2 (1997): 40. 
233 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World.” 
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risk of being murdered also increased. In 2009 the national homicide rate reached 15.7 homicides 
per 100,000 inhabitants but passed to 17 homicides in 2014 (see Graph 3). 236  According to 
Transparency International, corruption worsened too. Whilst in 2005 Mexico was ranked 65th out of 
159 countries in its Corruption Perceptions Index, by 2010, it ranked 98th out of 178, and in 2016, 
123rd out of 176 countries.237  
Graph 3. Homicide rate, per month, per administration, per 100,000 inhabitants. 
 
Source:  C. Vilalta, “Observatorio Delictivo” (Mexico City, 2011), 
http://www.geocrimen.cide.edu/index.php?page=observatorio (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
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236  Considering homicides denounced, and not only intentional homicide (homicidio doloso in Spanish). 
González–Pérez et al., “Deaths by Homicide in Mexico: Trends, Socio–Geographical Variations and 
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237  Freedom House, “Mexico” (Washington, 2006), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom–
world/2006/mexico#.VVOsyvlViko (Accessed 22–12–2017); Transparency International, “Mexico” (Berlin, 
2017), https://www.transparency.org/country/MEX (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
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With the military using maximum intensity force, rather than policing practices across civil 
communities, government also increased society’s distrust in the government’s public security 
apparatus.238 The army, for instance, once one of the country’s most trusted institutions, is now 
facing a credibility crisis, as an increasing sector of the population believes that ‘using the army is 
not the right solution to Mexico’s drug trafficking problem’ (see Graph 5). Recent polls also illustrate 
how the collusion between government and DTOs has diminished the potential for society-
government cooperation (see Graph 4).  
Graph 4. How dangerous is to help police in your city? 
 
                                                             
238 See, for instance, all the cases of military abuse towards civilians reported by Marcos Moloeznik. In Marcos 
Moloeznik, “The Impact of the Use of Military Force against Drug Trafficking in Mexico,” Renglones 61 
(2009): 9–12, http://www.renglones.iteso.mx/upload/archivos/Marcos_Moloeznik (Accessed 22–12–























































Graph 5. Is it correct or incorrect to use the army against drug–trafficking? 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from Consulta Mitofsky, “Décima Cuarta Encuesta 
Nacional Sobre Percepción de Inseguridad Ciudadana En México” (Mexico City, 2015), 10, 
http://mucd.org.mx/recursos/Noticias/XIVEncuestaNacionalSobrePercepcindeInseguridadCiudadanaenMxic
o/documentos2/NA_MUCD2015Feb.pdf (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
 
At state and municipal levels, insecurity also repressed investigative journalism. Just between 2000 
and 2009, 46 journalists were murdered across the country, creating a situation of uncertainty and 
disinformation in which criminal groups were able to demand silence and impose media, public, 
even government agendas.239 Overall, with over 50% of the population perceiving every public 
security authority as corrupt, 2 out of 3 citizens from the poorest economic stratums considering 
government does not pay attention to their demands and with the generalised opinion that ‘it is 
more important for government to try to maintain law and order than to protect people’s 
freedoms,’ the development of a democratic public sphere and politically effective OCS was an 
extremely complicated, even dangerous task. 240 Paradoxically, as explained in the following sub-
chapter, this context of insecurity ended triggering the awakening of civil society in Mexico. 
                                                             
239  Centro de Periodismo y Ética Pública in Sallie Hughes, “Democracy in the Newsroom: The Evolution of 
Journalism and the News Media,” in The Oxford Handbook of Mexican Polticis, ed. Roderic Ai Camp, 1st Ed 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 388, https://catalyst.library.jhu.edu/catalog/bib_4113908 
(Accessed 22–12–2017). 
240 Based on data from  A. Kphut et al., “Crime and Drug Cartels Top Concerns in Mexico” (Washington, 2011). 
Paul Sánchez, “Gestión de La Crisis de Seguridad En México, La Guerra Contra El Narcontráfico, 
Administración Pública y Reformal Del Estado.” (Mexico: CLAD, 2011), 24–25, 

















































4.2 Civil society’s awakening in an insecure public sphere.  
 
Despite the awesome, intimidating power of vested interests pitted against them,  
large groups of people do often respond critically to the world in which they live;  
they will commonly agitate, resist, fight back, and organize  
under even the most difficult circumstances,  
and they will forge a variety of social movements.241 
 
 ‘The concept of the public sphere is closely tied to the notion of civil society, although they are 
not synonymous.’ 242  Civil society, says Noelle McAfee, is ‘the demarcation of entities and 
associations by which socio–political activities give place to the space of public sphere.’243  It is ‘a 
matter of collective choice, but not government’, where people have the ‘freedom to conduct self–
organised efforts’, Calhoun argues.244 As such, civil society actors, Taru Salmenkari concludes, are 
‘essential for an authentic public sphere because they emerge from the public and make the public 
sphere more inclusive to new ideas. They conglomerate and represent citizens’ individual voices.’245 
From here, Jose Garcia states, civil society can be understood as ‘the sphere of intermediation 
between the state and the basic fundamentals of society.’246 It is ‘the moral structure of democracy’, 
Reyes argues, ‘the chance for minorities and disadvantaged groups to argue their case in a 
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democratic scenario that does not work for all the people’.247 In this sense, the Inter–American Bank 
for Development (IDB) regards civil society as being made of:  
Associations, academic and non–for profit institutions, professional groups, 
corporate social responsibility groups, NGOs, unions, religious institutions, 
youth groups, African–descendant organisations, indigenous groups, 
formal and informal organisations that belong and/or represent the 
community’s interests with philanthropic, ethical, cultural, religious and 
scientific perspectives.248 
 
Building on the above, this thesis defines civil society as Organised Civil Society (OCS): a non–
profit association, organized under certain level of institutionalism which can – but not necessarily 
has to – be formally registered with government, functioning as a self–governed body, with a 
voluntary membership and which main objectives are to alter or reform legislation in benefit of 
society. It does not look to obtain political power, neither to be part of the State, and government 
does not have a monopoly on its managerial decisions.249  
In this vein, the first expressions of OCS in Mexico were the higher education institutions, the 
Catholic Church and the charitable organisations it established in the 1960s.250 Although de jure 
citizens already had political rights and attributions, society was de facto voiceless in the country’s 
public sphere, even more in the political realm. Whilst the prevalent poverty and illiteracy limited 
citizens’ capacities to exercise their political rights, the government’s tight political control did not 
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permit the few social organisations to fully develop. Even the scarce social mobilisations that used 
to take place were structured by the government apparatus to reinforce its power against its political 
rivals. Nevertheless, this scenario started to change by the end of the decade.  
In 1968, workers’ unions and students’ movements developed a critical attitude against the 
political system. By taking over the facilities of Mexico’s National Autonomous University (UNAM), 
and constantly demonstrating in the streets, students and citizens showed their dissatisfaction with 
an unresponsive government. However, far from receiving a positive response from government, 
President Diaz Ordaz (1964–1970) violently repressed the movement on the 2nd of October 1968. 
Soldiers and secret police apprehended, tortured and kidnapped dozens of students, killing between 
30 and 300 of them.251 Although, for government, this seemed to be the way to manage and restrain 
antagonistic political forces in the public sphere, this massacre triggered further social movements. 
In the words of FUSDA CSO, it was then when ‘the awakening of civil society became the awakening 
of the Mexican society demanding its social, economic, cultural and political rights.’252 
By 1982, government continued resisting and repressing workers’ unions, social groups, strikes, 
and any type of demonstration against low salaries. However, three important socio–economic and 
political events radically challenged government–society interactions. First, in 1982, a severe 
economic crisis forced government to cut subsidies and the pay-outs to supportive workers unions. 
Secondly, in 1985, Mexico City was hit by an earthquake of magnitude 8.1 Richter, killing between 
6,000 and 10,000 people.253 With a ‘lethargic and grossly incompetent government’s response’ to 
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the disaster, solidarity among citizens emerged all across Mexico. For instance, in Mexico City 
citizens organised social groups to provide housing and demand the provision of social services for 
those in need. Thirdly, in 1988, the country witnessed ‘one of the most egregious examples of 
electoral fraud: massive protests took over the streets, triggering the development of a civil society 
movement centred on the struggle for political rights and democracy, and the beginning of the end 
of the PRI’s authoritarian rule. 254 
With civil society challenging the functioning of government and the widespread notion of 
electoral fraud, President Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) was forced to declare ‘the end of the one–
party system and promise a new relationship between state and society’.255 However, contrary to 
this, Salinas and the political elite went back to PRI’s clientelist practices. Through a corporatist state 
that recruited and financed social organisations, President Salinas intended to co-opt social activism 
to further retard the expansion of civil society in Mexico.256 Nevertheless, internal political fractures 
within the PRI, a lack of focus on long–term objectives and another socio–political and economic 
crisis, made it fail.  
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By 1994, at the end of President Salinas’ term, Mexico suffered another ‘peso’ devaluation (i.e. 
the Tequila Crisis) and the rise of the Zapatista movement claiming for indigenous autonomy in the 
southern state of Chiapas. With an economically and politically strained government and a new 
President in office (Ernesto Zedillo 1994–2000), CSOs started to gain social recognition as legitimate 
social actors capable of influencing public opinion, debating with government and leading society in 
the pursuit of common benefits.  
Overall, it is possible to argue that the expansion of civil liberties and political rights, including 
the development of civil society organisations, were not the result of the government’s voluntary 
openness to civil society, but a consequence of key socio–political developments that forced a 
gradual reconfiguration of society-government interactions (see Graphs 8 and 9).  
Graph 6. Evolution of political rights and civil liberties vs National socio–economic events. 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from Smith, “Mexican Democracy in Comparative 
Politics”; Freedom House, “Mexico.” 
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Graph 7. Mexico's democratic history 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration.  
 
Political events that took place during and after Mexico’s electoral democratisation in 2000 also 
validate the correlation between the evolution of Mexico’s democratic public sphere with key socio-
political developments (see Graph 9). In this sense, Grant argues that ‘the degree of political 
influence that pressure groups can achieve depends on the type of political party in office’, and this 
seems to apply in the case of Mexico.257 Previous to 2000, there had not been any other political 
party in the presidency than PRI, reason why there were very limited spaces for political debate 
open to the general public. However, as power alternations started to take place in Mexico, civil 
society began to acquire more political rights.258  In this vein, after Vicente Fox’s presidential victory 
in 2000, Mexicans witnessed the largest development of civil society organisations in the country’s 
                                                             
257 Grant, Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain, 145. 
258 The first alternation of power occurred in 1997, when the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) 
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history (see Graph 9).259 Taking advantage of the ‘2000 democratic wave’, Mexican activists began 
to claim for more social rights, including better education and urban services and the prosecution 
of human rights violations. What is more, the democratic furore pushed politicians to be more 
willing to listen, talk to and debate with their constituents.’260 Nevertheless, the flourishing of civil 
society seemed to have stopped during President Calderon (2006–2012) and President Peña Nieto 
(2012–2018) administrations. A phenomenon that finds explanation in Hipsher’s approach to civil 
society evolution. According to Hipsher, social movements work in a cyclical way:261 first, in the 
initial stages of transitions to democracy (i.e. President Zedillo (1994–2000) government allows for 
more freedom of action, permitting mobilisers to push for further and faster democratic evolution. 
Once this democratic transition arrives to its maturity phase, and democratic cooperation has been 
established, social movements start to be institutionalised, if not co-opted or corporatized, and to 
decline in both number and radicalism.262 This condition is perpetuated and enhanced by the CSOs’ 
financial needs. The current economic and political scenario, Tejeda argues, has ‘imprisoned’ civil 
society between the state’s coercive interests aiming to recover its influence in socio–political 
spheres, and corporate interests looking to colonize civilizations and cultures through civil society.263 
In this vein, according to CIVICUS, 23% of the CSO’s funding comes from individual donors (although 
it is not specified who these donors are), 22% from government, 12% from national sources 
(unspecified), 10% from national businesses and the rest from the sale/provision of services, foreign 
                                                             
259 As more than 50% of the still active CSOs were created between 1991 and 2000 FUSDA, “Las Organizaciones 
de La Sociedad Civil,” 31. 
260 Azuela, PRImera Cumbre Ciudadana Para Construir Un México Pacífico Y Justo, 78. 
261 Patricia Hipsher, “Democratic Transitions as Protest Cycles: Social Movement Dynamis in Democratizing 
Latin America,” in The Social Movement Society, ed. David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow (Oxford: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), 154. 
262  Grant, Pressure Groups and British Politics, 56; Ilán Bizberg, “Una Democracia Vacía. Sociedad Civil, 
Movimientos Sociales y Democracia.” (Mexico City: Colmex, 2010), 11, http://cei.colmex.mx/PDFs/Prof 
Bizberg/Movimientos.pdf (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
263 Tejeda, “Las Dimensiones de La Sociedad Civil,” 138. 
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donors, and membership fees.264 While this diversification provides CSOs with more autonomy from  
government, the influence that private donors can gain inside the organisations cannot go 
unnoticed, especially when only 26% of CSOs can currently meet their financial needs.265 What is 
more, by rewarding those cooperative activist groups with grants and seats in the decision–making 
tables and isolating the more critical ones, government has also found the perfect strategy to 
fragment civil society. Therefore, the constant battle for funding has created a scenario where those 
CSOs aligned to orthodox objectives become stronger, whilst the smaller, weaker but perhaps more 
critical CSOs face smaller chances of survival.266  
In Mexico, though, not only CSOs are being co–opted or corporatized, but – as detailed in the 
following sub-chapter – citizens’ political disaffection is also limiting the development and influence 
of civil society as a whole.   
4.3. A reinvigorated civil society in the recently democratised public 
sphere? 
 
With electoral democracy ‘arriving’ into Mexico in 2000, society witnessed a more open and 
bottom–up governmental system where citizens, OCS, academics and government started to work 
together. However, the rapid evolutionary trend that civil society experienced from the 1980s to 
2000 seems to be slowing down in terms of expansion and effectiveness. This section builds on data 
from over 12,000 responses to more than 5 national polls across 12 years, to develop a cross–tab 
analysis of public attitudes to civil society, citizens’ involvement in the public and political spheres, 
                                                             
264 Cortes et al., “A Snapshot of Civil Society in Mexico, Analytical Report on the CIVICUS Civil Society 
Index,” 30. 
265 Cortes et al., 40. 
266 Perez–Díaz, State, Bureaucracy and Civil society. A Critical Discussion of the Political Theory of Karl Marx 
New Studies in Sociology, 31, 76, 147. 
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and most efficient mechanisms for bottom–up political engagement. Through this method, this 
section aims to provide initial insights into two of the secondary questions of this thesis:    
What does the analysis of public security policy-making suggest about the rebirth of civil 



















How do the processes occurring within the public sphere 
contribute to, or trigger the generation of a bottom–up 
political change? How much power does the public have? 
Is media the surrogate of the public agenda or a mechanism 
for public domination? 
Micro 
Mechanisms / 
Case Studies / 
Tools 
Do public policy changes obey society’s demands? 
Is a thicker model of democracy, built around social capital, 
allowing civil society to set the agenda? Or does a top–down 
process continue dominating the agenda setting of public 
security policy in Mexico? 
 
With the new millennium and the ‘instauration’ of electoral democracy in Mexico, civil society 
became more willing to participate in, and eager to influence those public affairs of its interest than 
before. In 2001, for instance, 68% of the population was of the opinion that ‘the people should 
promote a change in law if it was considered to be unfair’.267 Between 2001 and 2012, citizens’ 
involvement in different forms of non–electoral political activity also increased by between 42% (i.e. 
complain to authorities) and 148% (publish letters in newspapers) (see Graph 10). 
                                                             
267 ENCUP 2001.  
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Graph 8. % of citizens involved in non–electoral political activism (2001–2012). 
 
Political Action 2001 2008 2012 Variation 
2001–12 
Unite with other people affected 23.3 22 34.3 47.3% 
Publish letters in newspapers 2.9 1.9 7.3 147.9% 
Complain to authorities 19.2 17.9 27.2 41.8% 
Ask for support from a CSO 7.5 7.7 14.9 97.1% 
Attend protests 7.6 8.4 11.5 50.0% 
Request support from a political party 8.6 8 13.5 57.6% 
Request support from Deputies or Senators 4.8 4.2 8.5 75.9% 
Call a radio or TV programme 5.0 3.5 7.4 48.2% 
Write to Mexico's President, governor or Municipal 
authority 
6.0 2.9 8.9 47.9% 
Protest in a peaceful manner through the use of a 
distinctive   
5.0 3.7 7.5 48.5% 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from Secretaría de Gobernacion, “ENCUP 2001, 
Resúmen de Resultados” (Mexico City, 2001), 
http://www.encup.gob.mx/work/models/Encup/Resource/20/1/images/resumen2001.pdf (Accessed 22–
12–2017); Colectivo de Análisis en Seguridad y Democracia, “Cuarta Encuesta Nacional Sobre Cultura Política 
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Nevertheless, Mexicans’ involvement in both the political and public spheres remains extremely 
low. This could not only reveal the lack of channels for political involvement, but also the 
development of what Flinders and Wood call ‘societal depoliticization:’ a sense of diminished 
interest in public affairs on the part of the public.268 For example, in 2001, 40.3% of Mexicans stated 
that participating in public demonstrations and blockades ‘would be their preferred method to 
demonstrate pubic inconformity’, 28.7% said it would be joining a social organisation and 16.7% 
that it would be by ‘promoting the destitution of a public servant.’269 Nevertheless, between 1988 
and 2001, only 8% of citizens had attended a citizens’ organisation meeting and just 6% participated 
in political demonstrations.270  
Citizens’ political involvement was not aligned to their perception of the effectiveness of political 
activism either (Table 9). For example, in 2001, mechanisms for citizens’ political activism, including 
‘attending protests’, ‘uniting with other people’ and ‘writing to Mexico’s President’,  were 
considered to be ‘a lot useful in the solution of a community problem’ by between 14% and 34% of 
the population.271 However, only between 5% and 23% of citizens had participated in them (see 
Graph 11). Similarly, calling a radio or TV programme’ was the political action with the 2nd largest 
number of people considering it ‘a lot useful’ for solving a community’s problem (29.2% of citizens), 
but the 8th preferred action in terms of number of people actually doing it (5%).  
                                                             
268 Matthew Flinders and M. Wood, “Depoliticisation, Governance and the State,” Policy & Politics 42, no. 2 
(2014): 137. 




271 Each percentage varied according to the mechanism in question. For instance, for ‘Protest in a peaceful 
manner with a distinctive’ there were 14.7% citizens thinking it was ‘a lot useful in the solution of a 
community problem’, and for ‘Unite with other people affected’ there were 34.1%. For discussion see 
Annex 3 Graph and/or Question 8A, Gobernacion. 
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Graph 9. % of citizens participating in non–electoral political actions (2001). 
 
Table 8. Most popular political actions and their level of perceived political effectiveness (2001). 
Political action 
Ranking by % of 
population 
(participants or 
not) considering it 






"a lot useful" 




% of population 
participating in 
the action 
Unite with other people affected 1 34.1 1 23.3 
Call a radio or TV programme 2 29.2 8 5.0 
Complain to authorities 3 26.6 2 19.2 
Write to Mexico's President, 
governor or Municipal authority 
4 24.5 6 6.0 
Publish letters in newspapers 5 19.7 10 2.9 
Ask for support from a CSO 6 19.4 5 7.5 
Attend protests 7 18.9 4 7.6 
Request support from a political 
party 
8 18.5 3 8.6 
Request support from Deputies or 
Senators 
9 16.5 9 4.8 
Protest in a peaceful manner with a 
distinctive 
10 14.7 7 5.0 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from Gobernacion. 
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Source: Author’s elaboration with information from INEGI, “ENCUP Resultados de La Encuesta Nacional 







































































































































% of Participants (2008) considering "not useful"
% of Participants (2008) considering "a little useful" (Poco)
% of Participants (2008) considering "useful to certain extent" (Algo)
% of Participants (2008) considering "a lot useful"














































Ask for support from an CSO 1 7.7 25.10 30.40 31.00 13.50 3 14.85
Unite with other people affected 2 22 24.80 37.30 30.30 7.10 1 34.32
Attend protests 3 8.4 16.90 29.60 34.90 18.40 5 11.45
Request support from a political 
party 4 8 14.80 28.80 40.80 15.50 4 13.54
Request support from Deputies 
or Senators 5 4.2 14.00 23.90 44.60 17.40 7 8.52
Call a radio or TV programme 6 3.5 14.00 41.40 31.20 10.80 9 7.43
Write to Mexico's President, 
gobernor or Municipal authority 7 2.9 13.50 29.60 37.20 19.50 6 8.92
Complain with authorities 8 17.9 12.60 32.20 34.20 20.90 2 27.21
Protest in a peaceful manner 
with a distinctive 9 3.7 11.60 27.80 55.90 4.50 8 7.49
Publish letters in newspapers 10 1.9 9.30 34.40 17.00 39.30 10 7.27
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The above data permits some initial conclusions. First, it supports the thesis that the lack of 
information prevailing before and during the first years of Mexico’s democratisation could have 
obstructed or deterred social activism.272 Secondly, citizens’ perception of the media’s effectiveness 
in both the public and political sphere showed a drastic drop from 2001 to 2008. Whilst in 2001, 
‘calling a radio or TV programme’ and ‘publishing a letter in the newspaper’ were among the top 5 
activities by their perceived level of effectiveness; by 2008 they were among the last 5, being 
surpassed by ‘attending protests.’ This can lead this thesis to argue that, after the country’s 
democratisation process, either media became more unapproachable to the public, or citizens 
noticed a more evident collusion between media and the elite, i.e. the elite monologues mentioned 
by Jacobs and Townsley (see Chapter 2.1.2).273 Thirdly, as ‘attending protests’ became the political 
action with the 3rd largest perceived effectiveness (2008) and one of the top 5 by percentage of 
citizens engaged in 2012, it could be possible to state that Mexico has started moving into a ‘protest 
society’, similar to the ones prevailing in Western democracies.274 However, while in the U.K., the 
Netherlands, Italy and the United States, people with higher levels of education and income tended 
to be more prone to be protesters, in Mexico the participation in public demonstrations and 
blockades increases among the lowest income sectors.275  
                                                             
272 Considering a time–frame between 1994 (beginning of the last PRI sexenio) and 2001 (on year after 
Mexico’s electoral democratisation and when the ENCUP was conducted). 
273 Jacobs and Townsley, The Space of Opinion, Media Intellectuals and the Public sphere. 
274  Dalton in Crozat, “Are the Times A–Changin’? Assessing the Acceptance of Protest in Western 
Democracies,” 60. 
275 Crozat, 77. 
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Graph 11. Preferred form of participation in non-electoral political activism (by level of income, 2001) 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from Gobernacion, “ENCUP 2001, Resúmen de 
Resultados.” 
Fourthly, organised forms of civil society (i.e. uniting with other people affected by the problem), 
rather than individual political actions, seem to have been the preferred type of political activism 
among Mexicans.  This point is perfectly illustrated by the percentage of citizens asking CSOs’ 
support to solve their problems, which passed from 7.5% in 2001, to 7.7% in 2008 and to 14.85% in 
2012.276   
Lastly, due to the CSOs’ importance as the most preferred, if not most recognisable mode of 
citizens’ political activity, the next sub-chapters study them in isolation and within the broader 
political context in which they operate, just as Grant suggested doing more than two decades ago:277 
 
                                                             
276 Gobernacion, “ENCUP 2001, Resúmen de Resultados”; INEGI/SEGOB, “ENCUP 2008: Resultados de La 
Encuesta Nacional Sobre Cultura Política y Prácticas Ciudadanas”; INEGI/Ministry of the Interior, “Quinta 
ENCUP 2012.” 
277 Grant, Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain, 8; Grant, Pressure Groups and British Politics. For 
discussion on the roles or functions of CSOs, see Larry Diamond, “What Civil Society Can Do to Develop 
Democracy,” in Presentation to NGO Leaders, February 10, 2004, Baghdad (Baghdad: Stanford University, 
2004), https://web.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/Develop_Democracy021002.htm (Accessed 22–12–
2017); Barry Lowenkron, “The Role of NGOs in the Development of Democracy,” Scoop Independent News 
















































4.4. Civil Society Organisations, an embryonic but already elite–dominated 
sector. 
 
CSOs are considered to be the most tangible expression of citizens’ political activism. 278 
Therefore, this section briefly studies the evolution and perils that Mexican CSOs face in order to 
understand how they mingle with Mexico’s democratisation, support a more democratic public 
sphere and allow for the development of citizenised policies.   
Although there is no precise data on the subject, the Federal Registry of Civil Society 
Organizations estimates there are currently between 20,000 and 35,000 CSOs in Mexico, that is an 
average of four CSOs per each 10,000 citizens -whilst in the U.S.A. there are more than 65 (see Graph 
12). On the specific case of public security, it is estimated that only 50 think tanks, CSOs and 
academic institutions are working on the topic.279 This is perhaps one of the reasons why Luis Reyes 
argues that ‘civil society in Mexico is still living and experiencing more a mirage than a goal 
achieved.’280   
Graph 12. Number of CSOs in America. 
 
                                                             
278 See, for instance, the reports produced by the World Bank in which it equates civil society to CSOs.’World 
Bank, “The Public Sphere, Communication for Governance & Accountability Program,” 3–4. 
279 OECD and IMCO, “Stregthening Evidence–Based Policy-making on Security and Justice in Mexico,” 39. 
280 Reyes, “La Ciudadania En Mexico. Un Beve Recuento Historico.” 
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Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from Maite Azuela, Primera Cumbre Ciudadana Para 
Construir Un México Pacífico Y Justo (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 2013). 
 
The analysis of the CSO’s membership also provides interesting facts. Data from CIVICUS 
reflects that almost 41% of the CSO’s active members attained university, 17% only completed 
secondary studies and 18% just primary education.281 This supports existing theoretical arguments, 
including Grant’s work, ensuring that CSOs are usually composed by only a small ‘biased well–
educated, middle–class’ sample of the entire society.282 Thus, although CSOs are supposed to be 
‘the chance for minorities and disadvantaged groups to argue their case in a democratic scenario 
that does not work for all the people’; in a country like Mexico, where 60% of citizens belong to the 
‘low income’ stratum but where CSOs are dominated by the educated elite, ‘the specific weight of 
each social class in society seems not to correspond with the one it has on the political stage.’283  
                                                             
281 Cortes et al., “A Snapshot of Civil Society in Mexico, Analytical Report on the CIVICUS Civil Society Index.” 
282 In the UK case, Grant found that 64% of the members of the pressure groups researched had a high–level 
of education. Grant, Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain, 132. 
283 ADN Político, “Las 6 Clases Sociales Que Hay En México, Según La Profeco,” ADN Político, May 13, 2014, 
http://www.adnpolitico.com/ciudadanos/2014/05/13/las–6–clases–sociales–que–hay–en–mexico–
segun–la–profeco (Accessed 22–12–2017); Heriberto López, “Los Niveles Socioeconómicos y La 
Distribución Del Gasto” (Mexico, 2009), http://www.amai.org/NSE/NivelSocioeconomicoAMAI.pdf 
(Accessed 22–12–2017); Wilson in Grant, Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain, 160; Perez–
Díaz, State, Bureaucracy and Civil society. A Critical Discussion of the Political Theory of Karl Marx New 
Studies in Sociology, 94. 
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Graph 13. CSOs' decision making structures. 
 
Source: Cortes et al., “A Snapshot of Civil Society in Mexico, Analytical Report on the CIVICUS Civil Society 
Index,” 46. 
 
This elitist condition within CSOs is perpetuated by their decision-making structures. On the one 
hand, only 6% of CSOs in Mexico allow their staff to have a direct input in the decision-making 
process. What is more, from those CSOs that work under a single person directive (75% of all CSOs 
in Mexico) only 45% elect their leaders.284 In addition to this, CSOs’ leadership tends to be related 
to Mexico’s business sector, particularly across those organisations working on public security. For 
instance, Causa en Comun CSO is presided by Maria Elena Morera, wife of businessman Pedro 
Galindo Rodriguez (bakery industry), Alto al Secuestro CSO is directed by businesswoman Isabel 
Miranda de Wallace and Mexico SOS CSO is coordinated by businessman Alejandro Martí.  
In Ai Camp’s words, this condition explicitly reaffirms the existence of ‘a power elite; a network 
of a small set of people who are the individual actors within Mexico’s power structure and who also 
share direct and informal access to other elite actors in their sphere of influence.’285  Yet,  as 
                                                             
284 Cortes et al., “A Snapshot of Civil Society in Mexico, Analytical Report on the CIVICUS Civil Society Index.” 
285 Ai Camp, “Mexican Political Elites in a Democratic Setting,” 288. 
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explained in the following sub-section, the elite is not completely responsible for the CSOs’ lack of 
representation and inclusion, as Mexico’s government actively co–opts and constrains CSOs.286  
4.4.1 CSOs, co–opted and not too efficient.    
 
According to Hipsher ‘Latin America’s political system is co–opting social leaders, if not 
marginalising and blocking the development of collective forms of protest,’ and Mexico seems to 
clearly exemplify this condition.287 In the 1970s, Mexico’s government co–opted workers’ unions 
through financial grants and the use of public force, rewarding allegiance to PRI and punishing the 
opposition. In the 2000s, the – allegedly – first democratically elected government neutralised its 
critics by making them part of the political system they were initially opposing. For instance, during 
Vicente Fox’s presidency, Rogelio Hermosillo, former director of Alianza Civica CSO (1995–1996), 
was named Director at the Ministry for Social Development (2001–2006).288 Maria Elena Morera’s 
(Causa en Comun) son worked for the Minister for Public Security. Alejandro Martí (Mexico SOS) has 
also been criticised for his ‘top–down activist views that do not correspond to the problems and 
reality lived by the millions of families in Mexico.’289 More recently, in 2012, the PAN convinced 
                                                             
286 Vreese, “The European Union as a Public Sphere.” 
287 Hipsher, “Democratic Transitions as Protest Cycles: Social Movement Dynamis in Democratizing Latin 
America,” 169. 
288 Ilan Bizberg, however, also identifies other examples where government did in fact use its control of the 
judiciary to either neutralise its opponents through incarceration practices, or benefit its supporters by 
not following –or blocking– adequate judicial practices. For example, during Felipe Calderon’s 
administration (2006–2012), Napoleón Gomez Urrutia, –then– director of the SNTMMSRM miners’ union 
and stronger opponent of private mining companies, was –Ilan Bizberg says– unfairly prosecuted for 
allegedly corrupt practices; but the historically corrupt SNTE teachers’ union was rewarded for the political 
support it offered to Calderon during the 2006 elections. Bizberg, “Una Democracia Vacía. Sociedad Civil, 
Movimientos Sociales y Democracia.,” 16. 
289 Grupo Formula, “Eduardo Gallo Llama Cupulares a SOS y Alto Al Secuestro. Con Ciro Gómez Leyva,” Grupo 
Formula, June 11, 2014, http://www.radioformula.com.mx/notas.asp?Idn=417951&idFC=2014 (Accessed 
22–12–2017); Davidson and Elstub, “Deliberative and Participative Democracy,” 367–85; Patricia Davila, 
“Gobierno Abre Espacios a Martí y Morera En Consejo Nacional de Seguridad,” Proceso, July 30, 2012, 
http://www.proceso.com.mx/315592/2012/07/30/gobierno–abre–espacios–a–marti–y–morera–en–
consejo–nacional–de–seguridad (Accessed 22–12–2017); La voz de la Frontera, “Sueño Guajiro,” La Voz 
de La Frontera, February 2014, http://www.oem.com.mx/lavozdelafrontera/notas/n3445871. (Accessed 
22–12–2017). 
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Miranda de Wallace (Alto al Secuestro) to run for office in one of Mexico City’s boroughs. Although 
unsuccessful, activist Javier Sicilia and journalist Gilberto Haaz said, this move illustrated how PAN 
‘co–opted this social fighter into the very tempting sphere of politics’ and ‘cheated on the real 
democracy’ 290 . These and other examples illustrate how despite CSOs might be the citizens’ 
preferred method for political activism (see chapter 4.3), there is an ‘abysmal distance between 
CSOs and the civil society they say they represent, but a close connection between their leaders and 
the inefficient government they say they criticise.’291 What is worse, the above cases support the 
notion that ‘politics can only be conceived from the top.’292 Thus, civil society as a whole is becoming 
more silent and fractured, as the CSOs’ agendas are drifting away from a systemic critique to 
progressively play the game of those institutions they were initially challenging. Consequently, as 
CSOs continue being led by a group of ‘university educated activists’ who assume their vision, 
realities, demands and basic needs are shared by everyone else, CSOs are losing credibility among 
citizens (Graph 14).293  This is why new politically radical and bottom up expressions of OCS, like the 
autodefensas movement studied in Chapter 6, are becoming more common across Mexico. 
 
 
                                                             
290  Jose Cardenas, “La Wallace Pone La Sal… y La Pimienta,” Excelsior, January 13, 2012, 
http://www.excelsior.com.mx/opinion/2012/01/13/jose–cardenas/801835 (Accessed 22–12–2017); 
Gilberto Haaz, “Acertijos,” El Sol de México, February 14, 2012, 
http://www.oem.com.mx/ELSOLDEORIZABa/notas/n2384807.htm (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
291  Francisco Rodriguez, “La Señora Morera,” Indice Político, October 25, 2012, 
http://www.indicepolitico.com/la–senora–morera/ (Accessed 22–12–2017); Alejandro Baltazar, “María 
Elena Morera, Activismo Al Servicio Del Gobierno Federal,” Revolucion Tres Punto Cero Michoacan, 
February 1, 2014, http://michoacantrespuntocero.com/maria–elena–morera–activismo–al–servicio–del–
gobierno–federal/ (Accessed 22–12–2017); Rosagel, “Dinero y Poder, Anzuelos Del Sistema Para 
Activistas.” 
292 Perez–Díaz, State, Bureaucracy and Civil society. A Critical Discussion of the Political Theory of Karl Marx 
New Studies in Sociology, 31, 76, 147; Bizberg, “Una Democracia Vacía. Sociedad Civil, Movimientos 
Sociales y Democracia.,” 21. 
293  Rosagel, “Dinero y Poder, Anzuelos Del Sistema Para Activistas”; Reyes, “La Ciudadania En Mexico. Un Beve 
Recuento Historico.” 
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Graph 14. Socio–political organisations' membership vis–à–vis the organisations’ political impact. 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from Gobernacion, “ENCUP 2001, Resúmen de 
Resultados”; INEGI, “ENCUP 2003, Resúmen de Resultados”; INEGI/SEGOB, “ENCUP 2008: Resultados de La 
Encuesta Nacional Sobre Cultura Política y Prácticas Ciudadanas”; INEGI/SEGOB, “ENCUP 2005.” 
 
What is more, in 2012 only 42% of the population considered that CSOs have had ‘a lot of 
impact’ in politics, a low percentage compared to the 70% of population that thought the same 
about political parties (see Graph 15). More worrying, in 2013, 40% of citizens considered CSOs 
would be less capable of influencing politics in the future,294 an opinion also shared by third sector 
professionals in Mexico, who believe CSOs are highly effective on public policy diagnosis but highly 
ineffective in policy creation or drafting, approval and implementation.295 In fact, according to the 
former Secretary of the Public Security Commission of the Chamber of Deputies, Deputy Elizabeth 
Oswelia, ‘CSOs–legislative interaction is mainly about forums’ rather than policy discussions.296  
                                                             
294 Reyes, “La Ciudadania En Mexico. Un Beve Recuento Historico.” 
295 FUSDA, “Las Organizaciones de La Sociedad Civil,” 31; Reyes, “La Ciudadania En Mexico. Un Beve Recuento 
Historico.”; Cortes et al., “A Snapshot of Civil Society in Mexico, Analytical Report on the CIVICUS Civil 
Society Index,” 57. 
296  Jose–Angel Garcia, “Inteview to Deputy Elizabeth Oswelia Yañez, Secretary of the Public Security 
Commission of the Chamber of Deputies (LX Legislature)” (Mexico City, 2013). 
2003 2005 2008 2012
Membership Political Parties 9.92 9.35 8.60 7.36
Membership Unions 11.89 9.51 13.10 6.23
Membership Citizen's
Organizations
14.01 13.26 8.30 11.74
Impact Political Parties 64 72 63 71
Impact Unions 54 56 48 53


























































































Graph 15. Internal and external perceptions of CSOs' impact on public policy 
 








Public Policy Diagnosis 
Internal 23.4 15.1 54.6 6.8 
External 31.9 31.9 27.7 8.5 
Matter placement on 
public agenda 
Internal 15.1 16 57.1 11.7 
External 10.6 27.7 53.2 8.5 
Public Policy Creation 
Internal 13.4 15.5 56.8 14.3 
External 2.2 26.1 54.3 17.4 
Public Policy Approval 
Internal 11.4 13.6 60.5 14.5 
External 2.2 13.3 55.6 28.9 
Public Policy 
Implementation 
Internal 10.1 16.7 58.9 14.3 
External 2.2 28.3 43.5 26.1 
Public Policy 
Evaluation 
Internal 11.7 12.9 58 17.4 
External 10.9 28.3 54.3 6.5 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from Cortes et al., “A Snapshot of Civil Society in Mexico, 
Analytical Report on the CIVICUS Civil Society Index.” 
 
In addition to this, other factors continue constraining civil society’s development and impact in 
policy discussions. To begin with, Azuela states, citizens’ organisations tend to have a reactive and 
temporary existence in Mexico, as they tend to focus on narrowed interests and look for personal, 
unorganised and one-off compensations and benefits.297 What is more, citizens rapidly disarticulate 
                                                             
297 Azuela, Primera Cumbre Ciudadana Para Construir Un México Pacífico y Justo. 
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their social collective action and return to their individualistic way of acting once the problem seems 
to have been solved, this is why,298 Bizberg and Lara argue, ‘Mexican civil society movements rarely 
transform into lasting political projects.’299 Various cases validate these arguments. For instance, in 
2004, a public demonstration in the name of public security mobilised 200,000 citizens in Mexico 
City. Despite its size, it did not accomplish any substantial political change, but was belittled by 
Mexico City’s Major (Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, current Presidential candidate) who referred 
to it as the ‘protest of the wealthy.’300 In 2011, the ‘Estamos hasta la madre’ (We are Fed Up) social 
movement organised by Javier Sicilia was joined by hundreds of thousands of citizens all across 
Mexico. Although the movement achieved the enactment of the ‘General Law of Victims’ (chapter 
5.4.1), the law was regarded as a deficient piece of legislation by Sicilia himself.301 Some of the 
reasons behind the limited effectiveness of these political actions, CIDAC and Antonio Crespo argue, 
are governmental co-optation, high levels of citizens’ political disengagement and lack of financial 
resources.302   
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Político, March 6, 2013, http://www.animalpolitico.com/blogueros–inteligencia–
publica/2013/03/06/ley–general–de–victimas–los–retos–ii/ (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
302 CIDAC, “La Iniciativa Ciudadana Más Allá de La Ley 3 de 3”; José Crespo, “Iniciativas Ciudadanas,” El 
Universal, February 8, 2016, http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/entrada–de–opinion/articulo/jose–
crespo/nacion/2016/02/8/iniciativas–ciudadanas (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
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In sum, it seems clear that even though Mexico achieved its democratisation (i.e. alternation of 
power) in 2000, a large section of the public still perceives it does not gain anything from the political 
game, even CSOs’ professionals regard civil society as fragile and lacking influence in public life and 
politics in general.303 Contrary to the pluralist system and participative democracy promised in 2000, 
Mexico’s socio–political scenario still emulates an elitist public sphere, where socio–political 
activism is dominated by the interests, preferences and projects of the wealthier and better 
organised.304  The country’s insecurity also continues raising social discontent with the political 
system to the extent that the public appears to have lost faith in the state’s capacity to respond to 
public demands and society no longer sees the state as an effective means of delivering the public 
good of public security.  
Taking this into account, this study seeks to contribute to the understanding and promotion of 
CSOs’ policy work in Mexico’s dangerous public sphere. This is why, notwithstanding Grant argues 
that ‘measuring, even estimating the effectiveness of any pressure group (including CSOs) is a 
difficult task’,305 this thesis conducts a systematic analysis of both the way CSOs operate and the 
policy objectives they achieve. What is more, considering that different scholars on Latin American 
studies argue that legal methods of political participation (e.g. forums with specialists, academia 
and government) are more policy efficient than extra–legal methods 306 , this thesis tests the 
efficiency of two very dissimilar forms of CSOs–government interaction, one, a politically 
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institutionalised and government sanctioned model (i.e. The First Citizen Summit in Chapter 5), the 
other, and an extra–legal and antagonist movement aiming to change the rules of the game (i.e. 
Autodefensas in Chapter 6). Through this comparative analysis, this thesis draws some meaningful 
conclusions about the rebirth of civil society and the deepening of a bottom–up democratic Mexico. 
Nevertheless, in order to do this, it is first necessary to understand the communication structures 
and relations that define citizens interactions, shape the structure and functioning of civil society 
and determine society-government interactions in policy-making processes.  
4.5 A mediatised public sphere in need of a citizenised media.  
 
Communication, say Patricia Duran et al, is ‘ideal for civil society and the objectives it pursues’; 
it allows them to enhance their impact and prestige, sensitise society about their work, gain further 
public credibility and become real agents of political change.307 Processes that, Habermas, Shaw and 
McCombs and other scholars argue, are heavily dependent on a free and informative media 
(Chapter 2). Media management is therefore – Tapia et al say – ‘an indispensable requisite for any 
CSO intending to influence public opinion, and public and governmental agendas.’308 With this in 
mind, it becomes essential to study the mediatised context that surrounds and determines the 
acting and effectiveness of OCS in Mexico where, (paradoxically) the mediatised public sphere 
seems to be constraining the development of a civic culture. 
According to  Javier Esteinou, ‘political discourses and the actions of popular representatives are 
not any longer the ones defining the Mexicans’ vision of themselves and their country’s future, but 
television and radio permanently influence the citizens’ minds and inform them about the conduct 
                                                             
307 Patricia Duran et al., “La Comunicación Estratégica y La Sociedad Civil,” Razon y Palabra 79, no. NA (2012): 
NA, http://www.razonypalabra.org.mx/N/N79/V79/18_DuranCisnerosMelendezGarcia_V79.pdf 
(Accessed 22–12–2017). 
308  Monica Tapia et al., “Manual de Incidencia En Políticas Públicas” (Mexico City, 2010), 91, 
http://www.alternativasycapacidades.org/sites/default/files/MIPP.pdf (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
109 
to be followed.’309 In this vein, with 73% of the population using the media as their main source of 
political information, and newspapers’ consumption having increased by over 100% between 2003 
and 2012, Mexico’s case reaffirms Temple, Hall, and Jacobs and Townsley’s works, showing that the 
media is ‘the main accessible source of information on public affairs and discussions’ (Chapter 
2.1).310 At the same time it supports Shaw and McCombs, Betancourt and other’s findings on the 
importance of media on public opinion making and public sphere shaping (Chapter 2).311 
Whilst in advanced democracies this mediatisation of the public sphere can foster the ‘ideal 
deliberative process’ and  ‘citizenised model of policy-making’ of which Cohen and Bua talk about 
(Chapter 2.1), in Mexico the mediatisation of public life is producing different results across the 
socio–economic sectors of the population.  First of all, regarding media consumption, the poorer 
citizens are, the more they consume TV and the less they read newspapers or use the Internet as 
main source of news information (Graph 17). 312  For example, whilst 56% of Mexico’s richest 
population (socio-economic group AB) watch TV to inform themselves about the country’s main 
news, the percentage grows to 71% across the poorest citizens (extreme poverty, socio-economic 
group E). With only 7% of the total TV programming in Mexico corresponding to news programmes, 
                                                             
309 Esteinou, “Hacia La Ciudadanización de Los Medios de Comunicación En México.” 
310  Temple, “A Forum for Frtuitcakes and Fascists: The Saviour of Mainstream Journalism,” 7; Jacobs and 
Townsley, The Space of Opinion, Media Intellectuals and the Public sphere, 63; Dahlgren, Television and 
the Public sphere: Citizenship, Democracy and the Media; Hall et al., Policing the Crisis. Mugging, the State 
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311  Betancourt, “The Development of the Media and the Public Sphere in Mexico”; Jerit, Barabas, and Bolsen, 
“Citizens, Knowledge, and the Information Environment”; Weaver, “Political Issues and Voter Need for 
Orientation”; van Dijk, News as Discourse; Lippmann, Public Opinion. 
312 Those living in extreme poverty continue relying on TV, however, expectedly, the financial cost of TV 
equipment pushes this % down among the ‘extreme poverty income group’ and, consequently, increases 
the level of radio consumption (a cheaper equipment). 
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the most vulnerable groups in Mexico lack of an adequate understanding of their communities and 
the country’s socio–political and economic reality.313   
The analysis of newspaper consumption produced contrasting results. In this case, the wealthier 
a person is, the more he/she uses this type of media for news information: whilst 11% of the AB 
socio economic group read newspapers, only 3% of the poorest group do it too (Graph 17). As 
newspapers tend to allow the opinions of a wider spectrum of voices, its readers (i.e. the wealthiest 
sector of Mexico’s society) are better informed about the society’s most pressing needs and the 
available mechanisms for influencing government’s decisions.314 
Graph 16. Use of TV/Radio and newspapers for news information (2012). 
 




                                                             
313 Including programming in state owned TV channels and those owned by two private media companies 
(Televisa and TV Azteca), but excluding cable or satellite TV. 25% of the programming of ‘free TV 
corresponds to commercialisation, 14% to movies and only 7% to news programmes. Regarding the ‘state–
owned TV’, it only reaches 47% of homes in Mexico with a rating of less than 1.7.  Rodrigo Gómez et al., 
“Los Medios Digitales: México” (Mexico, 2012), 21, 28, 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/mapping–digital–media–mexico–spanish–
20120606.pdf (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
314 For instance, in his 12 years analysis of news reports in 3 newspapers, Jose Santillan found that 23.6% of 
the articles were produced by academics, 19% by politicians 14% by journalists and 43% by invited guests 
2003 2005 2012
TV/Radio Daily 38 38 35
TV/Radio Sometimes 24 16 15
Newspaper Daily 7 15 15































Graph 17. Main sources of news information according to income level (2012)315 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from INEGI/Ministry of the Interior, “Quinta ENCUP 
2012.” 
 
More astonishing are the differences in the use of the internet as main source of news 
information. Although Mexico had the 4th highest number of blogs in the world in 2009, the internet 
in Mexico has not yet triggered the ‘deliberative democratic imaginary’ that Judith Bessant has 
found in other case studies.316 In fact, one of the most recent polls on the topic revealed there are 
more Mexicans aged 18+ reading newspapers than accessing internet articles, blogs or forums. 
Contrary to the UK, where the consumption of printed newspapers is in decline and the readership 
of electronic news outlets is increasing, in Mexico 93% of those reading newspapers prefer to do it 
from printed formats, and the majority of users of the internet are part of the wealthiest sector of 
the population (i.e. AB, C+ and C economic groups).317 
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Medios Digitales: México,” 51. 
317  INEGI, “Módulo Sobre Lectura. Febrero Del 2016.” (Aguascalientes, 2016), 
http://www.inegi.org.mx/saladeprensa/boletines/2016/especiales/especiales2016_04_02.pdf (Accessed 
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Graph 18. How complicated is politics? According to income level and type of media used (2012). 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from INEGI/Ministry of the Interior, Quinta ENCUP 
2012. 
 
Further analyses also reveal a connection between the unequal communicative distribution, and 
citizens’ public understanding and participation in politics. For example, those who use magazines, 
internet, social networks and newspapers as their main source of news information – mostly the 
richest socio-economic groups – consider politics less complicated than those who rely on TV, radio 
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and face-to-face comments – coincidentally those from the poorest income groups (see Graphs 18 
and 19).318  
Graph 19. Politics is too complicated vis–à–vis Media used by each income group (2012). 
 
Sources: Author’s own elaboration with information from INEGI/Ministry of the Interior, Quinta ENCUP 
2012.  
 
Correspondingly, citizens who rely on the Internet and newspapers as their main sources of 
information are more inclined to consider that society can have a stronger ‘influence in 
governmental decisions’ than those who rely on TV, Radio or Comments (Graphs 18 to 20).319  In 
this scenario it was not surprising to find that the richer a person was, the more news information 
that person had and the more probable it was that he/she had taken or attempted to take part in a 
protest or CSO movement (see Graph 21).320  
                                                             
318 Less than 35% of those who read magazines or use the internet to know about the news consider politics 
‘very complicated’, compared to 50% among those who use TV or Radio for the same purpose. 
INEGI/Ministry of the Interior, “Quinta ENCUP 2012.” 
319 For instance, whilst 34% of those who use newspapers consider citizens can influence those decisions ‘a 
lot’, only 25% of those who use radio are of the same opinion. 
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Graph 20. Can citizens influence government's decisions? (By type of media used, 2012). 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from INEGI/Ministry of the Interior, Quinta ENCUP 
2012. 
 
Graph 21. Citizens participating in protests and CSOs as % of each economic group (2012) 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from INEGI/Ministry of the Interior, Quinta ENCUP 
2012.  
 
The above findings provide important analytical elements for the following chapters of this 
thesis. First, the apparent connection between media consumption, socio–economic condition and 
citizens’ political participation supports Gustavo Cardoso and Jeff Chester’s argument that ‘society 
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and the public sphere are organised on the basis of media communication networks.’321  Therefore, 
as stated by Callan, Benjamin Moffitt and Simon Tormey (Chapter 2), for the public sphere to 
develop it is not sufficient that citizens passively receive information, there has to be an engaged 
citizenry creating their own public agenda.322 To put this better, citizens need not only to work under 
the established precepts of agenda–setting mechanisms, but, Cobb and Elder argue, transcend into 
an agenda building process.323  
Secondly, if this data is juxtaposed to Hall et al, Erbe, Madsen and Jacobs and Townsley’s work 
ensuring that media recruits the powerful, reproduces their messages and creates a hierarchy of 
credibility, this sub-chapter has illustrated how Mexico’s public sphere is defined by elite 
monologues. With over 77% of the low-income population (i.e. 68% of all Mexicans) relying on a 
type of media (TV) that devotes only 7% of its space to news information, the elite-dominated media 
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4.6. Final thoughts on Mexico’s dangerous and mediatised public sphere. 
 
The quantitative and qualitative analyses of data gathered from over 12,000 responses to 5 
different polls across 12 years suggests that although Mexico achieved its electoral democratisation 
in 2000, citizens’ involvement in politics continues to be very low and politically inefficient, limiting 
the public sphere’s potential in democratic politics. What is more, the few established forms of 
organised civil society (i.e. CSOs) seem to be dominated by educated and wealthy elites, neither 
encouraging bottom–up and inclusive decision–making within them, nor being effective in the three 
most important phases of the public policy cycle. If civil society is equated to CSOs, the cases of 
government co–option and business elite governance discussed in this Chapter portray a context in 
which there seems not to be any real decision-making process in the public sphere, but top–down 
political practices defining society’s future. Lack of access to media channels, limited information on 
non–electoral political activism and high levels of disaffection with politics are some of the factors 
that continue perpetuating a top–down ‘democracy’ in Mexico.  
Furthermore, it has become evident that the use of the media is an inescapable condition and 
indispensable tool for any social player intending to influence policy. ‘The media is not politics, but 
nowadays it is not possible to make politics without the media. Media are not political parties either, 
but it produces further political proselytism than any of these organisations’, Esteinou said, and he 
seems to be right.325 With Sanz, Bartel and Walgrave et al arguing that politics is witnessing an 
increasing mediatised democracy where ‘newspapers lead and politicians follow’, and with Mexican 
‘politicians following the old–school politics where nothing is news until it is published in the printed 
media’, newspapers seem to be the media outlet that OCS should be targeting in order to influence 
Mexico’s political sphere.326 However, just as argued by Esteinou argues, this sub-chapter has found 
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that the social nature of the media in Mexico is being determined by economic and political elites. 
Peasants’ organisations, indigenous groups, ecological movements, students’ organisations, even 
NGOs, lack media spaces in which to discuss social problems and promote their initiatives, to the 
extent that – Esteinou states – ‘media is truly amazingly capable of concealing their real country to 
Mexicans.’327 
Therefore, facing the media’s hidden politics, civil society should follow Tejeda’s advice and 
distance itself from traditional politics. To effectively secure its rebirth and foster the deepening of 
bottom–up policy-making in Mexico, the mediatised citizenry also needs to promote and secure the 
citizenisation of the media, particularly of the most influential outlets (i.e. newspapers). An 
energised OCS needs to open the established channels of communication, if not create new ones, 
to wider the public sphere and promote the organic development of an integral civil and political 
society. To do so, it needs to transform the imbalanced communicative and social pact that the PRI’s 
consolidated during its 70 year rule into a democratic and plural relationship that allows citizens to 
participate, contribute and co–define the country’s political and cultural spectrum. 328  
 
Having identified these important theoretical points, the following chapters analyse two distinct 
forms of organised civil society: one formally established, legally recognised, following a top–down 
management and conducting thin cooperation with government; the other, initially labelled as 
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Democracia y Los Derechos Humanos En América Latina,” Signo y Pensamiento XXVIII, no. 55 (2009): 164–
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illegal, even as a ‘threat to national security’, which arose from bottom–up political discontent.329 
Building on Grant’s work, Chapters 5 and 6 analyse how their acting and achievements under specific 
public sphere conditions (i.e. location, actors, media freedom, etc.) and political circumstances, 
reaffirm or refute both the preliminary conclusions given throughout this four first chapters and the 
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Chapter 5. Case study 1: Causa en Común CSO and the First 
Citizens’ Summit to Build a Peaceful and Fair Mexico. 
 
This chapter focuses on the First Citizen Summit to Build a Peaceful and Fair Mexico to study how 
established CSOs, working in a collaborative manner with government and lead by Mexico’s 
economic elite, gain public support and political relevance, and intend to achieve political changes. 
The main argument presented here is that institutionalised and government–sanctioned forms of 
OCS, not attempting to radically shake the political system, enjoy of constant and wide access to the 
main corridors of policy-making in Mexico. Nevertheless, it is precisely this lack of politically radical 
demands and tactics which impedes them from achieving quick and substantial policy gains for the 
society sector they argue to represent. Furthermore, this chapter demonstrates that influencing 
public policy involves a long process of negotiations and legislative drafting. This is why to regard 
the First Citizen Summit to Build a Peaceful and Prosperous Mexico, a two-day Summit, as the sole 
promoter or trigger of policy change – as its convenors have attempted to do – would be overstating 
its importance.  
To support this argument, this chapter develops different analyses throughout its five sub-
chapters, all of them building on data from primary documents of government policy (e.g. law 
discussions, constitutional changes, and legislative addresses), official memoirs and interviews with 
CSOs’ directors, Deputies and media editors. The First sub-chapter provides a succinct analysis of 
the public (in)security and antagonistic political scenario that triggered and surrounded Causa en 
Comun and other CSOs’ involvement in security related matters. The Second one studies the 
decision-making structure within ‘The First Citizen Summit to Build a Peaceful and Prosperous 
Mexico’, a civil society initiative of great importance in Mexico’s politics due to two main factors:  
120 
1. The Summit’s scale: involving over 100 CSOs from all across Mexico, the Summit managed to 
gather all the candidates running for Mexico’s presidency in the country’s elections of 2012 
to discuss – what the organisers described as – citizenly raised security initiatives.330 
2. The Summit’s socio–political importance: the Summit took place in a watershed moment in 
Mexican politics. In 2012, drug-trafficking related violence increased in 15 of Mexico’s 32 
states, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) returned to power after 12 years in 
opposition and Mexico’s biggest media company (i.e. Televisa) and PRI were accused of 
political corruption.331 These and other political events triggered the appearance of multiple 
social movements demanding the opening of greater spaced for citizens’ involvement in 
government decisions, however, none of them obtained as much political support and 
recognition as the First Citizen Summit.  
 
Considering that Van Dijk, Macek, Lazarsfeld, Shaw and McCombs, and others (see Chapter 3) 
regard the media as a key influencer of public and government agendas, the third sub-chapter 
studies the media coverage given to the Summit, its initiatives and the public (i.e. CSOs) and political 
players related to it. This permits discerning if this institutionalised and government-sanctioned 
form of civil society activism was able to position its demands as ‘newsworthy items’ and whether 
what was said and how it was said about them had an effect on public policy design. After this, the 
fourth sub-chapter matches the Summit’s proposals, with their media coverage and the legislative 
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5.1. Context: Public (in)security and electoral changes: pushing for national 
activism. 
 
By 2011 Mexico had already completed a decade of electoral democracy. Nevertheless, the 
mechanisms for justice provision and ‘bottom–up policy-making’ seemed to remain inefficient, if 
not inexistent. For instance, from 2000 to 2010, the number of crimes rose almost uninterruptedly 
across the majority of Mexico’s 32 states (see Figure 5). Just between 2007 and 2010 the official 
homicide rate grew more than in any other country in the world. What is worse, scholars like Leticia 
Ramírez, Leslie Solis and Nestor de Buen considered that the homicides’ dark figure could be even 
three times bigger than that of reported homicides (see Graph 22).332 A condition that prevails and 
keeps worsening throughout time due to citizens’ increasing distrust in the country’s judicial system. 
For example,  in 2011, 43% of the crimes committed in Mexico were not reported (see Graph 22), 
as 23% of the victims considered that doing it was a waste of time, 17% distrusted public authorities, 
11% believed it was a long and tedious procedure and 8% was afraid of the aggressor(s) revenge.’333 
Even when crimes were reported, justice was not delivered either: in Mexico City and Michoacan 
only 25% and 10% of the homicides cases end with formal sentences.334 Although Michoacan’s law 
establishes one of the harshest sentencing guidelines for homicide in Mexico (between 15 and 30 
years in prison), it has a conviction rate of less than 10%.335 If data is analysed at a national level the 
findings are more startling, as just 3.3% of all the homicide cases in Mexico end with a criminal 
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335 For a better comparison state by state, please refer to Annexes 14 and 15. Ramirez de Alba, Solís, and de 
Buen, “Indicadores de Víctimas Visibles e Invisibles de Homicidio,” 28,32,34. 
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conviction – a very low percentage compared to Chile’s 80%.336 These and other figures clearly 
describe a country where – in Pazo’s words – ‘there is a state of laws, but not rule of law.’337  
 
Figure 4. Geographic evolution of homicides in México. 
 
Source: Ramirez de Alba, Solís, and de Buen, “Indicadores de Víctimas Visibles e Invisibles de Homicidio,” 19. 
 
Graph 22. Visible vs Invisible homicides in Mexico 
 
Source: Ramirez de Alba, Solís, and de Buen, 27. 
Political disaffection was also high. In 2010, 73% of Mexicans were unsatisfied with the country’s 
democracy, 76% did not trust political parties and 10% of the young population declared they will 
                                                             
336  Ramirez de Alba, Solís, and de Buen, 32; RadioFormula, “Crean Organizaciones Sociales Frente Común Por 
Un México Pacífico y Justo.” 




never participate in politics.338 In this context, Mexicans were regrettably getting accustomed to 
living with high criminal rates and a government incapable of addressing even their most pressing 
security needs. Nevertheless, according to Maria Elena Morera (President of Causa en Comun CSO), 
the straw that broke the camel’s back was the attack to the Casino Royale casino in Mexico’s 
northern state of Nuevo Leon.339 On the 25th of August 2011, one year before Mexicans elected their 
57th President, an organised criminal group arrived at the casino, attacked the staff and customers, 
locked the venue’s doors and set the place on fire, murdering 52 people.340 That event, Morera says, 
marked a watershed moment in citizens’ activism, as the ‘representatives of civil society felt 
compelled to act and build an articulated citizenry co–responsible for public policy decisions.’341  
Building on the electoral context that surrounded the presidential election of 2012, including the 
facilities it provided for social mobilisation and citizens’ increasing political disaffection, fifteen CSOs 
                                                             
338 24 Horas, “Organizaciones Realizan Primera Cumbre Ciudadana,” 24 Horas, May 21, 2012, http://www.24–
horas.mx/oranizaciones–realizan–primera–cumbre–ciudadana/ (Accessed 22–12–2017); FUNDECI, 
“Pronunciamiento Primer Cumbre Ciudadana” (Mexico City: FUNDECI, 2012), 
http://www.fundeci.org/2012/05/pronunciamiento–primer–cumbre–ciudadana.html (Accessed 22–12–
2017); NTX, “Desinteresados En Política, 80% de Jóvenes,” El Universal, March 17, 2010, 
http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/666686.html (Accessed 22–12–2017); LASS, “Los Mexicanos Son 
Desinteresados En Política,” LASS, February 5, 2012, http://www.las5.mx/noticia/7633/los–mexicanos–
son–desinteresados–en–politica (Accessed 22–12–2017); CIDAC, “OSCs En México: El Reto de La 
Autonomía” (Mexico City, 2012), 
http://www.nuevamayoria.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3487&Itemid=1 
(Accessed 22–12–2017). 
339 Gustavo Sanchez, “Las 50 Ciudades Más Peligrosas Del Mundo; 9 Son Mexicanas,” Aristegui Noticias, 
February 7, 2013, http://aristeguinoticias.com/0702/mexico/las–50–ciudades–mas–peligrosas–del–
mundo–9–son–mexicanas/ (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
340 Gobierno de la República Mexicana, “Primera Cumbre Ciudadana Para Construir Un México Pacífico y 
Justo” (Mexico: Gobierno de la República Mexicana, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XKzw0fz3y3s (Accessed 22–12–2017); BBC News, “Mexico Drugs 
Crisis: Monterrey Shocked by Casino Attack,” BBC News, August 27, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world–latin–america–14693074 (Accessed 22–12–2017); Chritsian Rea, 




341  24 Horas, “Organizaciones Realizan Primera Cumbre Ciudadana”; FUNDECI, “Pronunciamiento Primer 
Cumbre Ciudadana”; Jose–Angel Garcia, “Interview to Maria Elena Morera, President of Causa En Común 
CSO.” (Mexico City, 2013). 
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joined forces to organise what would become the First Citizens’ Summit to Build a Peaceful and Fair 
Mexico – a Summit aiming to influence the policy agenda of who was going to become president of 
Mexico.342  With Maria Elena Morera and Causa en Comun leading this important initiative, the 
following sub-chapter analyses the Summit’s structure in order to identify the level of influence that 
citizens (either individually or through other forms of collective action) could have achieved in the 
definition of the Summit’s proposals.  
5.2 Causa en Comun, other CSOs and the Summit’s organisation.  
 
Causa en Comun and its Director, Maria Elena Morera, are two of the most recognisable 
institutions in social activism in Mexico; two names, if not ‘brands’ that appeared in the socio–
political scenario as a result of the kidnapping of Morera’s husband in 2001. This unfortunate event 
and the previous kidnapping of her brother in law in 1995, pushed Morera to join and preside over 
Mexico Unido Contra la Delincuencia (MUCD) in 2003, a CSO created by businesswoman Josefina 
Ricaño, whose son was also kidnapped and murdered in 1997.343 In her swearing–in speech as 
MUCD’s president, Morera stated ‘MUCD was going to be nobody’s accomplice:  
If someone is acting badly we are going to evidence him/her. MUCD 
does not obey any kind of political or ideological interest, and our 
characteristics are plurality, openness, a constructive criticism and a 
proactive attitude. To media, we ask you to use your power and 
                                                             
342 Joanna Lavinia, “Las Organizaciones Civiles y Sociales (OCS) En México y Su Presencia En Los Medios de 
Comunicación Impresos Nacionales,” La Implicación de Las Organizaciones Civiles y Sociales (OCS) En La 
Evaluación de La Gobernanza En México. (Paris: Instituto de Investigación y debate sobre la gobernanza, 
2008), http://www.institut–gouvernance.org/es/analyse/fiche–analyse–386.html (Accessed 22–12–
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343 Benjamín Castrejan and Jesús Hernández, “Una Odontóloga Contra La Delincuencia,” Expansión, 2008, 
http://www.cnnexpansion.com/actualidad/2008/09/03/alza–su–voz–contra–la–delincuencia; MUCD, 
“Mensaje de MUCD,” Grupo Paladín, n.d., 
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“Memorias de Un Secuestrador,” Contralínea, 2010, http://contralinea.info/archivo–
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influence to exhibit that delinquency is failing and society detests it, but 
also to continue with your constructive criticism and proactive approach 
towards government, whilst recognising those who are working well. 344   
 
Six years later, in 2009, Morera left MUCD to set-up her own CSO, Causa en Comun, where she 
committed ‘to work to open more spaces for citizens’ participation and public deliberation, and to 
create more democratic institutions’ in Mexico.345 Although relatively new, being 8 years old Causa 
en Comun has already overcome the short life expectancy of Mexican CSOs of just two years, and 
established itself as an authority in Mexico’s social activism sector.346 Since its foundation, Causa en 
Comun has coordinated national-scale projects with government and other leading CSOs, however, 
not all of them have been as successful as planned nor have they achieved the expected results: 
v In 2010 MUCD subscribed to the government’s National Agreement for 
Security, Justice and Legality 2008–2012, setting actions, targets, times and 
responsibilities across government institutions to strengthening the State’s 
capacity on public security provision.347 The agreement, however, did not 
accomplished its goals to the extent that Morera declared that it let society 
down as ‘government forgot about citizens by providing unsubstantiated 
figures on unfinished commitments’ to citizens’ demands.348   
 
v In 2011, working with the Electoral Institute of the State of Mexico, Causa en 
Comun created and promoted the programme The safest thing is to vote, to 
increase the electoral turnout in that year’s Governor election.349 Despite a 
large media campaign and the participation of senior political figures, the 
initiative ended producing the second lowest electoral turnout since 1986.350  
                                                             
344 MUCD, “Toma de Protesta de Maria Elena Morera.” 
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http://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5057719&fecha=25/08/2008 (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
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in Causa En Comun” (Mexico City, 2014). 
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http://www.excelsior.com.mx/2011/06/01/nacional/741594 (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
350 NOTIMEX, “La Elección Rebasó El Promedio de Abstencionismo En El Estado de México,” CNN Mexico, July 
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Notwithstanding the extent of these and other programme failures, Causa en Comun remains 
being an active political actor and one of the CSOs with which citizens are most familiarised with. In 
this vein, in 2011, in the midst of the Presidential race, Causa en Comun launched the initial call to 
organise the First Citizen Summit for a Peaceful and Fair Mexico. Defined by Morera as an 
‘unprecedented event’ and one of Causa en Comun’s most successful programmes, the Summit 
gathered all the country’s political parties, over 200 CSOs from across Mexico and the then 
presidential candidates (including current President Peña Nieto).351 Some of the CSOs that joined 
Maria Elena Morera as convenors of the Summit included Iluminemos México, coordinated by textile 
businessman Jorge Elias Kuri; Mexico Unido Contra la Delincuencia, overseen by businesswoman 
Josefina Ricaño and Mexico SOS, directed by sports businessman Alejandro Martí.352 Motivated by 
‘the violence crisis, the impunity and corruption problems, and citizens’ exclusion from the decision–
making processes’, Morera argued, more CSOs started to join the Summit’s discussions. By 
November 2011, nineteen CSOs were already meeting biweekly and by January 2012, thirty were 
already involved in the Summit (see Annex 4), scheduled for the 21st and 22nd of May 2012.353 
Aiming to create a ‘mega–event’ (as described by Morera herself) that represented Mexico’s 
plural civil society, the convenors of the Summit (see Annex 4) conducted a poll with CSOs in the 
country to produce a list of citizens’ demands with regards to public security. With more than 100 
respondents, the convening CSOs prepared a draft list of topics to be discussed during the two-day 
                                                             
351  Maria Morera in Garcia J, “Interview to Maria Elena Morera, President of Causa En Comun CSO (4 
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352 Maite Azuela, “Una Historia Que Vale La Pena Contar,” in Primera Cumbre Ciudadana Para Construir in 
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Summit. In this vein, for a topic to be included in the Summit’s final list it needed to comply with at 
least one of two characteristics:  
1) To be supported/mentioned by at least two respondents. 
2) To be a topic with less than 33% of respondents voting against it.354  
 
Following this selection process, the following topics were included in the Summit’s agenda:  
1) Strengthening of Civil Society Organisations. 
2) Political Reform and citizens’ participation. 
3) Inclusion and social cohesion. 
4) Quality education. 
5) Transparency and Accountability. 
6) Sustainable Economic Development and worthy employment. 
7) Citizens security, justice and human rights.355 
 
With a defined agenda, the convenors started working on what Maria Elena Morera considered 
were four key strategies to succeed in opening more political spaces for social leaders, facilitating 
political dialogue and achieving the Summit’s policy influence:356 
1. Positioning the issue of participative democracy in the media’s agenda: 
From the convening CSOs’ point of view it was important that each one of 
the matters discussed and proposals made before, during and after the 
Summit were part of public discussions and public opinion: ‘an ongoing flow 
of information about the CSOs’ activities to, towards and through the media 
was essential for the Summit’s success’, they said.357  
2. The construction of a common agenda: A central problem in the design of 
associational structures, Schmitter and Streech argue, is the management 
of internal interest diversity; a matter that becomes more noticeable when 
a supra–organisation (in this case Causa en Comun) or movement (i.e. the 
Summit) intends to feed a variety of viewpoints into other organisations’ 
decision–making processes.358 In this case, the  participants ‘committed to 
yield in their private interests in order to achieve a common goal.’359 
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Maria Elena Morera, President of Causa En Común CSO (4-Nov-2012),” pt. Minute 4:05. 
357 Azuela, Primera Cumbre Ciudadana Para Construir Un México Pacífico y Justo, 111. 
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3. Implementation of a less confrontational decision–making voting system: 
Considering the ideological differences across the organisations, the 
convening CSOs did not implement a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ voting system but a ‘traffic 
light voting–system’. In words of Maria Elena Morena, this system used a 
green card vote meaning total agreement, a yellow one signifying I have 
doubts and am not enthusiastic about the idea, but I can live with it, and a 
red one vote expressing complete disagreement with the proposal. As a 
result, rather than proposals being immediately discarded, through yellow 
votes the ideas were ‘tolerated’ for their discussion during the Summit.360  
4. Engage Mexico’s most important political forces in the process: ‘The higher 
the level of the political actors involved, Morera argued, the better and 
more efficient the results would be.’ In this vein, all Mexican political 
parties’ leaders and their presidential candidates attended the Summit. 
 
Through the implementation of these strategies, by March 2012 the convenors had already 
engaged 37 CSOs with the Summit’s activities. Nevertheless, the Summit’s composition ended up 
validating Grant’s findings: ‘in a centralised political system (like Mexico), the effective insider 
groups need to be in, or close to the metropolis’.361  In this vein, those CSOs from outside Mexico 
City, with less visibility and less financial resources, were unable to participate in the design and 
execution of the Summit as much as their counterparts based in the country’s capital.362 Whilst 
Iluminemos México, Mexico Unido Contra la Delincuencia and Causa en Comun (all established in 
Mexico City and the last two associated to Morera) were involved in 41%, 44% and 100% of the 
Summit; Puebla Vigila, from the State of Puebla (2 hrs from Mexico City) and Fundación Comunitaria 
Oaxaca, from the State of Oaxaca (8 hrs from Mexico City), were only able of participating in 18% 
and 3% of the process (i.e. the further they were located from Mexico City, the less they could be 
involved in the process) (see Figures 6 and 7).363 
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Figure 5. CSOs' participation in the First Citizens' Summit for a Peaceful and Fair Mexico (by level of participation in meetings, measured in %). 
 
Source: Mariana Azuela, Primera Cumbre Ciudadana para Construir un México Pacífico y Justo,  UNAM,  1st Edition (Mexico  City, 2013).
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Figure 6. Dispersion of the participant CSOs. 
 
Source: Mariana Azuela, Primera Cumbre Ciudadana para Construir un México Pacífico y Justo, UNAM,  
1st Edition, p.31 (Mexico  City, 2013). 
 
Notwithstanding these unequal opportunities for participation in the Summit, by May 2012, 168 
CSOs were participating in the Summit’s discussion tables on 7 main categories:364 
1) Strengthening of an organised civil society 
2) Political reform and citizen participation 
3) Transparency, accountability and access to information and media 
4) Social inclusion and cohesion 
5) Quality education 
6) Dignified employment and sustainable economic development 
7) Citizens’ security and human rights 
 
Looking for examples of the rebirth of OCS in the public sphere and bottom–up policy-making in 
public security, this thesis solely focuses on the ‘access to information and media’, and ‘citizen’s 
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security’ matters. In this vein, for ‘access to information and media’, the convenors agreed that the 
Summit should work on proposals related to:  
a) Developing a legislative reform that limits media monopolies, promotes 
pluralism within the public media and improves the quality of media 
contents.  
b) Guaranteeing the universal access to internet in Mexico and establish a 
national plan to boost it across society.   
 
In ‘citizens security’ CSOs would focus on proposals linked to:  
a) Securing the implementation of a ‘Law of Victims’ and the related 
secondary reforms. 
b) Ensuring the permanent citizens’ participation in the National Council of 
Public Security. 
c) Promoting an effective national policy on human rights. 
d) Guaranteeing the implementation of the penal reform in all the states 
across Mexico. 
e) Promoting alternative methods for conflict resolution. 
 
Photo 1. An example of a CSOs' discussion panel during the First Citizens' Summit to Build a Peaceful and 
Fair Mexico. 
 
Source: Pablo Mayorga, “Organizaciones Civiles Alistan Propuestas Ciudadanas Para Los Candidatos,” 
CNN, May 21, 2012, http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2012/05/21/organizaciones–civiles–alistan–
propuestas–ciudadanas–para–los–candidatos (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
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These, and the rest of the topics on the agenda, were voted by 168 CSOs, after a total of 07:45 
hours of discussion on the 21st of May (see Photo 1).365 Through this process, and notwithstanding 
the fact that 74% of the participant CSOs were from Mexico City and 9 states (including Michoacan) 
lacked any representation in the Summit (see Figure 7), the participant CSOs’ produced what they 
called the ‘Agenda of the Mexican civil society’ for the future President of Mexico including the 
following specific medium–term public policy demands:’366  
Table 9. CSOs’ demands in the First Citizens' Summit for a Peaceful and Just Mexico. 
On Access to information and media On Citizens’ Security 
1. To design a legislative reform that limits 
monopolies in media and 
telecommunications, promotes pluralism 
with public, indigenous, social and 
communitarian media, transparency and 
quality of media content.  
1. To generate a strategy so the provision of public 
security is administered by security personnel and 
organisations prepared for that function, creating 
a Civil Auditor Body for this matter. 
2. To guarantee the universal access to 
broadband and the neutrality of the 
network, as well as a comprehensive policy 
of digital television that guarantees the 
access and redistribution of the new digital 
dividend, allowing for the inclusion of new 
actors.   
2. To make an effective national policy of human 
rights, in accordance to the constitutional reform 
on the matter, including the mechanisms to 
guarantee its application (i.e. approval of the 
Amparo Law)  
3. To protect the right to information through 
effective measures guaranteeing media and 
journalists’ security.  
3. To review the policy on drugs, due to the impact 
it has in organised criminality and public security.  
 4. Ensure citizens’ permanent participation in the 
National Council of Public Security. 
 5. Guarantee the adequate implementation of the 
Judicial Reform in the States and Federation: 
a) Create Centres of Justice for Women that 
support the victims during the allegation and 
the entire process. 
b) Implement a professional career service for 
Public Ministry offices. 
 6. To typify the crime of ‘disappeared people.’ 
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 7. Creation of a National Citizens Observatory to 
ensure the implementation of the Law against 
Human trafficking.  
 8. Ensure the adequate implementation of the Law 
of Victims and implement the secondary reforms 
a) Immediate publication in the Diario Oficial de la 
Federación. 
 
On the 22nd of May 2012, the CSOs presented the presidential candidates with their policy 
proposals, ‘demanding’ (they said) the following actions: 
a) To reply to their proposals within 15 days (i.e. 10th of June 2012), stating 
his/her views and actions to be implement if being elected President. 
b) To name a point of contact to give follow up to their demands. 
c) To establish follow up meetings throughout his/her administration 
(2012–2018) in order to monitor the implementation of such policies.367  
 
Having said this and outlined both the Summit’s decision-making process and its ‘public agenda’ 
on media access and public security, it is necessary to assess whether this initiative did ‘favour civil 
society’s appropriation of public discussion and empower it in the policy–making process’, as argued 
by the Summit’s convenors.368 This is why, the following sections study the Summit’s impact on 
media and policy agendas in order to solve the following secondary questions:  
What does the analysis of public security policy suggest about the rebirth of civil society 














How do the processes occurring within the public sphere 
contribute to the generation of a bottom–up political change? 
How much power does the public have?369 
Micro 
Mechanisms / 
Case Studies / 
Tools 
Is a thicker model of democracy, built around social capital, 
allowing civil society to set the agenda? Or does a top–down 
process continue dominating the agenda setting of public 
security policy in Mexico? 
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5.3 The Summit and its influence over the media agenda.   
 
The previous section depicted the motives, organisation and political objectives behind the First 
Citizen Summit to Build a Peaceful and Fair Mexico. Building on that, this section looks at how that 
CSOs’ initiative achieved to transform the public sentiment (i.e. the Summit’s Agenda of the Mexican 
civil society) into a news worthy topic capable of influencing political decisions, as it would have 
been suggested by Kingdon, Wolfe, Jones and Baumgartner.370 
According to Trenz, ‘media plays an important role as an agenda setter’, so important that, 
Lippmann argued, it acts as our window to the vast world beyond direct experience and becomes 
our cognitive map of that world.371 In the same line, political analysts like Sanz have stated, ‘the 
political system is now working under a mediatised democracy mobilised by a persuasive media.’ 372 
More specifically, the President of Mexico’s National Commission for Human Rights, Luis Raul 
Gonzalez, has acknowledged how important it is for civil society to have a systematic and permanent 
access to media in order to attract government’s attention to its demands.373 Considering these 
statements, and in order to identify whether they were true in the case of the First Citizen Summit, 
this section builds on McCombs, Chibnall, Van Dijk and others’ work on agenda-setting (see Chapter 
3) to assess the Summit’s achievements in setting the media agenda. To do that, it analyses more 
than 2,000 news reports published between the 1st of January 2010 (around the creation of Causa 
en Comun CSO) and the 31st of December 2014 (when the last news report on the Summit was 
published) in three of the most important newspapers in Mexico (i.e. El Universal, El Reforma and 
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El Norte), each one with a different, if not antagonistic, editorial line.374  To allow for replicable 
studies, the news reports here analysed correspond to those ones matching to specific ‘term’s 
search combinations’ in Lexis Nexis’ news search engine (see Table 10). 
Table 10. News term search combinations to identify the capacity of CSOs to become newsworthy. 
Intended finding Case Term(s) search combination 
Capacity to become 
“newsworthy” 
Causa en Común Causa en Común or Maria Elena Morera 
Iluminemos México Iluminemos México or Elías Kuri 
Mexico Unido Contra 
la Delincuencia 
Mexico Unido Contra 
la Delincuencia 
or Josefina Ricaño 
México S.O.S. México S.O.S. or Alejandro Martí 
Observatorio Nacional Observatorio Nacional 
 
To begin with, this part of the research found that from all the five original convenors of the 
Summit, Mexico SOS was the Summit’s CSO that the printed media mentioned the most between 
January 2010 and December 2014.375 With a total of 763 news reports, El Universal, La Jornada and 
El Norte published an average of five articles per week on the CS’s activities. Maria Elena Morera 
and Causa en Comun came in second place with 629 reports, an important figure considering this 
CSO is the youngest among the five convening CSOs. Behind them were Josefina Ricaño and Mexico 
                                                             
374 Printed media was selected due to its importance in Mexico’s socio–political spheres. For discussion see 
section 3.2.1 and Luis Martinez, “Mercado de Periódicos Impresos Mexicano Crecerá En Ventas y 
Producción” (Mexico City, 2015), http://www.pwc.mx/mercado-de-periodicos-impresos-mexicano-
crecera-ventas-y-produccion (Accessed 22-12-2017); Jackson Jasper, “National Daily Newspaper Sales Fall 
by Half a Million in a Year,” The Guardian, April 10, 2015, 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/apr/10/national-daily-newspapers-lose-more-than-half-a-
million-readers-in-past-year (Accessed 22-12-2017). 
375 For purposes of this research, printed media is represented by the newspapers El Universal, El Reforma 
and El Norte. Considered influential due to their presence across the national territory and the number of 
daily copies printed: El Norte, in the state of Nuevo Leon, with more 161,000 copies per day and 77m  page 
views online; El Universal, with national presence but mainly distributed in the centre of Mexico, with 
170m page views online and 180,000 copies per day; Metro, in the State of Mexico, with 20,000 copies 
per day; and Reforma, with national presence but mainly distributed in the centre of Mexico, with 140,000 
copies and 35m page views online.  In Coordinación Nacional de Comunicación Social: Instituto Federal 




Unido Contra la Delincuencia (496 news reports), Observatorio Nacional Ciudadano (137) and Elias 
Kuri and Iluminemos Mexico (76) (See Annex 5). However, whilst Mexico SOS achieved the biggest 
media coverage between 2010 and 2015, its media presence has been decaying throughout time. 
Possibly the result of the lack of new socio-political projects or the absence of an efficient media 
strategy, Mexico SOS seems to have stopped being as interesting to the media as before, passing 
from having 170 news reports in 2010 to less than 100 in 2014. The same occurred with MUCD and 
Iluminemos Mexico, the former going down from 131 articles to 56, and the latter from 32 to just 
two in the same period of time. Contrary to this, Maria Elena Morera and Causa en Comun’s media 
presence has augmented overall, from having 96 articles published about them in 2010, to 131 news 
reports in 2014. In fact, Causa en Comun was the only convening CSO that enjoyed a permanent 
monthly presence in the printed media across the five years analysis. Observatorio Nacional 
Ciudadano, a ‘super citizens organisation’ founded in September 2010 by MUCD, Iluminemos 
Mexico, Mexico SOS and Causa en Comun, among other CSOs, also increased its media presence, 
from five news reports in 2010 to nearly 60 in 2014 (see Annex 18 and Table 11) Although this cannot 
be taken as an indicative of a correlation between a CSOs’ age and the level of media coverage it 
receives, the fact that media coverage to the older CSOs (i.e. MUCD being founded in 1998, and 
Mexico SOS and Iluminemos Mexico in 2008) has declined while that to the newer CSOs has – 
relatively – increased, provides new information to suggest the possibility of a cyclical evolution of 
civil society presence in the media. An issue that could be the subject of new research on the 
interaction between the media and public agendas.  
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Table 11. Number of news reports about Causa en Comun, Iluminemos Mexico, MUCD, Mexico SOS and 
Observatorio Nacional Ciudadano per year and newspaper (2010–2014) 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from Lexis Nexis. 
The media analysis also suggests that, in contrast to what MacDougall would expect, CSOs did 
not have to ‘fight’ with each other for media attention. In this vein, a Pearson correlation test 
showed no strong correlation between the number of news reports on one CSO and those of 
another one. Even in the case where media competition could be expected (i.e. MUCD vis-a-vis 
Causa en Comun – as Morera left the former to set-up the latter), the Pearson test showed no 
significant correlation between the news articles published on Causa en Comun and those on MUCD 
(r=0.050), nor vice–versa (r=0.050) (Table 12). Qualitative data also backs this finding, with media 
professionals like BBC reporter Juan Perez, assuring ‘the printed media in Mexico does not have a 
minimum or maximum space for news reports on the topic of civil society.’376  
                                                             
376 Jose–Angel Garcia, “Interview to Juan Perez, BBC Reporter for Latin America” (Mexico City, 2014), pt. Min: 
5:30. 
Norte Reforma Universal Norte Reforma Universal Norte Reforma Universal Norte Reforma Universal Norte Reforma Universal Total
2010 27 44 25 9 17 6 36 59 36 44 81 45 2 2 1 434
2011 45 71 62 1 9 2 29 40 19 57 99 66 5 5 2 512
2012 41 67 20 5 12 0 22 49 14 43 73 47 11 17 5 426
2013 27 48 21 3 10 0 18 44 4 33 54 22 8 17 4 313
2014 32 67 32 0 2 0 14 30 12 26 47 26 14 30 14 346
Total 172 297 160 18 50 8 119 222 85 203 354 206 40 71 26 2031
Observatorio NacionalCausa en Comun Iluminemos Mexico MUCD Mexico SOS
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Table 12. Analysis of correlation across the news media coverage given to Causa en Comun, MUCD, 
Iluminemos Mexico, Mexico SOS and Observatorio Nacional Ciudadano. 
 
 
Whilst other studies would build on this initial assessment to state that Mexico’s printed media 
does provide civil society with spaces to deliberate on the government’s actions and communicate 
their strategies and proposals, therefore, to argue that media fulfils its role as main interlocutor of 
the public sphere,377 this research went beyond and developed a more thorough study, which 
contrary to the preliminary findings, illustrated an actual reduction of media coverage to CSOs.  In 
this vein, although media coverage to certain CSOs (i.e. Causa en Comun) (see Graph 23) has 
                                                             
377 See, for instance, Reyes, “La Ciudadania En Mexico. Un Beve Recuento Historico.” 
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increased throughout time, the overall media coverage to civil society diminished between 2010 
and 2014, passing from an average of 37 monthly news reports in 2010 to 29 in 2014 (see Graph 
23).378 
Graph 23. Number of annual news reports about Mexico SOS, Causa en Comun, Iluminemos Mexico and 
MUCD  (2010–2014). 
          
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from Lexis Nexis. 
                                                             
378 For this specific chapter, ‘civil society as a whole’ is represented by the five convener CSOs: MUCD, Causa 
en Comun, Iluminemos Mexico, Mexico SOS and Observatorio Nacional Ciudadano.  
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Graph 24. Linear trend analysis of media coverage to civil society in Mexico (2010–2014). 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from Lexis Nexis. 
It would be incorrect, though, to point to the media as being solely responsible for this decrease. 
CSOs themselves lack the resources to position their stories in the news media, even of conducing 
media market research to design an influential media strategy. With not all media outlets paying 
the same level of attention to their work, it would be expected that CSOs work to establish a close 
relationship with those newspapers that currently provide the most limited coverage to their 
activities (i.e. El Universal). However, evidence suggests this is not being done:  
- Iluminemos Mexico is mostly represented, and its activities carried on by just one individual, 
its Director, Elías Kurí, who lacks specialist media management skills.379  
- MUCD ‘does not conduct a media follow–up, as ‘the CSO lacks the resources to do it.’380 
                                                             
379 Jose-Angel Garcia, “Interview to Elias Kuri, Director of Iluminemos Mexico (27-Nov-2012)” (Mexico City, 
2012). 
380 Lisa Sanchez in Garcia J., “Personal Interview to Lisa Sanchez, Programme Coordinator, Mexico Unido 
Contra la Delincuencia” (Mexico City, 2014), pt. Minuto 58:00; Homero Tapia in Garcia J., “Personal 
Interview to Homero Tapia–Perez, Coordinator of the Government Collaboration Programme. Mexico 
Unido Contra la Delincuencia.” (Mexico City, 2012). 
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- Causa en Comun acknowledged they did not have the capacity to conduct media analyses.381  
This not only evidenced the CSOs’ limited use of media as a key tool to influence the public sphere 
and political discussions. Paraphrasing Octavio Chavez, CSOs are still incapable of working within 
the ‘triangular relation between democracy, public opinion and media.’382 What is more, with CSOs 
stating that ‘media provides a better coverage of their activities with politicians during electoral 
times to then focus more on the politicians’ actions’, the impact of civil society in Mexican politics 
seems to be reduced to election periods – just as Castells argued.383  
Overall, this sub-chapter has illustrated the CSOs’ capacity to become ‘sufficiently attractive’ 
actors for media coverage. Causa en Comun, MUCD, Mexico SOS, Iluminemos Mexico and 
Observatorio Nacional Ciudadano, have found spaces in three of the most influential newspapers in 
Mexico.  Nevertheless, their scarce financial and human resources impede them from developing 
an effective media strategy to improve their presence in printed media. With limited media 
coverage to CSOs’ activities, the effectiveness of the public sphere as a central future of a bottom–
up democracy is also jeopardised. In such a scenario, Benjamin Moffitt, Tormey, Habermas and 
Bessant’s ideals and understanding of the public sphere would not materialise either as the public 
sphere cannot become the space where citizenry could ‘champion common sense from bureaucrats 
and shape the development of society as a whole’ (Chapter 2).384 
                                                             
381 Garcia, “Interview to Maria Elena Morera, President of Causa En Común CSO (4-Nov-2012).” 
382 Ruiz Chavez, “Transformación de La Esfera Pública: Canal Del Congreso y La Opinión Pública.” 
383 Garcia, “Interview to Maria Elena Morera, President of Causa En Común CSO (4-Nov-2012),” pt. Minute 
12:00. Jesica Zermeño, “Ciudadanos: Campaña Paralela; Reportaje Elecciones y Sociedad Civil. Mientras 
Los Partidos y Sus Candidatos Están En Campaña, La Sociedad Civil Organizada Trabaja Para Fijarle Una 
Agenda Al Próximo Presidente de La República,” Reforma, May 13, 2012. Castells, “The New Public Sphere: 
Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, and Global Governance.” 
384  Sparks, “Entertaining the Crisis: Television and Moral Enterprise,” 50; Habermas, The Structural 
Transformation of the Public sphere: An Inquiry Into a Category of Bourgeois Society., 359; Vreese, “The 
European Union as a Public Sphere,” 8. 
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Building on these findings on the media coverage given to individual CSOs, it results interesting 
to study whether a cohort of CSOs (i.e. the Summit) is capable of achieving a greater influence over 
the media agenda in Mexico, particularly between the 26th of August 2011 (day of the attack to 
Casino Royale casino) and the 31st of December 2014 (when the last news report on the Summit was 
published) (See Annex 6).  
5.3.1 The Summit’s Citizen Agenda and its influence over Mexico’s media agenda. 
 
Although Causa en Comun and the other convening CSOs started working on the Summit in 
September 2011, no printed media reported on the discussions that preceded the Summit until the 
13th of May 2012 (just one week before the Summit). In fact, fifty-two reports (59% of the total) 
were published that month, and the rest between June 2012 and August 2013. Secondly, almost 
two thirds of the articles published in May 2012 were about the convening CSOs and its leaders 
rather than about the Summit, to the extent that an NVIVO word cloud analysis reveals that 
newspapers were more concerned with individual activist figures, than with the specificities of the 
Summit’s proposals or discussions (see Figure 7).  For instance, candidates, organisations, and 
politics were amongst the terms the articles mentioned the most, whilst agreement, education, 
electoral and transparency (all of them topics discussed in the Summit) were barely mentioned.  
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Figure 7. Word cloud of news–reports on the First Citizens Summit. 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration. 
Whilst this allows to state the Summit had a very time-limited but highly impactful influence in 
the media agenda, this analysis does not permit to identify the Summit’s capacity to determine – or 
not – the framing of its demands and proposals in media discussions. This is why the following 
sections conduct an issue-specific media analysis.  
The Summit and the media coverage of the public agenda on ‘access to information and media’ 
A media tracking analysis of news articles published between the 1st of January 2010 to 30th of 
November 2014 shows that printed media published a total of 1,452 articles on the access to 
information and media topic area, including matters related to the Summits’ demands on a law to 
limit monopolies in the telecommunications sector, provision of universal access to broad band, and 
guaranteeing journalists’ security (see Table 13). More importantly, it provided sufficient evidence 
to make a few statements.  
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First, different from the convenors’ opinion, the analysis suggests that the Summit was not 
responsible for the initial media coverage of these topics, as they had been on the newspaper’s 
radar since at least January 2010 (see Graph 25).   
Table 13. News reports on “Access to information and media” included in the Summit's Citizens Agenda. 
Topic Search combinations in 
Lexis Nexis 
Number of news reports 
2010–2014 
To design a legislative reform that limits 
monopolies in media and 
telecommunications, promotes pluralism 
with public, indigenous, social and 
communitarian media, transparency and 
quality of content in media.  
1. Media and 
2. Monopolio and 
3. Communicacion 
4. Not Petroleo385 
Reforma: 186  
El Norte: 88 
El Universal: 66 
5. Ley de Medios  
(telecommunica
tions law) and 
6. Comunicación. 
7. Not monopolies 
8. Not Argentina386 
Reforma: 26 
El Norte: 22 
El Universal: 16 
To guarantee the universal access to 
broadband and the neutrality of the 
network, as well as a comprehensive 
policy of digital television that guarantees 
the access and re–distribution of the new 
digital dividend, allowing for the inclusion 
of new actors.   








To protect the right to information 
through effective measures guaranteeing 
media and journalists’ security.  
11. Proteccion  
reporteros or 
12. Protección  
periodistas  or 
13. Proteger a 
reporteros and 





                                                             
385 The reason for adding this ‘exclusionary term’ obeys to the fact that the Energy reform (involving the –
then– previous monopoly over oil extraction by Mexico’s state oil company) was also being discussed at 
that moment (2010–2014). 
386 The search purposely exclude a) the ‘monopolios’ search term to avoid the duplication of results vis–à–vis 
the previous search and b)‘Argentina’ as there were many news related to the Argentinian monopoly laws.  
387 This case does not look for a ‘law’ as the legal regulation on the subject is related (if not included) in the 
Telecommunications law analysed for the previous case.  
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Graph 25. Evolution of the media coverage of the topics related to the Citizens' demands on media and 
telecommunications. 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from Lexis Nexis database.  
Secondly, although data does show a peak in media coverage to the three topics around the date 
of the Summit (i.e. May and June 2012) (see Graph 25), a Pearson analysis demonstrates there is 
only a weak correlation between the media coverage of the Summit and that of the three topics 














































































































Number of news reports on Communications Law to limit monopolies
Number of news reports on access to broadband
Number of news reports on a law for journalists' protection
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Table 14. Analysis of correlation between media coverage to the ‘communication law’ and that given to 
the ‘Summit.’ 
 
Table 15.Analysis of correlation between media coverage to the ‘universal broadband access’ topic and 
the one given to the ‘Summit.’ 
 
Table 16. Analysis of correlation between media coverage to the 'law for the protection of journalists’ 
topic and the one given to the ‘Summit’ 
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A weak correlation that was in fact defined by multiple key socio–political developments 
occurring in parallel to the Summit. On the topic of a ‘communications law against monopolies’, an 
NVIVO text analysis showed that the Summit and the five convening CSOs were only referenced in 
9 news reports and mentioned in less than 0.01% of the text of the 406 news–articles on the topic 
(see Table 17).388 This illustrates the limited input the Summit had on the media’s agenda, especially 
when compared to the influence that other socio–political actors had. In this vein, parallel to the 
Summit, in May 2012 Mexico witnessed the rise of the “#YoSoy132” movement, a student’ initiative 
also demanding the democratisation of the Mexican media. A movement that occupied nearly 1.0% 
of the text–space of the news articles published on the matter. 
Similarly, on ‘guaranteeing universal access to broadband’ and the ‘law for the protection of 
journalists’, these topics were already part of the media’s agenda months before their discussion in 
the Summit (see Graph 27). Regarding guaranteeing universal access to broadband, the Summit was 
mentioned just 40 times across the 995 news on the topic (see table 17), with Mexico’s President 
and Congress being the topic’s main definers of media discussions389. Equally, on the law for the 
protection of journalists, the Summit had null influence on its media reporting as it was not 
mentioned once in the 53 news reports on the topic. In this case, although Alejandro Martí and 
Observatorio Nacional Ciudadano were quoted a total of thirteen times, the news reports on the 
topic were better defined by government agencies as Senate was mentioned 30 times, Deputies 27, 
and different parliamentary commissions 85 times.   
 
                                                             
388 A search of the terms ‘Morera’, ‘Marti’, ‘Kuri’, ‘SOS’, ‘Iluminemos’, ‘Ricaño’, ‘MUCD’, ‘Observatorio.’ 
389 News published between 2010 and 2014. 
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Table 17. CSOs presence in the news reports about ‘right to access to broadband’ 
 
Overall, based on the analysis of 1,452+ news articles, it is possible to state that the Summit 
cannot claim to have positioned, or shaped the discussions of any of its demands on access to 
information and media in the newspapers’ agenda. 
The Summit and the media coverage of the public agenda on ‘citizens’ security.’  
In this case, a quantitative analysis reveals that between January 2010 and November 2014 the 
three newspapers published a total of 1,124 news reports about the topics contained in the 
Summit’s agenda for ‘citizens’ security’ (see Annex 8 and Table 18): 
Table 18. News reports on the topics of 'citizens' security' included in the Summit's Citizens Agenda. 





1.To generate a strategy so the provision of 
public security is administered by security 
personnel and organisations prepared for that 
function, creating a Civil Auditor Body. 
1. Auditoría civil (Civil 
auditor) and 




2.To make an effective national policy of 
human rights, in accordance to the 















Javier Sicilia / Movimiento 
por la Paz
2 0 0 0
Isabel Miranda de Wallace / 
Alto al Secuestro
0 0 0 0
Alejandro Martí / Mexico 
SOS
0 0 0 0
Maria Elena Morera / Causa 
en Comun
6 0 6 0
First Citizens Summit 40 2 6 3
Eias Kuri /Iluminemos 
Mexico
1 0 0 0
Candidate(s) 41
President 17 123 85
Congress 9 27 35
Senate 6 20
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constitutional reform on the matter, including 
the mechanisms to guarantee its application:  
- Approving the reform to the Amparo 
Law  
4. Ley de Amparo 
(Amparo Law) 
 
El Norte: 124 
3. To review the policy on drugs, due to the 
impact it has in organised criminality and 
public security.   
5. Revisar (to revise) or 
6. Revisión (review) 
and 
7. Política de drogas 
(drugs policy) 
Reforma: 16 
 Norte: 5 
Universal: 2 
4.Ensure citizens’ permanent participation in 




representatives) and  
9. Consejo Nacional de 
Seguridad Pública 





Guarantee the adequate implementation of 
the Judicial Reform in the States and 
Federation: 
5.Creation of Centres of Justice for Women 
that support the victims during the allegation 
and the entire process. 
6.Implement a professional career service for 
Public Ministry offices 
10. Centros de Justicia 
de Mujeres (Centres 




El Universal: 5 
Norte:6 
 
11. Servicio Profesional 
de Carrera 
(professional career 
service ) and 












8.Creation of a National Citizens Observatory 
to ensure the implementation of the Law 




16. Trata de personas 
(human trafficking) 
Reforma: 4 
El Universal: 2 
9.Ensure the adequate implementation of the 
Law of Victims and implement the secondary 
reforms. 
Immediate publication in the Diario Oficial de 
la Federación 
17. Ley General de 
Víctimas (General 






Similar to the findings on access to information and media agenda, the Summit seemed not to 
have triggered the initial media coverage of seven of the nine topics part of its agenda on citizens 
security – as they were already being discussed in the newspapers before May 2012 (when the 
Summit firstly appeared in the media, see Annex 8). Nevertheless, the Summit did position the 
topics of ‘creation of a National Citizen Observatory to ensure the implementation of the Law 
against Human Trafficking’ and ‘creation of a Civil Auditor Body to review the strategy for the 
provision of public security’ in the media agenda. On the one hand, as illustrated in Graph 26 and 
Annexes 6 and 8, media coverage to both topics began the same the Summit started (i.e. 21st of May 
2012). On the other hand, a semiotics analysis also shows that both the Summit and its convening 
CSOs were referenced a total of 26 times across the 8 newspapers articles on those two topics, with 
the term Summit (Cumbre in Spanish) being the signifier of the newspaper’s articles (see Table 19 
and Figure 8).  
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Source: Author’s own elaboration with data from Lexis Nexis 
Table 19. Influence of the Summit on the media coverage of the public agenda on citizens' security. 
Name References Coverage 
News Civil Auditor 6 0.27% 
News Law of Victims 90 0.04% 
News Public Ministry 13 0.06% 
News National Observatory Human Trafficking 20 0.56% 
News policy on drugs 14 0.07% 
News Citizens’ Representatives 16 0.13% 
News typify the crime of disappearances 9 0.02% 
News Amparo Law 20 0.01% 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with data from Lexis Nexis via NVIVO. 
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Figure 8. Word Tree analysis: Summit's influence on media coverage of ‘the creation of a National Citizens 
Observatory in Human Trafficking’ and ‘civil auditor for the public security strategies’ (2010–2014) 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with data from Lexis Nexis via NVIVO. 
In addition to this, it is important to state that whilst the Summit only influenced the media 
coverage of these two topics, different expressions of civil society managed to define the media 
framing of three other topics: 
1) The demand to typify the crime of disappeared people was positioned by CADHAC CSO 
(Citizens in Support of Human Rights A.C.) With nearly 60 mentions across the 100+ articles 
on the topic, CADHAC not only positioned the topic in El Universal, El Reforma and El Norte 
newspapers, it also labelled the problem and defined the potential political actions linked 
to it.390  
2) Regarding ensuring the adequate implementation of the Law of Victims and implementing 
the secondary reforms, the first news–report on the topic (February 2010) was triggered 
by Isabel Miranda de Wallace (Alto al Secuestro CSO) and Alejandro Marti’s (Mexico SOS) 
actions. What is more, although the First Citizens Summit was mentioned 47 times across 
the 358 news reports on the topic (Graph 26 and table 20), the peaks of media coverage 
referred more to the actions of Javier Sicilia (participant, not convenor of the Summit) than 
to the Summit itself.391 As such, it can be argued that rather than improving the media 
                                                             
390 Compared to 3 mentions of Ricaño, 1 of Morera, 1 of Marti, 5 of Observatorio Ciudadano and 0 of Cumbre 
Ciudadana (Citizens’ Summit).  
391 For instance, in 2012, when the topic reached its 2nd and 3rd highest levels of media coverage, neither the 
Summit nor its convening CSOs were quoted a single time, but Sicilia was 23 times in the 23 news reports 
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attention towards the topic, the Summit attempted to capitalise on the actions of other 
CSOs to position itself on the media agenda. 
Table 20. CSOs influence in the media's reports on the promulgation of a “Law of Victims”. 
 
3) On Approving the reform to the Amparo Law, the topic was already part of the media 
agenda years before the Summit. Whilst the Summit was only mentioned a total of five 
times across the 569 news articles on the topic, Morera and Causa en Común two times, 
Marti and Mexico SOS, eight times; and Iluminemos Mexico, three times, those CSOs that 
were not part of the Summit’s original convening group influenced the media’s agenda in a 
more noticeable way. This included Miranda de Wallace and her CSO Alto al Secuestro (with 
21 mentions), and Javier Sicilia (with six mentions). Paradoxically, the political sphere seems 
to have been even more influential. On the one hand, the media coverage of Wallace 
activism rose as a result of her relevance as political candidate during that time.392 On the 
other hand, in those months when the topic reached its highest media coverage (i.e. 
February and April 2013), the opinions of governmental institutions (like the Chamber of 
Deputies) and business groups (like the Mexican Employers Council-COPARMEX), 
dominated the media coverage of the topic (see Table 21).  
                                                             
of April and 22 times in the 39 notes from July. In January 2013, the ‘Law of Victims’ was reported in 63 
news reports across the three newspapers, however, the Summit remained being ‘media inconsequential’ 
as the news did not mention it but focused on the opinions of Sicilia (58 mentions) and the personal 
comments of Alejandro Martí and Isabel Miranda de Wallace. 
392 In the early 2012 Miranda de Wallace began to run for office at one of Mexico City’s districts Azuela, 
Primera Cumbre Ciudadana Para Construir Un México Pacífico y Justo, 14; Lara, “Effective Participation in 
Latin America: From Extralegal to Legal Mobilization. The Challenges Ahead.” 









Javier Sicilia / 
Movimiento por la Paz 0 23 10 22 58
Isabel Miranda de 
Wallace / Alto al 
Secuestro
2 0 6 0 16
Alejandro Martí / Mexico 
SOS 2 0 1 0 26
Maria Elena Morera / 
Causa en Comun 0 0 15 0 1
First Citizens Summit 0 0 36 0 0
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Table 21. Main definers of media discussions on the "Reform to the Amparo Law" (01 Feb 2013–30 Apr 
2013). 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from Lexis Nexis.  
Summing up, the media coverage analysis here conducted illustrated how, despite its size (i.e. 
+100 CSOs involved), the Summit secured limited media influence, from the date of its conception 
in late 2011 to the date the last report about it was published. Access to information and media was 
the topic area of the Summit’s agenda where it had the least influence. In fact, rather than creating 
or defining new social demands, the Summit worked on existing ones to attempt to – in the words 
of Maria Elena Morera – ‘re-attract attention to the topics and force government to give an answer 
to those matters.’393 The Summit did achieve better results in the topic area of citizens security, 
however, 78% of its demands in this area (i.e. 7 out of 9) were not new initiatives but proposals 
previously positioned in the media by the convening and other CSOs.  Although the Summit did not 
achieve tangible results in multiple topics in the area of citizens security, it is important to state that 
other CSOs did so, particularly activist Javier Sicilia, in issues like typifying the crime of disappeared 
people, implementing the Law of Victims’ and reforming the Amparo Law. This allows concluding 
that whilst he public agenda can influence the media agenda in Mexico, this does not occur in all 
                                                             
393 Garcia, ‘Interview with Maria Elena Morera, President of Causa En Común CSO.,’ pt. Minute: 4.13; Garcia, 
‘Interview to Edgar Baltazar, Former Manager of the Programme of Citizenry Accompaniment to Police in 
Causa en Comun,’ pt. Minute: 5:41. 





Mexican Banking Association 10
Iluminemos Mexico 4
Mexico SOS 2
Alto al Secuestro 2
Causa en Comun 0
Observatorio Nacional Ciudadano 0
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cases as, as Howlett stated, ‘not everything the public (in this case being the Summit) knows and is 
talking about becomes part of the media content.’ 394 
Building on these findings, and considering Jacobs and Townsley, Dunaway et al, and Walgrave 
et al’s arguments ensuring the media ‘connects the individual with the state’ and ‘newspaper 
coverage precedes political attention’, it is imperative to test to what extent the Summit’s public 
agenda transcended the media coverage and became part of the political agenda (i.e. government 
policy). This is why, the following sub-chapter evaluates whether media served as a mechanism by 
which the Summit initiated political decision making and affected public policy.395 Considering that 
only a limited number of studies have developed such a connected study, the following sub-chapters 
would contribute to breaking with theoretical paradigms and assumptions on the relationship 
between public, media and government agendas.  
5.4 Policy outcomes: analysing the Summit’s media and policy 
achievements. 
 
The previous section provided the basis to state that the Summit showed a limited, yet 
important, capacity to influence the media agenda and potentially shape the debate on certain 
public demands (i.e. the Citizens’ Agenda). A condition that could serve to argue that the public 
sphere in Mexico acts as the communicative space where citizens (although CSOs leaders in this 
case) were able to participate in public debates (i.e. the Summit) and contribute to the formation of 
                                                             
394 Howlett in Soroka, “Policy Agenda–Setting Theory Revisited: A Critique of Howlett on Downs, Baumgartner 
and Jones, and Kingdon,” 765. 
395 See Jacobs and Townsley, The Space of Opinion, Media Intellectuals and the Public sphere, 254; Kingdon, 
Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies; Dunaway, Abrajano, and Branton, “Agenda Setting, Public 
Opinion, and the Issue of Immigration Reform,” pt. 3; Walgrave, Soroka, and Nuytemans, “The Mass 
Media’s Political Agenda Setting Power.”; Knill and Tosun, Public Policy: A New Introduction, pt. 116. 
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public opinion.396 Whilst this evidence tends to suffice for media agenda-setting studies, it does not 
allow to make strong arguments about citizens and the public sphere’s capacity to influence 
government decisions. For this reason, this sub-chapter intends to go beyond ordinary agenda-
setting studies to analyse if the public sphere can transcend its communicative function to 
effectively act as the channel by which citizens can shape the policies of the state.  In other words, 
it aims to become the linkage between those empirical findings on the generation of social demands 
(i.e. the Summit and its media coverage) and those ones about the formulation of public policies of 
which Kingdon talks about.397 In this vein, on May 13th, 2012, Maria Elena Morera declared: 
CSOs are tired of ‘being used by politicians as a marketing strategy. After 
this Summit, whoever becomes President needs to know there are some 
things that are irreducible for us, and that is what we are going to define; 
we don’t want a setback and we have a clear plan to achieve what we 
want.’398  
However, how effective was the Summit in terms of the number of its demands being 
transformed into legal reforms and public policies?  According to the convenors, a total of 78% of 
the proposals were accepted by the four main Presidential candidates.399 In this vein, Josefina 
Vazquez Mota, from PAN subscribed 100% of them, Quadri, from Nueva Alianza 77%; and Lopez 
Obrador (PRD) 99% (see Graph 27). In contrast, Enrique Peña Nieto from PRI, the most popular 
candidate among the electorate, subscribed only 69% of them.400 With Enrique Peña Nieto being 
                                                             
396  24 Horas, “Organizaciones Realizan Primera Cumbre Ciudadana”; FUNDECI, “Pronunciamiento Primer 
Cumbre Ciudadana”; Garcia, “Interview to Maria Elena Morera, President of Causa En Común CSO (4-Nov-
2012).” McKee, The Public sphere: An Introduction, 4–8. 
397 Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, 4. 
398 Zermeño, “Ciudadanos: Campaña Paralela; Reportaje Elecciones y Sociedad Civil. Mientras Los Partidos y 
Sus Candidatos Están En Campaña, La Sociedad Civil Organizada Trabaja Para Fijarle Una Agenda Al 
Próximo Presidente de La República.” 
399  Cumbre Ciudadana, “Un 78% de Las Propuestas de La Primera Cumbre Ciudadana Fueron Aceptadas Por 
Candidatos y Partidos.” (Mexico City, 2012), http://www.ccilaguna.org.mx/documentos–
publicos/comunicado–respuestas–candidatos–a–cumbre–ciudadana.pdf (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
400 CNN Mexico, “López Obrador Se Acerca a Peña Nieto En Las Preferencias, Revela Encuesta,” CNN Mexico, 
June 12, 2012, http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2012/06/12/lopez–obrador–se–coloca–a–cuatro–
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the candidate who was elected President (2012–2018) this thesis focuses on his actions to enact or 
discard the Summit’s demands on ‘citizens’ security’ and ‘access to information and media.’  
Graph 27. Summit’s proposals subscribed by each presidential candidate in 2012. 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from Azuela, Primera Cumbre Ciudadana Para 
Construir Un México Pacífico y Justo. 
 
In June 2012, Candidate Enrique Pena Nieto subscribed 69% of the Summit’s proposals, however,  
after having been elected President, his position noticeably changed. Just a few days after taking 
office, President Pena Nieto promoted the installation of the so called ‘Pact for Mexico’, a cross–
party negotiation that, he argued, would help to steer an agenda of structural reforms through 
Congress. In this Pact, Peña Nieto decided to focus on even fewer than 69% of the Summit’s 
demands:  
                                                             
puntos–de–pena–nieto–revela–encuesta (Accessed 22–12–2017); Cumbre Ciudadana, “Un 78% de Las 
Propuestas de La Primera Cumbre Ciudadana Fueron Aceptadas Por Candidatos y Partidos.” 









Citizens' proposals subscribed by each 
presidential candidate
% of Proposals fully subscribed % of Proposals subscribed with caution
% of Proposals not subscribed
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Table 22. Comparison between Summit's demands, its influence on the media agenda, Peña Nieto's 
commitments as Presidential candidate and President of Mexico.401  
Summit’s demands 







Enrique Peña Nieto’s position on the topic 
(as Presidential candidate in June 2012). 
Enrique Peña Nieto’s proposals in 
the ‘Pact for Mexico’ (as elected 
President in Dec 2012) 
To design a 
legislative reform 
that limits 








and quality of 
content in media.  
Limited input Subscribed: 
1. Committed to promote competition in 
telecommunications, strengthening public 
television and the provision of new 
concessions to new TV chains.  
2. Will promote a constitutional reform to 
create a citizens and autonomous 
organism that supervises the advertising 
contracts between government and 
media, guaranteeing journalistic freedom 
and citizens’ access to information. 
To strengthen the Federal 
Commission on Competency in 
order to provide it with tools and 
mechanisms to determine and 
sanction dominant positions 
(monopolies) in any sector of the 
Mexican economy. 
To guarantee the 
universal access to 
broadband and the 
neutrality of the 
network, as well as a 
comprehensive 




distribution of the 
new digital dividend, 
allowing for the 
inclusion of new 







3. Will promote the “National Plan for 
Broadband” with the objective to achieve 
universal access to broadband.  
4. Will offer safe access points to Wi-Fi, using 
public buildings as points of emission.  
5. Through the “Crusade for Digital 
Alphabetization”, to accelerate the 
internet connectivity for public schools, in 
at least 40,000 full time schools.  
6. To provide free laptops to all the students 
of 5th and 6th grade of primary school.  
7. Installation of community digital training 
and education centres in all the states of 
Mexico, guaranteeing the access to IT to 
new sectors of the population.  
8. Government will allow for an ordered 
transition to digital television.  
 
To guarantee an equitable access 
to world class 
telecommunications, hence:  
a) To reform the Constitution 
and guarantee the right to 
access internet  
b) To guarantee the provision of 
internet in public buildings 
 
To incentivise competition in radio 
and television, guaranteeing the 
implementation of world–class 
practices.   
To protect the right 
to information, 








Unanswered. To strengthen the mechanisms of 
protection of human rights and 
journalists. Creation of a special 
instance where authorities and 
OCS work together to determine 
the creation of such mechanisms. 
 
                                                             
401 This analysis is based on information available from official documents from Causa en Comun, the Summit 
and Mexico’s government. For discussion see: Fundación en Movimiento; President Enrique Peña Nieto et 
al., “Pacto Por Mexico” (Mexico City, 2012), http://pactopormexico.org/PACTO–POR–MEXICO–25.pdf 
(accessed 22–12–2017). 
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Public demands on “citizens 






Enrique Peña Nieto’s position on 
the topic (as Presidential 
candidate in June 2012). 
Enrique Peña Nieto’s proposals 
in the ‘Pact for Mexico’ (as 
elected President in Dec 2012) 
To generate a strategy so the 
provision of public security is 
administered by security personnel 
and organisations prepared for that 
function, creating a Civil Auditor 







9. To work for a more 
democratic public security, 
based on prevention, 
community participation, re–
design and the 
professionalisation of police 
and justice models.  
10. To create a ‘National Strategy 
to Reduce Violence’ 
connecting the three powers 
and orders of government, 
organised civil society, media 
and political parties.  
11. Create a national policy of 
crime prevention, re–
structure and professionalise 
the country’s police 
corporations, modernise and 
improve the justice system.  
12. Creation of the National Audit 
System   
Creation of a new “Gendarmería 
Nacional”. 
To make an effective national policy 
of human rights, in accordance to 
the constitutional reform on the 
matter, including the mechanisms 
to guarantee its application:  
a) Approving the reform to the 
Amparo Law  
Limited input, 
but positioned 




13. To promote the required 
reforms to the secondary laws 
to augment the efficiency of 
the recent reform on human 
rights.  
14. Promote the constitutional 
and legal reforms to ensure 
respect to human rights in the 
actions of the military and 
police forces across the 
country.  
15. To implement the reform on 
Oral Trials (Accusatory 
System) in all the States in 
Mexico.  
To reform the “Amparo Law” to 
make it compatible with the 
recent constitutional reforms. 
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To review the policy on drugs, due 
to the impact it has on organised 
criminality and public security.  
Limited input.  Subscribed:  
16. Against the de–penalisation of 
drugs.  
Government will focus on those 
municipalities experiencing the 
highest levels of violence in the 
country.  
1) Institutionalisation of social 
security programmes to tackle 
poverty, full time schools, 
young employability 
programmes, and the recovery 
of public spaces.  
Ensure citizens’ permanent 
participation in the National Council 
of Public Security 
Limited input. Unanswered Not found 
Guarantee the adequate 
implementation of the Judicial 
Reform in the States and Federation 
a) Creation of Centres of Justice for 
Women that support the victims 
during the allegation and the 
entire process. 
b) Implement a professional career 






Unanswered Not found 
To typify the crime of “disappeared 
people” 
Limited input. Unanswered Not found 
Creation of a National Citizens 
Observatory to ensure the 
implementation of the Law against 






Unanswered Not found 
Ensure the adequate 
implementation of the Law of 
Victims and implement the 
secondary reforms 
a) Immediate publication in the 
Diario Oficial de la Federación 
Limited input, 
but positioned 
and defined by 
other OCS 
initiatives. 
Unanswered To protect human rights as a State 
Policy:  
a) Law for the reparation of 
damage (repair the violation of 
human rights). Article 1 of the 
Constitution.  
b) Law for the Attention of Victims 
(now known as the “General 
Law of Victims”).  
Strengthen the mechanisms for 
the protection of human rights 
defenders and journalists, 
creating a special instance 
involving the participation of 
authorities and civil society. 
Source: Azuela, Primera Cumbre Ciudadana Para Construir Un México Pacífico y Justo, 95; Pacto por México, “Los 5 
Acuerdos” (Mexico City, 2012), http://pactopormexico.org/quienes/ (Accessed 22–12–2017).  
 
Notwithstanding President Pena Nieto’s limited action towards the complete Summit’s agenda, 
the convenors of the Summit argued they influenced the government’s agenda as some of its 
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demands ended up being included in the government’s ‘Pact for Mexico.’402 Although this statement 
cannot be refuted, a thorough analysis highlights the fact that some of the proposals included in 
President Peña Nieto’s Pact for Mexico (deemed as citizen victories by Maria Elena Morera) were 
already part of the agenda of previous administrations. Three of these initiatives were:   
v The implementation of a Law of Victims (‘General Law of Victims’). 
v To protect the right to information through effective measures guaranteeing media and 
journalists’ security (‘Law for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and Journalists’).  
v A National Citizens Observatory to ensure the implementation of the Law against human 
trafficking. 
5.4.1 The implementation of a Law of Victims. 
 
Although the enactment of the General Law of Victims is considered to be one of the ‘Summit’s 
major victories’, an archival research of media accounts and legislative tracking reveal that policy 
discussions on this topic are traceable to at least April 2010.403 In fact, at least three different 
initiatives were proposed, analysed and voted by Congress before the Summit included it on its 
agenda.  
First, on the 22nd of April 2010, Deputies Felipe Gonzalez, Jaime Rafael Diaz and Ramon Galindo 
(both from PAN), presented the Federal Law of Rights of Victims of Crime legislative proposal. Less 
than a year later (2011), Javier Sicilia brought back the public and political discussions on the need 
for a ‘law for victims.’404 In this vein, in July 2011, during the ‘Chapultepec dialogues’ Sicilia organised 
with then President Felipe Calderon (2006–2012), Sicilia publicly ‘demanded the creation of law for 
the attention of victims:’  
                                                             
402 Azuela, Primera Cumbre Ciudadana Para Construir Un México Pacífico y Justo. 
403 For discussion see Azuela, “Una Historia Que Vale La Pena Contar”; Azuela, Primera Cumbre Ciudadana 
Para Construir Un México Pacífico y Justo. 
404  Blanca Campos, “Sicilia Demanda Detener Ley de Seguridad Nacional,” Sexenio, February 28, 2011, 
http://www.sexenio.com.mx/articulo.php?id=6963 (Accessed 22–12–2017); CNN Mexico, “Javier Sicilia 
Exige Una Ley de Víctimas En La Cámara de Diputados,” CNN Mexico, December 14, 2011, 
http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2011/12/14/javier–sicilia–exige–una–ley–de–victimas–en–la–camara–
de–diputados (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
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The country cannot wait, victims cannot wait; pain and injustice is affecting 
them. We need to legislate now,’ he stated.405  
 
Sicilia’s demand and the citizen support it raised, ‘pushed Senate to commit to enact a Law of 
Victims’, to the extent that on the 14th of December 2011 (months before the Summit took place), 
Deputy Teresa del Carmen (PRD) presented a legislative initiative for a ‘General Law of Protection 
and Integral Reparation to Victims of Human Rights Violations Generated by Violence.’406  The 
initiative, however, did not pass either, due to the opposition from PAN and PRI.  After this political 
impasse, Sicilia was the only activist directly involved in the production of a third legislative 
initiative.407 With the support of other CSOs, in January 2012 Sicilia presented the initiative for the 
‘General Law of Victims’ to Senate, a proposal that served as the basis for that one presented by a 
coalition of Senators from different political parties on the 17th of April 2012. On the 25th of April 
2012 (one month before the Summit) such a proposal was unanimously approved by the upper 
chamber (Senate) to then been approved by the lower Chamber (Deputies) on the 30th of April 2012. 
Nevertheless, this legislatively approved initiative did not become law, as it was blocked by then 
President Calderon, arguing it was a ‘flawed’ proposal (a condition latterly acknowledged by 
Congress itself).408  
Although the Summit did include this proposal on its list of demands and, by doing so, 
contributed to its media coverage, it is undeniable that it was Sicilia who continue pushing it 
                                                             
405 Campos, “Sicilia Demanda Detener Ley de Seguridad Nacional”; CNN Mexico, “Javier Sicilia Exige Una Ley 
de Víctimas En La Cámara de Diputados.” 
406 Teresa del Carmen Inchaustegui, “Que Expide La Ley General de Protección y Reparación Integral a Víctimas 
de Violaciones a Derechos Humanos Generadas Por La Violencia, a Cargo de La Diputada Teresa Del 
Carmen Inchaustegui Romero Del Grupo Parlamentario Del PRD.” (2011), 
http://sil.gobernacion.gob.mx/Archivos/Documentos/2012/02/asun_2856451_20120229_1328815297.p
df (Accessed 22–12–2017); Andrea Becerril, “Avanza En El Senado El Proyecto de Ley de Atencion a 
Victimas Del Delito,” La Jornada, March 25, 2012, 
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2012/03/25/politica/018n2pol (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
407 Becerril, “Avanza En El Senado El Proyecto de Ley de Atencion a Victimas Del Delito.” 
408 Redacción AN, “La Ley de Víctimas, Cronología de Una Reforma En La Congeladora,” Aristegui Noticias, July 
9, 2012, http://aristeguinoticias.com/0907/mexico/la–ley–de–victimas–cronologia–de–una–reforma–
en–la–congeladora/ (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
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forward. For instance, on the 28th of May 2012, Sicilia – not Morera or the Summit – achieved 
President Peña Nieto’s commitment towards the Bill.409 When the law was enacted on the 9th of 
January 2013, Sicilia was the only social activist to whom politicians referred to in their speeches.410 
What is more, in all the official documents related to the legislative process behind this law neither 
Morera nor the Summit are directly mentioned, but Senators and Deputies explicitly acknowledged 
that the different initiatives for a Law of Victims were directly the result of ‘the work of the social 
movement lead by Javier Sicilia’ and ‘of an ethical commitment that the Senate had with civil society 
organisations, particularly with poet Sicilia.’411  
Overall, although this illustrates that the Summit did not position the ‘General Law of Victims’ in 
the media or political agendas, it does show that civil society, organised in a movement like Sicilia’s 
one, has the capacity to do so.   
5.4.2 Law for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and Journalists. 
 
In this case, government and CSOs’ records demonstrate that it was the ‘Espacio’ consortium of 
CSOs (not including any of the convenors of the Summit), which has positioned the topic on the 
government agenda since 2010.412 According to the 22 Senators part of the Commission of Foreign 
Relations and Non–Governmental Organisations of the LXI Legislature organisations like CENCOS, 
                                                             
409  Presidencia de la República, “Diversas Intervenciones Durante La Publicación de La Ley General de 
Víctimas” (Mexico City: Presidencia de la República, 2013), 
http://www.gob.mx/presidencia/prensa/diversas–intervenciones–durante–la–publicacion–de–la–ley–
general–de–victimas (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
410 PRD, “Discurso Ofrecido Por La Senadora Angélica de La Peña Durante La Publicación de La Ley General de 
Víctimas.” (Mexico City, 2013), http://prd.senado.gob.mx/wp/?p=9817 (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
411  Camara de Diputados, “DECRETO Por El Que Se Expide La Ley General de Víctimas.” (2013), 1,12, 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/sedia/biblio/prog_leg/018_DOF_09ene13.pdf (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
412 For a complete list of the organisations involved, see Peace Brigades International, “La Implementación de 
La Ley de Protección Para Personas Defensoras de Derechos Humanos y Periodistas” (Mexico City, 2012), 
http://www.peacebrigades.org/fileadmin/user_files/projects/mexico/files/Mechanism/1403BriefingMec
anismoPBI.pdf (Accessed 22–12–2017). Rogelio Hernandez, “La Sonrisa Del Representante de La ONU Para 
El Espacio OSC,” La Jornada, August 3, 2015, http://lajornadasanluis.com.mx/opinion/la–sonrisa–del–
representante–de–la–onu–para–el–espacio–osc/ (accessed 22–12–2017). 
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Peace Brigades International, Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustin Pro Juarez and Centro 
de Derechos Humanos de la Montaña Tlachinollan (all part of Espacio consortium) who signalled 
‘the lack of mechanisms of protection of human rights defenders’ and the ‘silent effect generated 
by the incapacity of journalists to publish information about violence, disappearances and murders’ 
back in 2010413 Since then and until March 2012, Senators Ruben Camarillo, Martha Leticia Sosa and 
many others, sustained over twenty meetings with Espacio, but none with the Summit. 414 More 
importantly, Senators themselves explicitly recognised that the Law for the Protection of Human 
Rights Defenders and Journalists enacted in June 2012 was ‘based on Espacio’s proposal for the 
integration of mechanisms for protection of Human Rights Defenders and Journalists presented in 
2010.415 
                                                             
413 Comisión de Relaciones Exteriores Organizaciones No Gubernamentales, “Proceso Participativo Para La 
Elaboración de La Iniciativa de Protección a Personas Defensoras de Derechos Humanos y Periodistas” 
(Mexico City, 2012), 8, 9, 
http://sil.gobernacion.gob.mx/Archivos/Documentos/2012/07/asun_2891153_20120711_1342021022.p
df (Accessed 22-12-2017); Secretaría de Gobernación, “Ley Para La Protección de Personas Defensoras de 




414  Please refer to Comisión de Relaciones Exteriores Organizaciones No Gubernamentales, “Proceso 
Participativo Para La Elaboración de La Iniciativa de Protección a Personas Defensoras de Derechos 
Humanos y Periodistas,” 25, 50; Peace Brigades, “Iniciativa Ley Para La Protección de Persona Defensoras 
de Derechos Humanos y Periodistas” (Mexico City: Peace Brigades, 2012), 
http://www.peacebrigades.org/fileadmin/user_files/projects/mexico/files/Mechanism/1203FichaTecnic
a_ES.pdf (Accessed 22–12–2017); Espacio OSC, “Propuesta de Integración Para El Mecanismo de 
Protección de Defensores y Defensoras de Derechos Humanos y Periodistas” (Mexico City: PBI Mexico, 
2010), http://www.pbi–
mexico.org/fileadmin/user_files/projects/mexico/files/Mechanism/1010PropuestaMecanismo.pdf 
(Accessed 22–12–2017); Camara de Diputados, “DECRETO Por El Que Se Expide La Ley Para La Protección 
de Personas Defensoras de Derechos Humanos y Periodistas.” (2012), 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/proceso/lxi/257_DOF_25jun12.pdf (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
415 To compare Orozco’s proposal with the law enacted, please refer to Comisión de Relaciones Exteriores 
Organizaciones No Gubernamentales, “Proceso Participativo Para La Elaboración de La Iniciativa de 
Protección a Personas Defensoras de Derechos Humanos y Periodistas,” 25, 50; Peace Brigades, “Iniciativa 
Ley Para La Protección de Persona Defensoras de Derechos Humanos y Periodistas”; Espacio OSC, 
“Propuesta de Integración Para El Mecanismo de Protección de Defensores y Defensoras de Derechos 
Humanos y Periodistas”; Camara de Diputados, DECRETO por el que se expide la Ley para la Protección de 
Personas Defensoras de Derechos Humanos y Periodistas. 
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5.4.3 A National Citizens Observatory to ensure the implementation of the Law 
against human trafficking. 
 
Despite being one of the few topics that the Summit effectively positioned in the media agenda, 
it was not the Summit who achieved substantial results in policy-making on the matter, but other 
CSOs that were not part of the Summit. In this vein, legislative tracking exhibits that the socio–
political actor that initiated the discussions and continues monitoring the legislative processes 
surrounding this law is Rosi Orozco, President of Unidos Contra la Trata CSO and former Federal 
Deputy (2009 to 2012). It was due to her political activism from within Congress that the Chamber 
of Deputies institutionalised its Legislative Commission to Fight Human Trafficking in 2010. Acting 
as the Commission’s president, Deputy Orozco proposed the initiative for the General Law to 
Prevent, Sanction and Eradicate the Crimes in the area of Human Trafficking and for the protection 
and assistance to the Victims of these Crimes in August 2011, and achieved its enactment in June 
2012.416  
5.5. Main findings on the First Citizen Summit.  
 
The analysis of a) the structure and actions of the First Citizen Summit to Build a Peaceful and 
Fair Mexico and its convenors, b) their coverage in printed media and c) government responses to 
                                                             
416 Congreso de la Union, “Ley General Para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar Los Delitos En Materia de Trata de 
Personas.” (2014), http://documents.mx/documents/ley–general–para–prevenir–sancionar–y–erradicar–
los–delitos–en–materia–de–trata–de–personas.html (Accessed 22–12–2017); Secretaría de Gobernación, 
“Ley General Para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar Los Delitos En Materia de Trata de Personas y Para La 
Protección y Asistencia de Víctimas de Éstos.” (Mexico City, 2015), http://documents.mx/documents/1–
ley–general–para–prevenir–sancionar–y–erradicar–los–delitos–en–materia–de–trata–de–personas–y–
para–la–proteccion–y–asistencia–a–las–victimas–de–estos.html (Accessed 22–12–2017); Rosi Orozco, 
“Pide Rosi Orozco Al Senado Aprobar Lo Antes Posible La Nueva Ley Contra La Trata de Persona” (Mexico 
City: Rosi Orozco, 2012), http://rosiorozco.com/pide–rosi–orozco–al–senado–aprobar–lo–antes–posible–
la–nueva–ley–contra–la–trata–de–personas/ (Accessed 22–12–2017); Rosi Orozco, “ONGs Piden Comisión 
Para La Trata de Personas” (Mexico City: Rosi Orozco, 2012), http://rosiorozco.com/ongs–piden–
comision–para–la–trata–de–personas/ (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
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the Summit’s demands allow this thesis to state that an Organised Civil Society has been capable of 
influencing the public, media and government agendas in Mexico, at least since 2010. However, this 
chapter has also revealed that civil society’s involvement and influence in policy-making is not as 
open, expeditious or straightforward as Mexican politicians intend to portray, but neither always as 
obscured, fallacious or unachievable as some political analysts declare.417  In this vein, the First 
Citizen Summit to Build a Peaceful and Fair Mexico represents a clear example of the most 
recognisable, although not most common, form of OCS in Mexico. With Mexico City being 
considered an exemplar metropolis in terms of policies that encourage an engaged citizenry and 
progressive inclusive legislation, even a ‘luxury gateway from the country’s DTOs, kidnappings and 
killings’, it provided a public sphere similar to the one envisaged by Dahlgren, Castells and Habermas 
(see Chapter 3).418 It not only offered a geographical space where political ideas emanated from the 
public could be addressed to the government decision makers. Free of radical (in)security threats, 
it also permitted the free circulation of information and public deliberation. In other words, the 
Summit was surrounded by, and guaranteed (as Cohen would have said) the ideal speech situation 
for all those who participated in it. Under these conditions the Summit had a good potential to serve 
and enhance the functioning of the public sphere as the connector between the state and the needs 
of society, just as Nitoiu and Hall et al argued. 
                                                             
417 See for instance Kliksberg’s work and the opinion of the current Ministry of the Interior in Bernardo 
Kliksberg, “Diez Falacias Sobre Los Problemas Sociales de América Latina.,” Revista de La Facultad de 
Ciencias Económicas V, no. 18 (n.d.), 
http://sisbib.unmsm.edu.pe/bibvirtualdata/publicaciones/economia/18/a02.pdf (Accessed 22–12–2017); 
Ernesto Aroche, “¿Y Las Autoridades Locales? Cerradas a Dialogar Con La Sociedad Civil: 2a Cumbre 
Ciudadana,” Animal Político, June 3, 2014, http://www.animalpolitico.com/2014/06/y–las–autoridades–
locales–cerradas–dialogar–con–la–sociedad–civil–2a–cumbre–ciudadana/ (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
418  Luisita Lopez, “My Mexico City Is Everyone’s Now,” New York Times, December 28, 2016, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/28/travel/mexico–city–culture–childhood–new–
awakening.html?_r=0 (accessed 22–12–2017); Adam Ludwing, “A New Lab To Reinvent Mexico City,” 
Forbes, November 10, 2013, https://www.forbes.com/sites/techonomy/2013/11/10/a–new–lab–to–
reinvent–mexico–city/ (accessed 22–12–2017); GOOD, “GOOD 2014 Good City Index” (New York, 2014), 
https://www.good.is/guides/good–cities–index–2014 (accessed 22–12–2017). 
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Nevertheless, envisaged, designed, and fully coordinated by established CSOs, the Summit 
proved Alfonso Leon’s point that ‘Mexican CSOs work as communications nodes originated in 
private interests aiming to transcend in the public space.’419 Being the domain of elites, quite remote 
from the life rhythms of ordinary citizens, the Summit did validate Boggs, Temple and Bua’s works, 
as it showed that the ruling of Mexico could be achieved without input from the majority: the usual 
suspects were dominating every socio–political interaction in Mexico. In this vein, the main 
organisers of the Summit were all directors of established and government–sanctioned CSOs which, 
notwithstanding their intentions for inclusiveness and representativeness, ended by inadvertently 
perpetuating the inevitability of elites which Boggs talks about. For instance, sworn in as President 
of Causa en Comun, Maria Elena Morera promised to work to open more spaces for citizen 
participation and public deliberation.420 However, in a country where 68% of Mexicans belong to 
the low-income stratum, and where citizens’ involvement in non–electoral forms of political 
activism is partly determined by citizens’ income, this ended being an unachievable goal, even 
during the Summit’s ‘mega event of civil society’ (as defined by Morera herself).   
Being under the coordination of the usual suspects – the educated and wealthy members of 
society, related to the country’s economic elite –, the Summit also ended by ratifying the works of 
contemporary analysts like Dahlgren or Boggs, as the Summit inadvertedly gave place to displace 
the role of the public by private forces. In this vein, notwithstanding the existence of over 35,000 
CSOs in Mexico, the Summit involved just over 150, most of them registered in Mexico’s main 
metropolis: Mexico City. Whilst those CSOs based in Mexico City were capable of being involved in 
over 41% of the Summit, those from the periphery – and perhaps with different and more pressing 
social demands – ended up participating in just 14% of its process.421With better access to political 
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participation schemes and closer to the main corridors of political power, Causa en Comun and the 
other convening CSOs organised a Summit that, notwithstanding its undeniable importance as one 
of the first events unifying dispersed social activism efforts, ended being a partial and – more 
importantly –a top–down representation of citizen political participation.  
More importantly, the Summit’s agenda, portrayed as the Agenda of the Mexican civil society for 
the future President of Mexico, was discussed and approved by only 168 CSOs, displacing the 
importance of the public and supporting both Ai Camps and Reyes’ views that in Mexico key political 
players define the country’s economic and political agendas. By assuming that their vision, realities 
and demands were shared by the rest of the population, even by those missing CSOs from those 
unrepresented states, the convening and participant CSOs also confirmed Calhoun’s studies of CSOs 
and the public sphere: ‘many CSOs take on what they regard as public purposes but remain in groups 
of people knit together by personal relationships.’422 With such a limited number of participants, 
and due to the convening CSOs’ relation with government (more collaborative than radically 
critical), the Summit risked becoming a detrimental democratic practice, favouring the development 
of what Temple describes as ‘simulacrums of political engagement’.423 Therefore, it can be argued 
that contrary to its alleged objective, the Summit, like other forms of OCS, did fall into the trap of 
the ‘inevitability of elites’ of which Risse talks about.424 Seen as a top–down and elite–designed 
initiative, the Summit also contributed to the decline in citizens’ trust in CSOs and their increasing 
demand for more representative and politically radical forms of OCS (e.g. the autodefensas case).  
It would be incorrect, however, to completely blame the convening CSOs for the Summit’s partial 
representation of the national and inter–class needs and interests. As in the U.K., in Mexico, CSOs 
are not responsible for what Flinders and Wood call the ‘societal depoliticization’, a condition that 
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preceded the Summit and which, paradoxically, has been increasing since Mexico’s electoral 
democratisation in 2000.425 Although citizens are becoming more interested in political matters, 
levels of participation in non–electoral forms of political activism continue to be quite low (see 
chapter 4). Some of the reasons are the lack of incentives to do it, the perceived low effectiveness 
of CSOs and the absence of resources (e.g. financial resources, time constraints, etc.). As noticed in 
Chapter 4, financial constraints are an important limitation to the survival of CSOS across the 
country. With only 26% of the CSOs in Mexico having the financial means to sustain their current 
activities, CSOs’ life expectancy is of just 2 years. A condition that, Flinders would argue, has pushed 
the smaller and more critical CSOs to either cease operating or become more collaborative with the 
State, losing their distinctive qualities and potentially becoming an unintended delivery arm of the 
State.426  
The media coverage analyses conducted in this chapter also revealed that the lack of financial 
and human resources for media management is another important constraint to the development 
of an effective OCS and public sphere in Mexico. For example, printed media attention to CSOs’ 
actions (including those from the Summit’s convenors) has been declining since 2010. Even in those 
cases in which the Summit achieved a noticeable media presence, the news reports about its 
proposals and demands were more, or better, defined by government actors. Therefore, it seems 
that Alvarez Icaza is right when stating that as long as CSOs lack of specialists in civil 
communications, civil society’s demands and proposals will not be adequately attended.427  
The Summit, thus, partially achieved its organisational objectives: ‘to forge a robust, 
representative and mobilised civil society capable of mobilising actors with diagnostics and 
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proposals.’428 Although it did offer a public space where civil society representatives identified 
common problems, discussed contrasting alternatives and demands, and presented clear proposals 
for the political realm, it failed to mobilise civil society across the country and produce a 
representative national civil society Summit. More importantly, it did fail to secure important policy 
gains.  As Bovens correctly points out: 
‘Policies […] decrees and decisions are often made in committees and cross 
a number of desks before they are implemented,’ even discussed, this 
researcher would add.429 
In this vein, this chapter has revealed that far from being ‘Summit citizens’ victories’, the policies 
enacted were the result of the actions from other less publicly known, yet politically influential – 
and elite defined – CSOs or OCS’ initiatives (e.g. the Law of Victims coordinated by Javier Sicilia). 
What is more, Maria Elena Morera has recently stated that ‘once they signed the Pact for Mexico, 
political actors almost completely abandoned dialogue and interlocution with civil society and 
(many of the answers to the Summit’s) proposals ended being diluted in legislative negotiations or 
ended becoming petty regulations.’430 This is why, to regard the First Citizen Summit to Build a 
Peaceful and Fair Mexico, a two day event, as the creator, promoter or trigger of policy changes (as 
its convenors have attempted to do), would be overstating its importance. 
Through this and other findings, this chapter has broken with existing paradigms on the 
normative wheels of democracy, assuming that media effects on public agenda are followed by 
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political action (see Chapter 3): sometimes political action does precede media and public attention 
(e.g. the case of the Law of Victims) whilst in others, public agenda initiates and can define political 
change (e.g. the creation of the National Observatory on Human Trafficking). 
Taking into account that this chapter focused on institutionalised forms of OCS (i.e. CSOs), and 
acknowledging that neither civil society nor the public sphere are limited to CSOs, the following 
chapter replicates this analysis of public–media–political effectiveness in a more nebulous form of 
OCS. It focuses on the case of the ‘self–defence groups’ in Mexico, an OCS movement against the 
increasing violence in the state of Michoacan that, in contrast to the Summit, did not count on the 
government’s support, but in fact was initially suppressed by government. Despite its importance, 
very limited scholarly attention has been devoted to study the policy impact of the self-defence 












Chapter 6. Case study 2: Hopelessness in the public sphere: self-
defence groups vs crime. 
 
Hopelessness has become so extreme that  
some citizens are turning to violence themselves  
through vigilantism.431 
 
In 2006, President Calderon launched what Eduardo Guerrero described as ‘a full–fledged surge 
against organised crime.’432 Since then, Mexico has been immersed in a deadly confrontation with 
drug–trafficking organisations (DTOs) that lead to 100,199 executions just between 2006 and 
2012. 433  A figure that, compared to the 3,970 homicides that occurred in England and Wales 
between 2006 and 2012, reflects the insecurity environment in which Mexicans were living in.434  
Although Mexico’s drug–trafficking related insecurity has national and international causes and 
repercussions, there are local cases of particular importance. One of them is the State of Michoacan, 
in west–central Mexico. Due to its weather and geographic characteristics (similar to those found in 
Colombia) that facilitate the cultivation of marihuana, its significance as a strategic maritime port of 
shipment between South America and the U.S.A., and the prevailing levels of poverty in the state, 
Michoacan has been one of the main bastions for DTOs in the world.435 Since the early 2000s to at 
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least 2015, political and even civil rights were heavily constrained in the state. Media organisations 
were censored and citizen mobility, even inside the state, was restricted. In some municipalities 
government was substituted de facto by a drug trafficking social structure that conditioned the 
provision of social services in exchange for allegiance and the payment of quotas, i.e. extortions.  
With organised crime having effectively penetrated the municipal government, civil society was 
notoriously weak, subsumed to a corrupt government and intimidated by drug traffickers.  
This situation changed when after years of criminal exploitation, citizens organised themselves 
in ‘armed vigilante movements’ that not only challenged the State’s authority and monopoly of the 
use of force, but also altered state and national policies on security provision. These armed vigilante 
movements, from now on called autodefensas, had three key demands: 
1) Security: 
v The installation of security check–points by the army and federal 
police across the municipalities under their control.   
2) Their legalisation as autodefensas.436 
3) The capture of the seven leaders of the Caballeros Templarios DTO: 
Servando Gomez (La Tuta), Nazario Moreno, Enrique Plancarte, 
Dionicio Loya, Jesus Vazquez, El Tena and El Chicano.437 
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With the ‘first armed uprising of the Mexico of the XXI century’ being entirely built around public 
security demands, it is one of the best case studies to analyse whether non–legally constituted and 
antagonistic forms of OCS can impact the media and political agendas in Mexico.438  This is why, this 
chapter builds on the public sphere theory to study whether Michoacan’s dangerous democratic 
environment permitted the development of a public sphere where the state was in touch with the 
needs of society, and media allowed citizens to come together and exchange ideas 439 
Simultaneously, it applies the agenda-setting framework to determine whether Michoacan’s socio–
political context allowed or not the public and political spheres to function as an input–output model 
where demands were articulated by a broader range of socio–political groups. To do this, this 
chapter is divided into 4 sub-chapters. The First one describes Michoacan’s violent and criminally 
dominated public sphere. The Second and Third sub-chapters build on data collected through one–
to–one interviews, focus groups and first–hand experiences during four weeks’ fieldwork in one of 
the world’s most dangerous places: sub-chapter two provides an insider perspective of the 
autodefensas movement, its organisation and objectives, whilst section three conducts the media 
agenda–setting analysis. The Fourth one conducts the ‘political agenda–setting’ analysis, developing 
legislative tracking of initiatives related to the autodefensas’ demands.   
The core finding of this chapter is that non–institutionalised and non–government sanctioned 
forms of OCS are capable of achieving their political goals, even in undemocratic and dangerous 
contexts. The autodefensas movement in Michoacan does highlight the fact that communication 
practices are essential for an effective public sphere, but contrary to existing paradigms, media 
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agenda does not always precede public agenda, and the autodefensas achievements are a clear 
example of this. By creating alternative microcosms of public discussions, the autodefensas 
challenged the macrocosms of the State’s criminally coerced public sphere, positioned new topics 
on the media agenda and triggered clear legislative changes. Overall, this chapter breaks with 
existing perceptions insisting that only ‘elite’ dominated, institutionalised and governmentally 
sanctioned structures of civil society (i.e. CSOs) are politically influential. It also hopes to trigger a 
shift in the study of civil society in Mexico, pointing the need to tackle civil society developments 
outside the usual democratic scenarios, particularly where media is controlled by criminal groups.  
6.1. Context: Michoacan’s and the first armed uprising of the Mexico of the 
XXI century. 
 
Since the 1950s Michoacan has been known for its production of marihuana and poppy flower, 
and from the 1990s, with the association of Mexico’s ‘Cartel del Milenio’ (i.e. Millennium Cartel) and 
Colombia’s’ Medellín Cartel, for the making of methamphetamines. Up to the 1990s, though, Romeo 
LopCam argues, violence was not an issue that worried Michoacans.440 However, after the elections 
of 2000, Mexican municipalities obtained a larger scope for political manoeuvre: from having few 
resources and powers in the 1980s, they became responsible for local services and obtained the 
right to establish their own public security policies.441 Nevertheless, Michoacan’s municipalities 
remained the least developed ones across Mexico, a condition particularly noticeable in their 
incapacity to control organised crime and drug–trafficking. 442  Being a fertile and strategic 
geographic point for the production and exportation of marihuana, Michoacan has witnessed 
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increasingly violent battles between leading international DTOs. Between 1995 and 2000, the Cartel 
del Milienio and the Gulf Cartel’s elite violent commando, the Zetas, engaged in a violent 
confrontation for the control of Michoacan. After five years of altercations, over 500 executions and 
17 beheadings, the Zetas and the Gulf Cartel imposed their rule in the state. However, other DTOs 
were already ready to fight this profitable market, to the extent that ‘violence became these guys’ 
tool to obtain all kinds of streams of income.’443 The year 2000, ‘was the point of inflection in the 
history of organised crime in Mexico, it was then when criminal organisations became real 
machineries for killing’, says Guillermo Valdez, former director of Mexico’s Intelligence and National 
Security Centre (CISEN).444  
With the incarceration of Osiel Cardenas Guillen, leader of the Gulf Cartel, in 2003, a new dispute 
for power emerged, leading to the appearance of the La Familia Michoacana (The Michoacan Family 
in English) DTO, controlled by Servando Gomez, La Tuta; Nazario Moreno, El Chayo; and José de 
Jesús Méndez, El Chango; all of them previous members of the Gulf Cartel.445 Having created an 
alliance with the national Cartel of Sinaloa DTO, the newly created Familia Michoacana challenged 
Los Zetas and triggered one of the most noticeable raises in homicides in Michoacan’s history (see 
Graph 28).446  
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Graph 28. Homicides rate per 100,000 in Michoacan 1990–2008 
 
Source: Jose Merino, Eduardo Fierro, and Jessica Zarkin, “Michoacán En Datos (Parte I): Dos Décadas de 
Violencia,” Animal Político, January 21, 2014, http://www.animalpolitico.com/blogueros–salir–de–
dudas/2014/01/21/michoacan–en–datos–parte–dos–decadas–de–violencia/ (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
 
Whilst in 2002 there were less than 15 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in Michoacan, once 
this intra–cartel fight started they grew to nearly 25 in 2006. In 2006 alone, La Familia Michoacana 
assassinated 5 directors, 1 deputy director, 1 commandant and 7 officers of Michoacan’s municipal 
police forces. With new and more radical terror tactics, La Familia Michoacana also altered both the 
media’s communicative role and society’s perception of its informative value. On the one hand, by 
intimidating newspapers’ owners and news editors, assassinating reporters, even creating their own 
local newspaper (CO1 stated), La Familia Michoacana controlled the flux of socio–political 
information, if not the public sphere in certain municipalities of Michoacan.447 In Jesus Lemus’ 
words, La Tuta became ‘the most media savvy drug trafficker in Mexico’s history.’448 On the other 
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hand, La Familia Michoacana was responsible for the first act of ‘narco–terrorism’ in Mexico. On the 
night of the 15th of September 2008, in the middle of the celebration of the 98th anniversary of 
Mexico’s Independence, a grenade exploded in Michoacan’s main plaza, killing 8 people and injuring 
more than 100.449  As noticed by Lorenzen, this event crossed ‘the thin red line’ in society’s tolerance 
towards drug–trafficking; it broke with the drug-traffickers code of conduct: citizens were not any 
longer extent from narco–violence.450 With the state government being incapable of providing 
justice and security, violence expanded from the municipalities of Uruapan, Apatzingan and Morelia 
to Chinicuila, Coalcoman, Tepalcatepec, Buenavista, Aguililla and Aquila (see Figure 9). 
Figure 9. Organised–crime related deaths by Municipality 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from Guerrero, “An Assessment of Illegal Protection 
Markets in Mexico”. 
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In this scenario, in 2009 President Calderon initiated more frontal operations against drug 
trafficking in Michoacan – his hometown –, arresting 12 Mayors (including those from Apatzingan 
and Uruapan) and 26 public servants due to their complicity with La Familia Michoacana DTO.451 
This, in the words of Hector Aguilar, marked ‘the beginning of the end of La Familia.’452 By the 24th 
of January 2011, the DTO published its last press release announcing the disbandment of La Familia 
Michoacana (See photo 2).453   
Photo 2. One of the last media messages from La Familia Michoacana (25th November 2010). 
 
Source: Algutal, “No Buscamos Vencer Sino Convencer Dice Con Mantas La Familia Michoacana,” 2010, 
http://algutlal.com/2010/11/. 
 
Nevertheless, DTOs’ operations did not stop. By March 2011, new DTOs emerged, and new 
territorial battles took place again (see Figure 10). In this vein, rather than ‘disappearing’, La Familia 
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Michoacana disintegrated into new violent groups: Guerreros Unidos (United Warriors), La nueva 
empresa (The new enterprise) and Los Caballeros Templarios (The Templar Knights); this last one 
created on the 11th of March by La Tuta, former leader of La Familia Michoacana. After ‘some of the 
bloodiest fights between drug cartels, Los Caballeros Templarios succeeded in dominating the state 
once again.454    
Figure 10. Deaths by homicide presumably related to organised crime between December 2006 and 
December 2010 (as % of total homicides).  
 
Source: Ramirez de Alba, Solís and de Buen, “Indicadores de Víctimas Visibles e Invisibles de Homicidio,” 
29. 
 
Building on La Familia’s expertise in media and public opinion management, Los Caballeros 
Templarios implemented new terror propaganda strategies. 455  In this vein, DD1 argued, the 
Caballeros Templarios made use of press insertions and narco–messages to ‘legitimate their fight 
as socially driven and justify themselves as the best option to other DTOs.’456 In their first narco–
message (see Photo 3), the DTO stated ‘they would be developing the altruistic tasks that La Familia 
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Michoacana used to develop in the state. They would maintain order, stop robberies, kidnappings 
and extortions, and shield the state against possible intrusions from rival organisations.’457  
Photo 3. Narco message from Caballeros Templarios 
 
Source: Isabel Longhi–Bracaglia, “Los ‘Caballeros Templarios’ Del ‘Narco,’” El Mundo, March 10, 2011, 
http://www.elmundo.es/america/2011/03/10/mexico/1299781228.html (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
 
 
This was not a new phenomenon for Michoacans, in fact, they were already accustomed to living 
with DTOs and their violence: ‘whilst they did not mess with us, everything was fine,’ AD1 stated; 
(citizens) used to see them passing through the streets highly armed, but it was as if they were 
ghosts, they did not do anything to us.’458 ‘Everybody, at certain point, needed to be or was in 
contact with the DTOs. They did their thing without involving us. It was not ok, but it worked.’459  
However, this blind-eye relationship changed when the DTOs started extorting and kidnapping local 
businessmen and farmers.460 Just in the first 3 months since its public appearance (i.e. March to June 
                                                             
457 See the first public appearance of the Los Caballeros Templarios in Longhi–Bracaglia; Redacción, “Aparecen 
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2011) the Caballeros Templarios DTO executed 30 people and shot down a Federal Police helicopter. 
That same year the DTO contributed with USD$2m to the electoral campaign of the PRI’s candidate, 
Fausto Vallejo, who governed Michoacan between 2010 and 2014; an investment that proved to be 
extremely profitable for the DTO but highly detrimental for Michoacans.461 In the first year of Fausto 
Vallejo’s administration (February 2012–April 2013) violence became even more pronounced:  
v In 2007, the state’s kidnapping rate was of one per 100,000 inhabitants, by 2013 it was 
of nearly 5. 
v Between 2012 and 2014, Michoacan surpassed the world’s homicide average rate.462 
v In 2012, 94% of crimes (629,524) were not reported to the authorities as citizens were 
afraid of doing it.463 
v By 2013, small and large farmers across 73 of Michoacan’s 114 municipalities had been 
extorted by the DTO.464 
v In 2013, the municipality of Yurécuaro, Michoacan, became the most dangerous place in 
the world, with 166 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.465   
v The U.N. identified that 70% of Michoacan’s municipalities were infiltrated by organised 
crime.466  
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Graph 29. Kidnapping and sexual crimes rates in Michoacan (1997–2013). 
 
Source: Guerrero, “La Dictadura Criminal.” 
 
With a noticeable government incapacity, if not outright unwillingness, to control violence and 
crime, Michoacans were in desperate need of organising themselves in autodefensas movements 

















‘Michoacan is nobody’s land’, ‘travelling around Michoacan is an extreme sport’, ‘we are 
abandoned,’ ‘everybody: police, military, whoever, is colluded.’467 These, and other circumstances 
triggered the appearance of armed citizen movements. For instance, due to his involvement in social 
protests, Vicar Gregorio Lopez, then Vicar of Apatzingan, received multiple death threats to the 
extent that he was forced to wear a bulletproof vest whilst giving mass (Photo 4).468 M.D. Jose 
Mireles, from Tepalcatepec, Michoacan, was another citizen who suffered from the insecurity in the 
state: his nephew, and youngest and older sisters were kidnapped by Los Caballeros Templarios, 
three incidents that contributed to the premature death of his mother. Furthermore, the DTO also 
stole his father’s cattle, risking his family’s financial stability.469 
Photo 4. Meeting with Vicar Gregorio Lopez. Apatzingan, Michoacan, 29th January 2014. 
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With families across the state suffering from similar crimes, and criminal extortions having cut 
Michoacans farmers’ income by 40%, citizens were forced to act, to organise in self–defence forces 
and ‘take the law into their own hands.’470  
Rather than stopping them, government tacitly accepted its inability to contain organised crime 
and explicitly recognised the communities’ right to organise, demand and provide their own 
communal security. For instance, on the 19th of February 2013, Michoacan’s Governor, Fausto 
Vallejo, publicly stated he agreed with the concept of self–protection and would work with these 
communities’ representatives to legitimate their self–defence civil groups by training and 
institutionalising them as ‘communitarian police forces.’471  Federal Senators from opposition (PRD) 
also supported the existence of ‘communitarian police forces’ in the neighbouring state of 
Guerrero.472 Nevertheless, this political support towards self–defence movements radically changed 
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when the citizen movements evolved from being isolated, disorganised and small-scale events into 
large, organised and moneyed armed vigilante groups across Michoacan’s strategic agricultural 
economic towns.  
On the 24th of February 2013, M.D. Jose Mireles rose in arms in the community of Tepalcatepec, 
Michoacan: ‘If I have them in front of me, those who caused my mother’s death, those who 
kidnapped my sisters, I am going to eat them for sure.’473 That is what he told his father whilst 
coordinating Mexico’s most recent and largest autodefensas movement. In parallel, Hipolito Mora, 
from the neighbouring town of Felipe Carrillo Puerto (aka ‘La Ruana’), and Estanislao Beltran, from 
Buenavista Tomatlan, (see Map 1) rose up in arms against drug traffickers and narco–politicians.474  
By 9:00 am the self-defence groups were only formed by 80 people with 22 rifles and shotguns, but 
by 3:00pm they were already 3,000 people who had already disarmed the municipal police in 
Tepalcatepec and La Ruana.475  
 
With sufficient firearms to challenge municipal government’s authority, the autodefensas gained 
visibility and public support across the country. By February 2013, 78% of Mexicans had heard of 
the movement and 57% agreed with the autodefensas actions to defend their communities against 
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delinquency. What is more, almost 50% of the population considered that by taking justice into their 
own hands the autodefensas were helping authorities to end crime.476 Businessmen and national 
social activists were also in favour of the movement. For example, businessmen organisation 
COPARMEX stated that the autodefensas were a ‘valid expression of citizens’ inconformity.’477 
Citizens, journalist Raul Lopez explained, did consider the autodefensas were a legitimate social 
force capable of achieving what the state could not: ‘to provide them with security through a 
representative authority that had the community’s best interests at heart.’478 ‘The autodefensas 
gave Michoacans the opportunity to obtain the justice that government did not aim to provide. They 
represented an opportunity to recover the freedom of expression that no longer existed in 
Michoacan’, CO1 and a FC1 added.479 With increasing public support, the autodefensas movement 
quickly expanded across the municipalities of Buenavista, Aguililla, Chinicuila, Aquila, Tancítaro, Los 
Reyes, Coahuayana and the northern town of Yurécuaro.480 Soon, Mexico’s General Prosecutor said, 
Michoacan became Mexico’s government’s ‘main security concern’ and ‘the perfect example of 
ungovernability in Mexico.’ 481  
                                                             
476 Parametría, “La Importancia de Confiar En Las Instituciones. Las Autodefensas En México” (Mexico City, 
2012), http://www.parametria.com.mx/carta_parametrica.php?cp=4615 (Accessed 22–12–2017); 
Viridiana Rios, “Autodefensas: El Riesgo de No Aplicar La Ley,” Nexos, April 1, 2014, 
https://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=20018 (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
477 Ezequiel Flores, “Empresarios Dan Su Apoyo a Grupo de Autodefensa En Guerrero,” Proceso, June 17, 2013, 
http://www.proceso.com.mx/345124/empresarios–apoyan–a–grupo–de–autodefensa–en–guerrero 
(Accessed 22–12–2017). 
478 Jose–Angel Garcia, “Interview to Raul Lopez Mendoza, Journalist of Cambio de Michoacan” (Michoacan, 
2013), pt. Min: 15.52. 
479 Garcia, “Interview to CO1 in Michoacan.”; Jose–Angel Garcia, “Focus Group on February 2nd 2014 in 
Apatzingan, Michoacan.” (Apatzingan, 2014). 
480 Laura Castellanos, “Autodefensas: En Un Año Se Extienden a 14 Municipios,” El Universal, February 24, 
2014, http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/primera–plana/2014/impreso/autodefensas–8221limpian–
8221–22–de–michoacan–44490.html (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
481  Redacción, “Michoacán, El Estado Más Violento: Murillo Karam,” Quadratin, April 17, 2013, 
https://www.quadratin.com.mx/justicia/Michoacan–el–estado–mas–violento–Murillo–Karam/ (Accessed 
22–12–2017); Redaciión, “Michoacán, El Escenario de La Ingobernabilidad.” 
188 
In this scenario, and just three months after assuming office, President Peña Nieto stated that 
‘these groups’ practices were illegal actions and government would combat them.’482 Mexico’s 
Minister of the Interior, Osorio Chong, declared ‘these groups needed to disappear as the figure of 
self–defence groups does not exist in Mexico’s law.’483 More importantly, Michoacan’s governor, 
Fausto Vallejo, changed his initial support and started to challenge the movement: although he 
would not cancel the dialogue with these groups, he now considered the autodefensas were illegal 
as they possessed illegal weapons and were taking justice into their own hands. ‘Illegal groups need 
to be eradicated’, he said.484  Institutionalised citizen organisations like the ones studied in Chapter 
5 also opposed the autodefensas. For instance, Morera, from Causa en Comun, stated they were 
movements financed by organised crime, whilst Miranda de Wallace, from Alto al Secuestro, 
equated them to guerrillas.485  
Nevertheless, with over 83% of Michoacans not feeling safe in their own state and only 10.3% 
fully trusting the state police, the autodefensas ignored those calls asking for their disarmament and 
demobilisation.486 Instead, the autodefensas found even further support in other municipalities: 
citizens believed the autodefensas’ power was a better option to the useless government 
institutions.487  
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‘It is not possible that government itself wants to disarm us in order to give 
access to other drug cartels […] we are not living in a state of law, we are in 
war, and the fact that government is calling the army to arrest us pushes us 
to continue fighting. If we want to be safe, we need to do it ourselves’, 
Mireles said.488  
 
By mid 2013, with an increasing number of autonomous but connected autodefensas 
movements across Michoacan, their leaders constituted the General Council of Self–defence and 
communitarian groups. With a horizontal decision–making process, where ‘nobody was more than 
the other’, Mireles said, the Council ruled over the autodefensas’ acting, and coordinated its future 
incursions against DTOs and interaction with media.489 Nevertheless, being trapped in a system that 
did not recognise their legality and which had allowed the appearance of DTOs in their state, the 
autodefensas were not only confronting the Caballeros Templarios DTO, but also – occasionally – 
federal security forces with orders to disarm them. For instance, in October 2013 (8 months after 
the autodefensas’ uprising), 4 members of Mireles’ family were kidnapped, dismembered and 
incinerated by the DTO in Nueva Italia as a threat to his movement.490 At the same time, in an effort 
to impede the dissemination of the autodefensas’ movement across Michoacan and Mexico, federal 
government dispatched more army battalions and federal police forces to the state:  
- On the 19th of May 2013, security forces entered the municipalities of Coalcoman, 
Buenavista and Tepalcatepec (see Map 3). In Buenavista, citizens armed with machetes and 
stones stopped the military convoy approaching their community, forcing soldiers to turn 
around and leave without achieving their autodefensas disarmament.491  
- In August 2013, the army detained 45 members of Aquila’s autodefensas group for the 
possession of banned guns.  
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- In December 2013, army entered the municipality of ‘La Huacana’ to disarm their 
autodefensas, but after an intense confrontation a woman was accidentally shot and killed 
by a solider.492  
 
The autodefensas capitalised on these confrontations and social discontent to continue fighting 
for their objectives, and to counteract the Caballeros Templarios’ dominance over the local media 
and public sphere, the self–defence groups started their own media strategy to ‘transform La Tuta 
into a monster across media accounts’:493   
 ‘The  autodefensas are fighting a media campaign against you, it is a trap against 
you, and they are winning over the media […] they are transforming you into a 
monster […] what I feel is that there has been a slow reactionary capacity here, 
you need to do something, to give us some narco–messages or something,’ Jose 
Luis Diaz, Caballeros Templarios' media adviser, told La Tuta in 2013.494   
However, this task proved to be difficult. Whilst in Western democratic scenarios ‘crime news 
are a gift to all the news–hungry editors,’ in Michoacan’s violent context, they were in fact a problem 
for reporters and editors. In Michoacan’s cities like Uruapan even the most read newspaper was 
subject to threats and secret forced–agreements with DTOS:495  
‘National and international media can easily move around Michoacan, but 
local journalists are already identified, they know everything about our 
families and constrain us from publishing information,’ DD1 said.496  
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The Caballeros Templarios ‘managed everything in the local media, to the extent that they 
considered themselves news editors.’497 ‘They were able to call journalists to their mobile phones 
or arrive to their offices to openly state their demands.’498 To further intimidate journalists, DTO’s 
lieutenants even ‘used to pick up 5 or 6 journalists, behead them and place their bodies on a 
roundabout,’ to the extent that in 2014 Michoacan was one of the five riskiest states to practice the 
profession in the riskiest country for journalism in the world.499 In Jesus Lemus’ words, ‘organised 
crime landed in the editorial boards, the heart of the public opinion machine.’500 For instance,  the 
Caballeros Templarios financed the Esquema news agency to influence the media coverage given to 
the autodefensas and their criminal organisation.501 To systematise their control over other media 
outlets, the DTO also produced two electronic media outlets (i.e. MS Television and Avance de 
Apatzingan) to subtly broadcast their propaganda and arrange interviews for the international 
media, including those between La Tuta and reporters from MundoFox (USA) and Channel 4 (UK).502  
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The DTO, however, was not the only player constraining freedom of expression. In February 2006, 
local Deputy David Garibay, broke into a newspaper’s office and armed, and threatened to kill its 
Director if the media outlet continued criticising his political actions.503 A few weeks later (i.e. March 
2006), journalists Ramon Angeles Sarta and Maria Esther Aguilar disappeared, with local journalists 
believing they were murdered by local authorities. 504   
Facing this situation, ‘many local journalists started sending information to international 
newspapers and organisms, using nicknames. But some of them started to be murdered, so 
journalists stopped doing it:’505   
‘Many times we contacted international organisations to request their help in order to 
send some of our threatened colleagues abroad, for their protection. We requested 
their assistance so many times, but nothing happened, thus, we were forced to 
negotiate with the drug–traffickers,’ DD1 and CO1 explained. 506  
Journalists and editors ‘were pushed to negotiate with the devil, to find the way to survive. They 
started publishing journalistic articles under the general authorship of Redaccion (i.e. Editorial in 
English), even stopped publishing many details to satisfy the DTO’s requests’. 507  ‘The media’s 
situation in Michoacan was so fucked up. While many times the information in the national media 
was made up and full of everything is ok type of news, we (i.e. local media), who knew everybody 
                                                             
“La Propaganda y La Ocupación Templaria,” SinEmbargo.Mx, October 10, 2013, 
http://www.sinembargo.mx/10–10–2013/779731 (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
503  Agencias, “Ejecutan a Reportero Gráfico En Michoacán,” El Siglo de Torreon, March 10, 2006, 
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Michoacán,” Proceso MX, March 10, 2006, http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=215610 (Accessed 22–12–
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http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/60456.html (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
504 Agencias, “Ejecutan a Reportero Gráfico En Michoacán”; Redacción, “Ejecutan de Dos Tiros a Exfotógrafo 
de La Voz de Michoacán”; Marquez, “Diputado Pide Licencia Para Encarar Denuncia.” 
505 Garcia, “Interview to CO1 in Michoacan (27-Jan-2014),” pt. Minute: 00:34:00; 02:11:00. 
506 Garcia, pt. Minute: 27:00, 34:00, 54:00; Garcia, “Interview to DD1 (18 January 2014),” pt. Minute: 00:03:17. 
507 Garcia, “Interview to CO1 in Michoacan (27-Jan-2014),” pt. Minute: 27:00, 34:00, 54:00; Garcia, “Interview 
to DD1 (18 January 2014),” pt. Minute: 00:03:17. 
193 
was dying, could not publish many things.’508 Even if accurate information was reported by the 
national newspapers, it had a null effect in Michoacan’s public sphere, as those news outlets have 
minimal circulation in the state.509 For example, El Universal, one of Mexico’s largest and most 
influential newspapers, only distributes 10 copies in Apatzingan, a municipality of nearly 100,000 
people, of which three of them are sold to the population and the rest are bought by local 
government and media outlets.  
Overall, C01 said, ‘the DTO’s leaders were intelligent, they knew that in an uninformed society it 
would be easier to maintain the status–quo.’ 510  In fact, it can be argued that the Caballeros 
Templarios perfectly understood the importance of Laswell’s media maxims and how to control the 
media agenda–setting layers. By intimidating citizens and corrupting journalists and public servants, 
the DTO left local media with very few sources of information: only a few who knew the facts were 
willing to speak, and of those, some were murdered after, even before, speaking to the press.  
Furthermore, with national and international media having very limited penetration in Michoacan, 
the DTO effectively determined the local media agenda and, potentially, influenced the national 
one.  
Considering this scenario, and building on Rogers, Sanz and Wolfe et al’s arguments stating that 
‘what people know is what they read in the newspapers’, that ‘the political system functions under 
a mediatised democracy’ and that ‘national public policy agenda fluctuates with the volume of 
media attention to particular issues’ (see Chapter 2.2), it becomes unsurprising that there was a 
                                                             
508 Garcia, “Interview to CO1 in Michoacan (27-Jan-2014),” pt. Minute: 41:00. 
509 As explained by DD1. Garcia, “Interview to DD1 (18 January 2014),” pt. Minute: 00:15:06. 
510 Garcia, “Interview to CO1 in Michoacan (27-Jan-2014),” pt. Minute: 00:41:00; 02:30:56. 
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national political paralysis in/towards Michoacan.511 The autodefensas, however, started to change 
this media and public sphere scenario. 
‘When the autodefensas began their activities, there were threats to stop publishing news about 
them. However, as the autodefensas expand in number and territorial dominance, the DTO stopped 
exercising as much pressure over local news agencies as before.’512 First, knowing that they would 
not find an echo in the local traditional media, either because of its collusion with criminal groups 
or due to the DTO’s threats, the autodefensas turned to social media to denounce insecurity and 
communicate their actions to a wider audience. In this vein, their webpage Valor por Michoacan 
became the space where Mireles constantly accused municipal and state public servants of working 
for the Caballeros Templarios, and where the Consejo Michoacano de Autodefensas communicated 
its decision to expel the state police corporations from their communities. 513  Through this 
mechanism, Pablo Madrid and Lemus argue, Mireles and the autodefensas triggered a national and 
international interest to their demands: soon, ‘the silence of local media and public servants started 
to fall.’514 In words of Vicar Gregorio Lopez, ‘the autodefensas began to understand the media 
dynamics in order to use them as a mechanism for informing society about their movement.’515  
                                                             
511 For example, the Deputies members of Mexico’s the Public Security Commission used newspaper reports 
as one of their main sources of information on social needs. Furthermore, national government institutions 
in charge of preserving, if not promoting, citizens and societal development, like the National Commission 
for Human Rights (CNDH), officially stated they did not know about Michoacan and neighbour states’ 
security and human rights problems until they read about the autodefensas in the newspapers. Garcia, 
“Inteview to Deputy Elizabeth Oswelia Yañez, Secretary of the Public Security Commission of the Chamber 
of Deputies (LX Legislature) (4-Oct-2013).” CNDH, “Informe Especial Sobre Los Grupos de Autodefensa y 
La Seguridad Pública En El Estado de Guerrero.,” CNDH (Mexico City, 2013), 1–2, 
http://www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/doc/Informes/Especiales/2013_IE_grupos_autodefensa.pdf (Accessed 
22–12–2017); CNDH, “Informe Especial Sobre Los Grupos de Autodefensa En El Estado de Michoacan y Las 
Violaciones a Los Derechos Humanos Relacionadas Con El Conflicto.”  
512 Garcia, “Interview to CO1 in Michoacan (27-Jan-2014).” 
513 Jesus Lemus, Tierra Sin Dios, 1st Ed. (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 2015). 
514 Lemus. 
515 Jose–Angel Garcia, “Interview to Vicar Gregorio Lopez, Vicar of Apatzingan, Michoacan” (Apatzingan, 
2014), pt. Minute: 00:16:24. 
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‘They even learnt to ration their information so they could be part of the daily media agenda’, 
Villalpando said.516  For instance: 
‘In January [the 18th] 2014, the autodefensas secured the house of one of 
the DTO’s main leaders and organised a press conference in the community 
of Antunez. They already knew how to do it perfectly, they sent us a press 
release stating the time and place to meet next morning, and some key 
points for us to prepare in advance. Next day, they told us the house they 
secured was of Nazario Moreno, alias El Chayo, one of the DTO’s founders. 
They knew how important this news was as President Calderon’s 
administration had previously told Mexico and the world El Chayo was 
killed by security forces back in 2010. Next day, they called us all again, they 
showed us some things, t–shirts, books, and guns which belonged to El 
Chayo; things they had already obtained days ago, the very first day [the 
18th]. Then, the day after, they called us back and presented us with the 
sword that El Chayo used in the DTO’s initiation rituals… and so forth. They 
did that on many occasions, and we could not do anything about it.’517 
Furthermore, whilst government’s information was inaccurate, if available, the ‘autodefensas 
were capable of providing names and numbers relatively quickly; neither the army, nor the federal 
police, even less the municipal presidents, talked to people.’ 518 What is more, they understood how 
to limit their negative media coverage. According to various journalists, the autodefensas started 
‘to make use of their preferred and most supportive media (e.g. La Jornada and El Universal 
                                                             
516 Garcia, “Interview to Jorge Villalpando Castro, Video–Journalist for Al–Jazeera and Former Editor of El 
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518 A case in point was an autodefensas’ incursion into the town of Coalcoman joined by this researcher on 
the 25th of May 2013 (see Photo 5). Whilst government reports could only state that federal security forces 
were dispatched to investigate, the autodefensas were capable of telling journalists, on real–time, the 
number and place of deaths’, Villalpando confirmed (see Photo 5). 518  Garcia, “Interview to Jorge 
Villalpando Castro, Video-Journalist for Al-Jazeera and Former Editor of El Universal Media Content (15-
Jan-2014),” pt. Minute: 00:55:35. 
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newspapers) whilst directly refusing access to those media channels they considered gave them 
negative coverage (e.g. Televisa and TV Azteca).519 
Photo 5. Autodefensas incursion in Coalcoman, 25 May 2013. 
 
Source: Garcia, “Interview to Jorge Villalpando Castro, Video–Journalist for Al–Jazeera and Former Editor 
of El Universal Media Content. 
 
 
                                                             
519 Garcia, pt. Minute: 01:07:00, 00:41:00. 
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Through its actions, CO1 and DD1 stated, the autodefensas did contribute to improve freedom 
of expression in the state. By October 2013, CO1 said, the ‘discussion tables between DTOs and 
media had stopped, as the DTOs were busier with other things.’ 520  With the assassination or 
apprehension of some of the DTO’s media managers, ‘media could also start publishing everything 
again, even mentioning the names of the criminals wanted by the authorities. It was a noticeable 
difference’, DD1 added.521 ‘Society started to be informed again and they trusted more in the power 
of civil society.’522 However, to what extent are these statements true? How noticeable was the 
autodefensas’ impact on the liberalisation of the media agenda? These are some of the questions 
that the following sub-chapter intends to answer through multiple quantitative methods.  
6.2.1 Autodefensas: freeing both media and public sphere. 
 
Building on the previous section, this sub-chapter looks at nearly 10,000 news reports about the 
Caballeros Templarios DTO, Michoacan autodefensas and the government’s actions related to them 
in order to measure the autodefensas’ impact on media and government agendas.  
Through a qualitative study of the news reports published in El Universal, El Norte and Reforma 
national newspapers, but also in Cambio de Michoacan local newspaper, this thesis found that 
between March 11th, 2011 (i.e. day of the emergence of the Caballeros Templarios) and June 31st, 
2015 (i.e. allegedly the end of the autodefensas uprising), 8,823 reports were published on the 
matter:  
 
                                                             
520 Garcia, “Interview to DD1 (18 January 2014),” pt. Minute: 00:17:40. 
521 For instance, El Pantera was killed on the 27th of February 2014 and Nazario Moreno on the 10th of March 
2014. Garcia, pt. Minute: 00:21:19. 
522 Garcia, “Interview to CO1 in Michoacan (27-Jan-2014),” pt. Minute: 1:02:00. 
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Table 23. Media coverage of the "Autodefensas" and "Caballeros Templarios" DTO (2011–2015) 
 Autodefensas Templarios Total 
Reforma 1,734 1,312 3,046 
Cambio de Michoacan 1,214 944 2,158 
El Universal 1,008 827 1,835 
El Norte 1,019 765 1,784 
Total 4,975 3,848 8,823 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from Nexis Database and Cambio de Michoacan, 
“Cambio de Michoacan Newspaper’s Search Engine,” Cambio de Michoacan, n.d., 
http://www.cambiodemichoacan.com.mx/buscar.php (Accessed 22–12–2017).  
 
A figure that allows stating that the autodefensas and Caballeros Templarios DTO were 
newsworthy topics, however, Michoacan’s challenging security sphere did limit the freedom of 
press. In this vein, local news reports on the DTO remained quite restricted between 2011 and the 
beginning of 2014, supporting the local journalists’ arguments discussed in this chapter’s previous 
sub-section.  Several events back up these findings, including the following two: 
1. Journalists: spread our message, or you will pay with your flesh. Citizens: Deaths will begin 
if PAN arrives to power. 
From May to August 2011, Michoacan was involved in pre–electoral exercises and from the 
31st of August  to the 8th November 2011 in formal electoral campaigns that lead to the 
election of Fausto Vallejo (PRI) as Michoacan’s Governor. Vallejo’s campaign and 
governorship, though, was always suspected of having links to the Caballeros Templarios, a 
collusion that became evident when on the 12th of November 2011, the Caballeros 
Templarios published an advert on Michoacan’s AM pushing citizens to vote for PRI:523  
                                                             
523 For instance, Jorge Monroy found out that between 2009 and 2011 Fausto Vallejo’s close collaborators 
actively negotiated and sought the DTO’s support for his campaign. Jorge Monroy, “Reyna Tenía Una Red 




‘To the people of Michoacan: we do not want the PAN in any level of 
government, we will not stop until we bring the PAN to standstill. Deaths 
will begin if they [PAN] arrive to power, heads and dismembered bodies will 
appear. To journalists: tell the truth and spread our message or you will pay 
with your flesh. Do not wear any merchandise or t–shirts with the PAN’s 
logo, we do not want innocent people to die.’ 524 
2.  ‘Writing about the Caballeros Templarios became forbidden for the local media.’ ‘The 
Governor was their puppet.’  
According to DD1 and CO1, with ‘Fausto Vallejo serving as a puppet of the Caballeros 
Templarios, ’writing about the DTO became forbidden for the local media.’525 In this vein, 
before the DTO acquired considerable power in the State (i.e. between March 2011 and 
September 2011), Diario de Michoacan published an average of 14.2 news reports per 
month about it, more than any of the three national newspapers (see Annex 9). However, 
once Vallejo assumed office and the Caballeros Templarios cemented their dominance on 
the state, local media coverage about the DTO’s atrocities reduced to an average of 8.9 
news reports per month. Once the autodefensas’ presence became more notorious across 
the state (i.e. from April 2014 onwards), Cambio de Michoacan’s reporting on the topic 
started to overcome the national newspapers again (See Annex 9 and Graph 30).  
                                                             
524 Lemus, Tierra Sin Dios. 
525 Garcia, “Interview to Vicar Gregorio Lopez, Vicar of Apatzingan, Michoacan”; Garcia, “Interview to the 
Deputy Director of a Local Newspaper in Michoacan”; Garcia, “Interview to CO1 in Michoacan (27-Jan-
2014),” pt. Minute: 1:00:07. 
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Graph 30. Homicides in Michoacan vis–à–vis news reports on Caballeros Templarios and autodefensas (by 
month and newspaper 2011–2015). 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from INEGI, “Mortalidad Conjunto de Datos: 
Defunciones Por Homicidios”; Michoacan, “Cambio de Michoacan Newspaper’s Search Engine.”  
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Some could argue these differences in media coverage could have been the result of a reduction 
in both the news slot for local media and the DTO and autodefensas’ importance as newsworthy 
topics. Evidence, however, disproves these arguments. First, the daily printed version of Cambio de 
Michoacan contained a sustained average of 68 news reports daily between October 2011 and June 
2015.526  Secondly, considering that ‘crime–news is a gift to all the news–hungry editors who depend 
on exciting the public’s imagination to turn a profit’ and that ‘bloody news’ are the main selling point 
of Michoacan’s local media’, it can be argued that due to their actions, both the Caballeros 
Templarios and Autodefensas remained being newsworthy topics.527 For instance: 
v By May 2013, local and national business organisations continued regarding the Caballeros 
Templarios as ‘one of their main concerns.’528  
v Between August 2012 and August 2013, more than 100 families were forced to migrate to 
other states in the country.529  
v Data from Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics (INEGI) and the Executive Secretariat of 
the National System of Public Security illustrates that homicides related to organised crime 
continued rising throughout the DTOs and Governor Vallejo’s rule (see Graph 31).   
                                                             
526 For example, the printed versions of Monday 18th and Monday 25thof February 2013 included 57 and 62 
news reports, and the printed version of the 14th and 21st of April 2014 contained 58 and 60 news reports. 
These figures exclude those reports published on the newspaper’s Entertainment (Escenarios in Spanish) 
section and columns of opinion, but include those contained in the newspaper’s supplement Municipios. 
See Annex 9. 
527 McCreery, “The Monster and the Press.” 
528  Univision, “Los Caballeros Templarios Imponen Su Ley En Michoacán,” UNIVISION, May 9, 2013, 
http://www.univision.com/noticias/narcotrafico/los–caballeros–templarios–imponen–su–ley–en–
michoacan (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
529 AFP, “Al Menos 40 Familias Desplazadas En Oeste de México Por Miedo Al Narco,” El Tiempo, August 21, 
2013, http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS–13005590 (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
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Graph 31. Deaths by intentional homicide vis–a–vis Cambio de Michoacan coverage to the 
Caballeros Templarios 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from INEGI, “Mortalidad Conjunto de Datos: 
Defunciones Por Homicidios”; Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública, “Incidencia 
Delictiva Del Fuero Común” (Mexico City, 2015), http://secretariadoejecutivo.gob.mx/incidencia–
delictiva/incidencia–delictiva–fuero–comun.php (Accessed 22–12–2017); Michoacan, “Cambio de 
Michoacan Newspaper’s Search Engine.” 
 
Pearson’s analyses did not reveal a significant correlation between the number of homicides and 
the news published on the DTO and autodefensas between March 2011 and June 2015 either: for 
homicides vis–à–vis media coverage to Caballeros Templarios, the Pearson’s coefficient was almost 
inexistent (i.e. r=–0.009) and vis–à–vis media coverage to the autodefensas it was of only r=0.212. 
(Table 24).530 
                                                             
530 Similarly, no significant correlation was found when divided the time frame into three parts: pre–during–
post autodefensas movement. This indicates that level of homicides related to the conflict, at least on their 
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Table 24. Pearson correlations between number of homicides and the media coverage given to Caballeros 
Templarios DTO  and Autodefensas (March 2011 and June 2015). 
 
Therefore, it is possible to state that as illustrated by the qualitative data on the previous sub-
chapter, the changes in Cambio de Michoacan’s reporting on the DTO did not conform to an 
unavailability of information, but to the limited freedom of expression and constrained public 
sphere that prevailed in Michoacan: 
 ‘while people were being killed in Michoacan, the authorities at state and 
municipal levels, being colluded with the DTO, wanted to limit the 
information on the criminal.’531  ‘If an international or national media outlet 
arrived, they (i.e. the DTO), colluded with state government, organised 
interviews with La Tuta and more. They were so eager to do this that if 
someone from the BBC, CNN or AP arrived in town, La Tuta asked for them, 
they were received, escorted and given interviews. But for us, this was 
restricted. La Tuta wanted to produce an image abroad portraying the DTO 
as a social fighter,’ CO1 and Lopez said.532  
                                                             
531  Garcia, “Interview to CO1 in Michoacan (27-Jan-2014)”; Garcia, “Interview to Raul Lopez Mendoza, 
Journalist of Cambio de Michoacan (28-Jan-2014).” 
532 Garcia, “Interview to CO1 in Michoacan (27-Jan-2014),” pt. Minute: 00:35:15; 00:23:24. 
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With scarce information being filtered by local media, the ‘inter–media agenda–setting process’ 
of which Fogarty and McCombs talk about was only partly activated, as national and international 
media did not have any material to publish or informative lead to follow, DD1 said:  
‘It was not possible for us to share information with reporters from other media’,533 
‘Local media used to have the information but could not publish it, and national media 
was incorrectly portraying an image of “everything is fine’ in Michoacan.’534  
Nevertheless, as the autodefensas movement rose (March 2013 – Feb 2014), the ‘inter–media 
agenda–setting process’ started to work in the way that McCombs and Fogarty would have 
expected, with Pearson analyses showing an almost perfect positive correlation between national 
and local media coverages of the Caballeros Templarios (i.e. r=.871 and bigger, see tables 25 to 27).  
Table 25. Correlation between local and national media coverage of Caballeros Templarios, previous to 
the autodefensas movement. 
 
                                                             
533 Garcia, pt. Minute: 2:28; Garcia, “Interview to DD1 (18 January 2014),” pt. Minute: 00:15:17. 
534 Garcia, “Interview to CO1 in Michoacan (27-Jan-2014)”; Garcia, “Interview to DD1 (18 January 2014).” 
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Table 26. Correlation between local and national media coverage of Caballeros Templarios, during the 
autodefensas movement. 
 
Table 27. Correlation between local and national media coverage of Caballeros Templarios, after the 
autodefensas movement. 
 
*Tables in Spanish not translated into English to ensure validity of the data. Content equates to that 




Having said this, it is possible to state that the Caballeros Templarios DTO effectively impeded 
the local media to server its most basic function: to connect the individual with the state and act as 
the spiritual mirror in which a people could see itself and the spirit of the state. By restricting 
freedom of expression, the DTO prevented Michoacan’s society from having an informed mind, 
participating in public debates and triggering socio–political changes. In other words, the criminal 
group dominated Michoacan’s public sphere, and as such, a fully functional citizenry could not 
flourish in Michoacan.535 Although the emergence of a social force capable of shaping the policies 















                                                             
535 A. McKee, The Public sphere: An introduction, p.7; Dahlgren, Television and the Public sphere: Citizenship, 
Democracy and the Media, 8.  
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6.3 The autodefensas policy outcomes: public power setting the agenda?  
 
‘I think you have arrived in the key moment for your study. This is the moment when 
civil society starts to gain power; we have reached such a level of social degradation 
that society was pushed to solve things itself. And this is what the autodefensas are 
doing’, CO1 said in 2014.536 
Since the day of their uprising in February 2013 the autodefensas in Michoacán incessantly 
fought against the Caballeros Templarios, but also government forces. Nevertheless, until January 
2014 the autodefensas had failed to achieve their three main demands: 537 
1) Security: 
v The installation of security check–points by the army and federal 
police across the municipalities under their control.   
2) Their legalisation as autodefensas.538 
3) The capture of the 7 leaders of the Caballeros Templarios DTO: Servando 
Gomez (La Tuta), Nazario Moreno, Enrique Plancarte, Dionicio Loya 
Plancarte, Jesus Vazquez Macías, El Tena and El Chicano.539 
 
The year 2014, however, proved to be pivotal for the autodefensas’ survival and goals. On the 
4th of January 2014, Mireles suffered an airplane accident in Michoacan, incapacitating him from 
being involved in the movement. Consequently, his aide, Estanislao Beltran, aka ‘Papa Smurf’, took 
control of the autodefensas’ leadership. Regrettably, CO1 recalls, Estanislao was not as good and 
charismatic communicator as Mireles, diminishing the autodefensas’ media impact.540 On the 10th 
                                                             
536 Garcia, “Interview to CO1 in Michoacan.,” pt. Minute: 00:00:04; Garcia, “Interview to Jorge Villalpando 
Castro, Video–Journalist for Al–Jazeera and Former Editor of El Universal Media Content.,” pt. Minute: 
00:28:00. 
537 Informador.Mx, “Autodefensas de Michoacán Se Expanden a Churumuco,” Informador. Mx, December 29, 
2013, https://www.informador.mx/Mexico/Autodefensas–de–Michoacan–se–expanden–a–Churumuco–
20131229–0037.html (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
538 For more information, please refer to the following news reports and political analyses. Velediaz, “La Huida 
de Los Templarios.”Corona, “La Resistencia de Las Autodefensas Al Desarme Tensa El Conflicto En 
Michoacán”; Animal Político, “Mireles Niega Apoyo Al Desarme (Video)”; Animal Político, “‘Dejaremos Las 
Armas Cuando Se Restablezca El Estado de Derecho En Michoacán’: Mireles (Video Completo)”; Redacción, 
“Autodefensas Condicionan Desarme a Caída de Siete Líderes ‘Templarios’”; La Jornada, El Pueblo Que 
Venció Al Crimen Organizado. Testimonio de Un Policía Comunitario En Michoacán. 
539 CNN Mexico, “La Muerte de Plancarte Deja a ‘la Tuta’ Como El Último Líder ‘Templario.’” 
540 Garcia, “Interview to CO1 in Michoacan (27-Jan-2014).” 
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of January 2014, Michoacan’s Governor, Fausto Vallejo, formally requested the federal 
government’s military support for public security provision by which:  
v Federal government took responsibility over the provision of security in the 
State. 
v 'The autodefensas were asked to either join the police force or disarm’ by 
Osorio Chong, Mexico’s Minister of the Interior.541  
v Federal government ‘disbanded local and state government powers’, sent 
1,500 more police officers to the state and created the new Commission for 
Security and Integral Development for Michoacan under the command of 
Commissioner Alfredo Castillo, part of President Peña Nieto’s right–hand 
men.542  
With Commissioner Castillo controlling the functioning of Michoacan’s government, 
the federal security forces took control over the security of 27 municipalities, pressing 
the autodefensas to cooperate more closely with federal government.  In this vein, on 
the 15th of January 2014, with Mireles still out of the picture, Commissioner Castillo, 
Governor Fausto Vallejo, Hipolito Mora and Estanislao Beltran, signed the first 
agreement to begin the autodefensas institutionalisation through their incorporation 
into Michoacan’s Rural Defence Corps. 543 An accord based on the following points: 
1. This agreement will work towards the institutionalisation of the self–defence 
groups through their incorporation into the ‘Rural Defence Corps’, under the 
control of Mexico’s Ministry of Defence.  
                                                             
541 Redacción Animal Político, “Fuerzas Federales Ya Empiezan a Llegar a Michoacán,” Animal Politico, January 
13, 2014, http://www.animalpolitico.com/2014/01/gobierno–emplaza–autodefensas–de–michoacan–
dejar–las–armas–se–hara–cargo–de–la–seguridad/ (Accessed 22–12–2017); BBC News, “Mexican Police 
Start to Disarm Vigilantes in Michoacan,” BBC News, January 14, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world–latin–america–25724986 (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
542 President Enrique Peña Nieto, “DECRETO Por El Que Se Crea La Comisión Para La Seguridad y El Desarrollo 
Integral En El Estado de Michoacán.” (2014), 
http://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5329743&fecha=15/01/2014 (Accessed 22–12–2017); 
Jorge Monroy, “En Michoacán, EPN Aplicó Desaparición de Poderes de Facto,” El Economista, January 19, 
2014, http://eleconomista.com.mx/sociedad/2014/01/19/michoacan–epn–aplico–desaparicion–
poderes–facto (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
543 CNDH, “Informe Especial Sobre Los Grupos de Autodefensa En El Estado de Michoacan y Las Violaciones a 
Los Derechos Humanos Relacionadas Con El Conflicto.,” pt. 198. 
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2. The autodefensas’ members would have the option to become part of the 
Municipal Police forces, as long as they complied with all relevant law 
regulations.  
3. Self-defence groups would register all their firearms, and, in exchange, Mexico’s 
Ministry of Defence would provide them with all the tools they required for their 
operation, transportation and communication.  
4. Government would audit the expenditure of the public resources given to each 
municipality.  
5. There would be a rotation of the representatives of the judiciary power in each 
municipality.  
6. The recently created Commission for Michoacan would maintain a constant 
communication with the municipal authorities to provide  the required 
support.  
7. For those members of the autodefensas who have been detained for carrying 
illegal guns and freed under provisional liberty, these agreements would give 
them the possibility to attend their legal procedures in Michoacan rather than 
in another state.  
8. Law enforcement against those municipal and state public servants involved in 
criminal activities.  
 
This move brought both positive and negative consequences for the autodefensas’ demands.544 
Positively, the autodefensas began to achieve one of the movement’s goals: The installation of 
security check–points by the army and federal police across the municipalities under their control 
(see Map 1).  Since the Commissioner’s arrival to Michoacan, the autodefensas started to join efforts 
with federal security forces in order to extend their fight against DTOs: whilst ‘the self–defence 
groups executed the action, police forces/army provided additional assistance if required’, 
Villalpando said and this researcher witnessed.545 Government’s approach to disarmament also 
changed. Although government continued publicly stating that the autodefensas’ disarmament was 
a precondition for further negotiations, de facto government allowed citizens to continue being 
                                                             
544 Redacción, “Durante El Nuevo Operativo de Las Fuerzas Federales En Michoacán van 110 Detencione,” La 
Jornada, January 27, 2014, http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2014/01/27/politica/015n1pol (Accessed 22–
12–2017). 
545 Garcia, “Interview to Jorge Villalpando Castro, Video–Journalist for Al–Jazeera and Former Editor of El 
Universal Media Content.” 
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armed for their protection. In words of CO1 and Vicar Gregorio Lopez, after the tacit agreement ‘the 
autodefensas used to put their guns down when the media was taking photos, but citizens remained 
armed in agreement with the Marines.’546  
Map 1. Autodefensas and federal security forces working together. 
 
Source: Charles Parkinson, “‘Nuevo Cartel’ En Michoacán Refuerza Temores Por La Criminalización de Las 
Autodefensas,” InsightCrime (Mexico City, May 2014), http://es.insightcrime.org/noticias–del–dia/nuevo–
cartel–michoacan–refuerza–temores–criminalizacion–autodefensas (Accessed 22–12–2017).547 
According to the – then – Federal Commissioner for Public Security, this increasing cooperative 
relation lead to the capture of Jesus Vazquez Macias, alias El Toro (in January 20th, 2014) and Dionisio 
                                                             
546 Garcia, “Interview to Vicar Gregorio Lopez, Vicar of Apatzingan, Michoacan”; Garcia, “Interview to CO1 in 
Michoacan.”; Garcia, “Interview to the Deputy Director of a Local Newspaper in Michoacan”; Garcia, 
“Interview to Jorge Villalpando Castro, Video–Journalist for Al–Jazeera and Former Editor of El Universal 
Media Content.” 
547  Charles Parkisnon, “‘Nuevo Cartel’ En Michoacán Refuerza Temores Por La Criminalización de Las 
Autodefensas,” InsightCrime (Mexico City, May 2014), http://es.insightcrime.org/noticias–del–dia/nuevo–
cartel–michoacan–refuerza–temores–criminalizacion–autodefensas (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
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Plancarte, aka El Tio (in January 27th, 2014),  two of the names in the autodefensas’ most wanted 
list.548 With this, the self–defence groups were on track to achieve another of its main goals: the 
capture of the 7 leaders of the Caballeros Templarios DTO. Thus, further actions were put in place 
to accomplishing their third goal: their legalisation as autodefensas: ‘the autodefensas wanted to 
enlist, that [government] gave us some budget, registration and a uniform to wear, to be legal, and 
we are working towards that’, Vicar Gregorio Lopez stated.549 Although the agreement of the 15th 
of January did not last, as the autodefensas continued with their incursions without registering in 
the Rural Defence Corps, cooperation between government and autodefensas did not cease. 
Therefore, on the 26th of January 2014, both sides signed a second agreement, witnessed by Maria 
Elena Morera, from Causa en Comun, and other CSOs’ representatives. Rather than forcing a sudden 
disarmament, the new accord contained only four mutually accepted prescriptions (see Photo 6):550  
1. The self–defence groups would not enter Morelia (Michoacan’s capital), 
nor any other main city (apart from those they have already taken).  
2. The groups would only be present in road filters or revision points, always 
in collaboration with federal forces.  
3. There would not be any new autodefensas’ incursions without being agreed 
with the Federal and State authorities.  
4. [More importantly, the agreement treated them as equal by stating] 
Federal and State authorities, and autodefensas would work in a 
coordinated and transparent way to recover order and tranquillity in 
Michoacan.  
                                                             
548 Benito Jímenez, “Gobierno Pacta Con Líderes Legalizar Autodefensas En Michoacán,” Terra, February 27, 
2014, http://noticias.terra.com.mx/mexico/gobierno–pacta–con–lideres–legalizar–autodefensas–en–
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549 Garcia, “Interview to Vicar Gregorio Lopez, Vicar of Apatzingan, Michoacan,” pt. Minute: 00:02:59. 
550 CNDH, “Informe Especial Sobre Los Grupos de Autodefensa En El Estado de Michoacan y Las Violaciones a 
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Photo 6. Second agreement between the autodefensas and Mexico's government (26 Jan 2014) 
 
Source: Reforma, “Exhiben Acuerdo Castillo–Autodefensas,” Diario Mx, March 3, 2016, 
http://diario.mx/Nacional/2016–03–03_12aaa23d/exhiben–acuerdo–
castillo_autodefensas/#DmxBox (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
 
On the negative side, however, this further collaboration with government exacerbated internal 
disputes within the autodefensas movement. First, on the 4th of February 2014, the Autodefensas’ 
Council officially named Estanislao Beltran as their spokesperson.551 An action that, Mireles said, 
stopped the communication between both leaders.552 Secondly, on the 22nd of February 2014, 
Hipolito Mora, Vicar Gregorio Lopez and the leaders of 10 autodefensas groups across Michoacan 
                                                             
551 Jorge Gil, “Estanislao Beltrán Releva a Mireles Como Vocero de Autodefensas,” Proceso, February 5, 2014, 
http://www.proceso.com.mx/364151/estanislao–beltran–releva–a–mireles–como–vocero–de–
autodefensas (Accessed 22–12–2017). 




accused Estanislao Beltran of having links with a new DTO, i.e. the Viagras.553 With Mireles returning 
to Michoacan on the 24th of February, two sets of rival autodefensas movements developed in 
Michoacan.554  
Due to the increasing frictions between autodefensas groups, a third agreement was signed on 
the 3rd of March 2014. In this agreement government ceased referring to the movement as 
autodefensas and started framing them as ‘groups of organised citizens:’ 555 
1) The groups of organised citizens will share information with the 
Commission for Michoacan’s Development and Integral Development, 
which would be managed by Mexico’s Intelligence and National Security 
Centre (CISEN). 
2) The groups of organised citizens, in coordination with federal authorities, 
will remove the barricades where they are no longer needed.  
3) The groups of organised citizens will inform the authorities about the 
municipalities where they still do not have presence, so authorities can 
arrest those groups that portray themselves as autodefensas.  
4) The groups of organised citizens reiterated their commitment to incursion 
in urban areas.  
5) The groups of organised citizens commit to conduct a ‘cleaning process’ to 
expel people who are not part of the movement. 
 
With some autodefensas being aligned to this agreement (i.e. those lead by Estanislao and The 
American) and others being in disagreement (those following Mireles and Hipolito Mora), further 
tensions arose. On the 6th of March 6th, Vicar Gregorio Lopez was removed from the Autodefensas 
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Council and announced his departure to Italy.556 One week later, Hipolito Mora’s group (i.e. La 
Ruana’s autodefensas) confronted Luis Antonio Torres’ (the American) group in the community of 
Tepalcatepec, leading to Hipolito Mora’s arrest on the 11th of March.557  
Although public support continued rising (from 42% of citizens agreeing with them in August 
2013 to 53% in March 2014), due to the increasingly noticeable divisions inside the movement, the 
percentage of Mexicans agreeing with the government’s demand for disarmament also rose (from 
29% in January 2014 to 53% in April 2014, see Graph 32).558 Furthermore, institutions like Mexico’s 
CNDH increasingly pronounced against the continuous expansion of these armed groups stating 
‘there was no justification for the existence of groups taking justice in their own hands.’559  
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Graph 32. Trends in public opinion towards self–defence groups in Michoacan 
 
 
Source: CESOP, “Capsula Semanal de Opinion Publica, 267”; CESOP, “Capsula Semanal de Opinion Pública, 
268”; CESOP, “Capsula Semanal de Opinion Publica 275”; CESOP, “Capsula Semanal de Opinion Publica 290” 
(Mexico City, 2014); CESOP, “Encuesta Telefónica Sobre Los Grupos de Autodefensa” (Mexico City, 2013). 
With Hipolito Mora still in jail and being conscious that public opinion favouring their 
disarmament had been increasing, SD1 and SD2 said, the autodefensas ‘sought to achieve most of 
what they could while they could.’560 In this vein, on April 14th 2014, Mireles, Estanislao and the 
leaders of other 18 autodefensas met with Commissioner Castillo, and agreed a fourth pact to 
establish ‘firm commitments towards the legalisation, coordination, demobilisation, dialogue, 
                                                             


























Aug 2013 nov-13 Jan 2014 feb-14 mar-14 Apr 2014 jul-14
Army will reduce violence 55
Agree with autodefensas 42 44 51 53 71
Approves government's work in Michoacan 49 69 56
Fausto Vallejo, the solution 50
Approve Federal Police in Michoacan 83
Approves government's demand for disarmament 29 29 53 46
Government should support autodefensas 51
Approves Government and autodefensas actions 77 55
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protection, compensation and legal solutions’ for the conflict, an accord that would signal the 
beginning of the end of the autodefensas’ movement. In this vein, the agreement established: 561 
1. The possibility for local citizens to join a new ‘Rural Police force’ in 
Michoacan. 
2. The extension to the deadline for incorporation to the ‘Rural Defence Corp’ 
(not to be confused with the former), a body dependant on the Ministry of 
National Defence.  
3. The creation of Michoacan’s ‘Rural Police Corporation’ by May 11th, 2014. 
Between April 15th and that day, the local Minister of Public Security was to 
be in charge of the staff’s recruitment and training.  
4. Between the date of the agreement and May 10th, the autodefensas, 
federal and local government will continue working together to localise 
organised crime targets. 
5. By May 10th, the autodefensas should have registered their weapons, and 
the Ministry of Defence will determine their right to be owned according to 
existing legal regulations.  
6. The Commissioner will meet every Tuesday and Thursday with 
representative sectors of Michoacan’s municipalities to discuss Integral 
Development and Security related matters.  
7. In terms of Integral Development, the Commissioner will be accompanied 
by other high–level authorities from federal government to respond to the 
local citizens’ demands.  
8. The Commission for the Security and Integral Development committed to 
look for programmes to support the widows and orphans of the security 
conflict in the state.  
9. To transfer those autodefensas’ members detained for illegal possession of 
guns to Apatzingan’s prison.  
10. For those other autodefensas’ members detained for other serious crimes, 
in addition to gun possession, the legal process will continue according to 
law.  
11. The Commission commits to generate the required conditions to guarantee 
the physical security of the leaders of the autodefensas.  
                                                             
561 @ADN Político, “11 Acuerdos Entre El Gobierno y Autodefensas En Michoacán,” @ADNPolítico, April 15, 
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Photo 7. Autodefensas agreeing their disarmament on 14th April 2014. 
 
Source: CNN Mexico, “Autoridades de Michoacán Iniciarán Desarme de Autodefensas El 28 de Abril,” 
CNN Mexico, April 25, 2014, http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2014/04/25/autoridades–de–michoacan–
iniciaran–desarme–de–autodefensas–el–28–de–abril (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
With the signature of this agreement, Commissioner Castillo and Mexico’s Minister of the 
Interior, Osorio Chong, stated:  
‘From May 10th onwards there cannot be any armed citizens in the streets; it is an 
agreement, not an ultimatum, between them (i.e. the autodefensas) and state and 
federal government. Those who continue being armed will face the consequences, and 
government would be able to arrest them for illegal possession of firearms’.562   
In the same tenor, Mireles argued: 
 “The autodefensas do not disappear but are transforming into State Rural Police. They 
will continue carrying short guns, but what we do not want is that people go to buy 
                                                             
562 CNN Mexico, “Autoridades de Michoacán Iniciarán Desarme de Autodefensas El 28 de Abril”; Milenio 
Digital, “Desarme de Autodefensas Será En 27 Municpios: Castillo,” Milenio, April 25, 2014, 
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tortillas with goat horns (i.e. long and more powerful weapons). We are not in war 
anymore.’ Mireles said on April 16.563 
By the 1st of May 2014, 1,500 people had already applied to join the government’s Rural Defence 
Corps and 1,700 firearms had already been registered with Mexico’s Ministry for National Defence 
(SEDENA). On the 10th of May 2014, just as agreed, the ‘illegal’ autodefensas dissolved themselves 
and became ‘legal’ entities sworn in by Commissioner Castillo. Different from being part of the Rural 
Defence Corp, functioning under the umbrella of the Ministry of National Defence (as required in 
the first agreement of the 15th of January 2014), the autodefensas evolved into a new and relatively 
independent ‘Rural State Police.’ Although the self–defence groups did not manage to be legally 
named as autodefensas (one of their key demands), they did accomplish their recognition as a 
legitimate citizen force for security provision in their communities.564 
Photo 8. Papa Smurf being sworn in as "Policia Rural" by Commissioner Castillo (10th of May 2014). 
       
Source: Redacción, “Autodefensas Ahora Son Policias Rurales.,” Proceso MX, May 10, 2014, 
http://www.proceso.com.mx/371912/autodefensas–ahora–son–oficialmente–policias–rurales–somos–
gobierno–papa–pitufo (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
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The agreement, however, also produced relevant wins for society. First, since the beginning of 
the movement, Mireles and the autodefensas’ leaders accused Jesus Reyna, Michoacan’s Interim 
Governor (April–October 2013), Rodrigo Vallejo Mora, son of Michoacan’s Governor Fausto Vallejo 
(2012–2014) and many other local politicians of being colluded with the Caballeros Templarios.565 
Although for many years they acted with total impunity, once the autodefensas started mobilising, 
their networks of corruption were discovered and each one of these political figures was arrested.566  
Secondly, government met the autodefensas’ demand for the incarceration of the Caballeros 
Templarios seven main leaders. Up to the date of the agreement (i.e. April 2014) four of them had 
already been apprehended, or killed, by security forces:  
- Jesus Vazquez Macias was detained by federal security forces on the 19th of 
January 2014.567 
- Dionicio Loya Plancarte was captured by army and security forces on 
January 27th  2014.568  
- Nazario Moreno, who presumably died in 2010, was officially killed (for 
real) on March 9th  2014.569  
- Enrique Plancarte was also killed by security forces on the March 31st  
2014.570  
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Servando Gomez La Tuta was then captured in February 2015 and El Tena on the 5th of March 
2015.571 The last one, El Chicano (whose real name is unknown) remains free so far.572  
Thirdly, the autodefensas also achieved further federal investment in the state, including 
MXN$45bn in social policies, the signature of a national agreement for Michoacan’s electrification 
and the construction of 400 public dining rooms for kids.573  
Fourthly, and perhaps more importantly, despite their confrontational attitude against 
government, the autodefensas achieved what many lobbying groups and CSOs like those analysed 
in Chapter 5, attempt to do: to sit with the key decision makers, be treated as equals and change 
public policy.  
6.3.1 The autodefensas, achieving their recognition through the Rural Force Body of 
the Public Security Ministry of the State of Michoacan de Ocampo. 
 
With the agreement of April 2014, the autodefensas pushed federal government to legislate their 
operation in their preferred terms and to bypass legal locks to secure their functioning as Rural State 
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Police.574  In this vein, although the federal and state executive powers recognised the existence of 
Michoacan’s Rural State Police, ‘the administrative agreement between the autodefensas, the 
Commissioner and governor (i.e. the agreement of the 14th of April 2014) was not sufficient to justify 
the Rural Police’s existence as it did not legally specify its responsibilities, neither limited its faculties. 
In other words, it did not state ‘what they were going to do.’ 575  In fact, the quickly designed 
agreement and fast–tracked creation of the ‘Rural State Police’ contravened three local and federal 
laws:  
v Article 53 of the Organic Law of the Mexican Army and Air Force establishes 
that ‘the Ministry of National Defence is formed by Combat Units, Units of 
Services, Special Corps, Rural Defence Corps and Military Education 
establishments.’ 576 At no point, did this law support the existence of the 
State Rural Police.  
 
v Even if the State Rural Police was wrongly equated to the Rural Defence 
Corps (part of the Ministry of Defence), article 23 of the Manual for the 
organisation, functioning and employment of the Rural Force Corps 
establishes that only those citizens ‘without previous criminal convictions’ 
and ‘aligned to Mexico’s government politics’ could be part of this 
organism.577 Both of them were conditions not met by the previous members 
of the autodefensas.  
 
v Thirdly, even in the case that the State Rural Police was going to function as 
a State dependant institution (not managed by Mexico’s Ministry of 
Defence), Michoacan’s Public security System Law did not contemplate that 
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figure either, nor the resources to be allocated to it and their operational 
level within the state’s police hierarchy.578  
These legal loopholes and the autodefensas’ capacity to re–emerge pushed government to 
create the legislation needed for the new police group to continue working: ‘government did not 
have any other option than legalising us’, Hipolito Mora said.579 In this vein, on the 13th of May 2014, 
without previous legislative discussion and less than three days after the de facto institutionalisation 
of the Rural Police forces, Michoacan’s governor Fausto Vallejo published the Decree by which 
Michoacan’s government created the Rural Force Body of the Public security Ministry of the State of 
Michoacan de Ocampo. Legislation that, rather than unilaterally determining the functioning of the 
Rural Police, legitimised the agreements that citizens achieved with government. 
Although this decree was opposed by 14 federal Senators from PAN due to – what Jose Contreras 
has described as – its contradictions with Michoacan’s legislation and Mexico’s General Law of the 
National System of Public security, both federal government and Michoacan’s governor supported 
the validity of – what media and analysts have called – the ‘super decree.’580  Thus, the autodefensas 
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not only achieved their lawful recognition as legitimate providers of public security, they also 
secured citizen’s rights to rightfully possess weapons for legitimate defence. 
6.3.2. Other achievements and losses.  
 
In addition to their political–legislative success, throughout their movement the autodefensas 
gained an important level of leverage among key Mexican influencers. Parallel to the autodefensas’ 
actions to achieve their legitimacy as State Rural Police, Mireles worked alongside Isabel Miranda 
de Wallace, Javier Sicilia, Alejandro Marti (see Chapter 5) and other social leaders to constitute the 
Self–Defence against Citizen Insecurity and Impunity group aiming to expand the autodefensas 
model as a form of OCS against an unresponsive government. 581  Nevertheless, hopes for this 
expansion, if not re-generation of the autodefensas movement at a national level vanished with 
Mireles’ arrest. On the 27th of June 2014, Mireles was detained with over 70 people for possessing 
over 40 guns and 3,600 gun cartridges.582 Although Mireles had the support of Javier Sicilia, who 
equated him to ‘Mexico’s revolutionary hero Pancho Villa’, he failed to gain assistance from his 
former comrades.583 For instance, Estanislao Beltran stopped giving interviews about Mireles’ case. 
More importantly, Hipolito Mora never demanded his liberation but stated:584   
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‘Mireles was one of those who raised his hand in that famous agreement 
(of April 14th, 2014) stating that nobody was going to possess illegal 
firearms without any type of government credential. I did not vote because 
I was in jail, he did it and there he is now, in jail’.585  
Consequently, the initial alliance between Mireles, Hipolito Mora and Estanislao (see Photo 9) 
that once permitted the autodefensas to become the first armed uprising of the Mexico of the XXI 
century was now broken, signalling the beginning of the end of the autodefensas movement.586 
Photo 9. Mireles, Mora and Estanislao. 
 
Source: Redacción, “Mireles No Respetó El Acuerdo de Desarme: Hipólito Mora,” SDP Noticias, Julio 8, 2014, 
http://www.sdpnoticias.com/estados/2014/07/08/mireles–no–respeto–el–acuerdo–de–desarme–hipolito–
mora (Accessed 22–12–2017). 
Soon after Mireles’ arrest, different Law Makers from opposition produced different initiatives 
to decree an amnesty law for Mireles and other former members of the Autodefensas. For instance, 
in September 2014, 15 [federal] Senators from political parties in opposition (PAN, PRD and PT), 
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presented a legislative project to ‘decree an amnesty for those who participated or were part of the 
autodefensas groups and were either subject to judicial investigation or process, or have been 
sentenced, as long as those processes were started between March 7th 2013 and 1st of September 
2014.’ 587 Similar legislative initiatives were proposed almost in parallel in Michoacan’s state 
Congress, including Deputy del Carmen’s ‘Initiative with Project of Decree of an Amnesty Law for 
Autodefensas and Communitarians of the State of Michoacan’.588 Nevertheless, all the initiatives 
failed. Thus, by 2016 the autodefensas movement was extinct. On the 1st of January 2016, Silvano 
Aureoles, Michoacan’s current Governor (2015–2021), officially declared the end of the movement: 
‘today, we face a new stage in Michoacan’s history. We leave behind the time of nonsense and 
violence to move forward to an environment of peace and stability. With the end of the 
autodefensas, we come back to the path of institutionalism and legality’, he said.589 On the 11th of 
May 2017, Mireles was released from prison, but the autodefensas movement was completely 
defeated in 2016 when he explicitly accepted asked for the government’s forgiveness:  
 ‘for having attempted to alter the political order and tried to solve a problem without 
government’s support… Thank you and sorry Javier Sicilia […] Isabel Miranda […] and 
all the autodefensas. I beg you, masters of law and justice, for the prompt liberation 
of all my autodefensas brothers.’ 590 
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6.4. Main findings on the autodefensas. 
 
Mexico is so utterly unique that it defies comparison, it stands in a class of itself, Smith stated.591 
Not only this, by being submerged in what Calderon frames as ‘a never-ending democratisation 
process,’ Mexico has also been immersed in a long-lasting security trap, and one case that perfectly 
illustrates these points was the autodefensas movement in Michoacan.592 
Different from the socio-political context found in the First Citizens Summit case-study (see 
Chapter 5) the autodefensas faced a public sphere co–opted by a powerful DTO and its accomplices 
in local government. Initially labelled as an illegal movement in Michoacan, even a threat to national 
security by Mexico’s political class, the autodefensas challenged a virtual narco–republic, where 
government was depoliticising, but not towards the demos or the public, as Flinders and Buller argue 
happens in effective governance, but towards an interest group disinterested in the public good.593 
In this scenario, Candon, McCreery, Fogarty, and Bendix and Liebler’s theoretical predictions failed 
to materialise. First, crime news were not a gift to all the news–hungry editors, as they could not 
publish them. No inter–media agenda–setting process materialised and sensational interests ‘close 
to home’ were not enough to prompt or support investigative journalism. The media was a dealer 
of public opinion, just as suggested by Temple, but nor for Bua’s usual suspects, but for a dominant 
criminal organisation. In other words, media was incapacitated from fulfilling what Walgrave et al, 
Cobb and Charles consider is its raison d’être (see Chapter 2.1), i.e. it was providing biased 
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information, failing to educate the public on matters of common interest and was in fact, 
disconnecting the federal government from the public’s needs. As such, Cohen’s ideal speech 
situation and discourse ethics were substituted by censorship and limited forms of deliberation 
circumscribed to the private (rather than public) sphere. Put simply, media freedom and other civil 
liberties and political rights that tend to accompany democratic setups were almost non–existent in 
Michoacan’s pseudo democratic environment: Michoacans did not fully know what was occurring 
in their state, and those who knew were unable to raise government’s attention. Power, thus, ‘was 
not a fluid positive–sum concept and a resource held by all actors’; on the contrary, it was so 
concentrated and seemingly unmovable across the DTO that, paradoxically, it triggered the most 
radical power struggle that Mexico has seen in its recent history.594  
Nevertheless, facing this scenario, the autodefensas managed to create microcosms of public 
discussions across their communities to challenge the macrocosms of the criminally dominated 
state’s public sphere. By becoming media savvy and understanding the importance of media 
management, the autodefensas rationed information and started controlling the framing of news 
reports.  With this, the movement influenced and allowed for new media discussions, fostered 
public discussions and transformed the public sphere into one of criticism against government 
inefficiency. As a result, contrary to Zucker, Winter and Eyal’s arguments and, more importantly, 
against O’Keefe and Gross and Aday’s work, in Michoacan the media did not set the agenda of the 
public, but it was the public agenda who defined the media agenda, making of the autodefensas 
one of the few cases which would arguably support Klapper’s minimal effects theory (Chapter 2).   
Overall , contrary to the Summit, the autodefensas case study represented a more unique and 
relatively unstudied form of OCS, as most of the research has focused on the more traditional Civil 
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Society Organisations. In this case, elite domination was not the main concern or obstructer of new 
forms of OCS, but it was the lack of public security which triggered the decline of the public sphere 
in Michoacan. Being immersed in a violent context in which government was actively hindering civil 
society’s development, the autodefensas represented Reyes and Grant’s vision of civil society: a 
chance for minorities and disadvantaged groups to argue their case in a democratic scenario that 
does not work for all the people. It also embodied Gramsci’s description, as the autodefensas 
constructed new and cultural hegemony by rebelling against the orthodox, rather than working 
alongside it – as the Summit did.  
In a context where freedom of expression was severely constrained, the autodefensas created 
new microcosms of public spheres within their towns and municipalities to challenge the 
constraining macrocosms of the public sphere that prevailed across the state. These face–to–face 
communication structures they established, fed the micro public spheres with multiple and 
contrasting expressions of political discontent and nourished them with citizenly raised demands 
and potential solutions to society’s problems. As such, the autodefensas not only battled a non–
democratic public sphere, but promoted the rebirth of what Azuela calls a ‘civic responsibility 
culture’ capable of forging its own public agenda and shaping society as a whole, just as Habermas 
and McKee would have suggested.595  
More importantly, the autodefensas movement not only re–installed a civil culture where 
citizens’ involvement in political decisions stopped being seen as a concession and became a political 
right. Through disruptive but publicly supported political actions, including the expulsion of 
government authorities from their communities, the autodefensas effectively showed that an 
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organised citizenry is a viable alternative to an inefficient and criminally captured government. Not 
only did it trigger symbolic changes from government, it also achieved the substantive policy 
changes it aimed for, i.e. establishment of security checks, the capture of six out of seven of the 
















Chapter 7. Conclusions. 
 
This thesis has studied the processes and conditions under which two very different expressions 
of Organised Civil Society have not only survived, but also developed and influenced  media and 
government agendas in an effort to secure their political goals. Different from their counterparts in 
advanced democratic setups, the First Citizen Summit to Build a Fair and Prosperous Mexico and the 
Autodefensas self-defence groups were not immersed in a democratic scenario where public 
debates are inclusive and representative, media freedom and independent journalism are the norm, 
and bottom-up decision-making structures are actively promoted by government. On the contrary, 
by emerging in Mexico, both movements faced a dangerous public sphere characterised by elite-
dominated public institutions, high levels of political disaffection, rising homicide rates and blatant 
corruption between and across government, media and criminal groups. It is in this context that this 
research not only has proved to be well timed, but also well suited to provide new evidence to 
inform government policies on bottom-up and participative democracy.  
Through an innovative theoretical mix, bridging Habermas’ Public Sphere theory with McCombs 
and Shaw Agenda Setting Framework through media effects analyses, this thesis has uncovered 
some of the hidden politics of policy making in Mexico, shed new light on the political capacities and 
impact of bottom-up social movements and challenged theoretical paradigms about the functioning 
of the normative wheels of democracy in non-western scenarios. Therefore, in order to provide the 
main conclusions of this research, this chapter is divided into three sub-chapters. The first one 
provides this thesis’ main empirical insights. The second sub-chapter outlines the original 
contributions to knowledge that the study represents. The last one focuses on the policy 
recommendations and potential elements for future research.  
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7.1 Main empirical insights. 
 
 ‘To make explicit what is implicit is an ambiguous task’, Perez-Diaz says.596 This is perhaps one 
of the reasons why much of the existing scholarship on civil society and its participation in policy-
making processes tends to be risk-averse and is more oriented towards theorising than into testing.  
Consider this, rather that developing another isolated analysis of the structure of civil society or the 
media effects over public opinion, with limited policy implications, this research built on empirical 
data to pragmatically test theoretical paradigms on the functioning of civil society in young or non-
democratic scenarios like Mexico. What is more, as ‘researchers and policy influencers are often 
said to inhabit parallel universes, debating the same matters but never fully engaging with each 
other’s work’, this thesis differentiates from existing scholarship in that it did not study civil society 
as a standalone issue, but as part of a broader struggle over political influence and power.597 Neither 
did it consider the analysis of the creation of social demands and the primacy of the state in the 
establishment of public policies as two homogenous but isolated spheres.598 On the contrary, it 
departed from the premise that these public and governmental spheres are socially constructed but 
politically disputed, and that the emergence of public demands and generation of public policies 
must be studied as an interrelated dynamic process – where media plays a pivotal role. 
By doing this and bringing together Habermas and McCombs and Shaw’s works this thesis was 
able to answer its main research question: What does the analysis of public security policy suggest 
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about the rebirth of civil society and its capacity to influence political decisions in Mexico’s 
dangerous public sphere?  
In this vein, this thesis empirically illustrated the inherent relationship that exists between civil 
society development and public sphere conditions. For instance, the Summit could have not taken 
place in an undemocratic public sphere unsupportive of CSOs' development; neither would the 
autodefensas have emerged if Michoacan’s public sphere had offered the facilities for open and 
responsive political debates. Similarly, it identified that the more open for dialogue and inclusive 
the public sphere is, the less radical the forms of OCS are: where the public sphere functions 
adequately, civil society will co–exist with government in a cooperative way (e.g. the Summit), but 
when it does not and citizens perceive they are being ether ignored or negatively affected by the 
prevailing political game, it will trigger the appearance of more radical forms of OCS rebelling against 
the orthodox and established system (e.g. the autodefensas). 599  
Nevertheless, this thesis also found that not all expressions of organised civil society are 
inclusive, representative or socially focused as their leaders portray them. In fact, whilst the 
evidence gathered and analysed in this thesis supports Jean Grugel’s point stating that ‘the influence 
of CSOs grows in inverse proportion to the influence of the state, it also backs up Flinders and 
Habermas’ arguments assuring that depoliticization allows the powerful and well-organised special 
interests to design and implement policy for their own benefit.’600  
On the one hand, it is undeniable that Mexico’s democratisation in the year 2000 and the 
consequential weakening of centralised government institutions favoured the flourishing of CSOs 
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like Causa en Comun or MUCD. However, caution needs to be taken, as a decline in the influence of 
the state not always translates into further freedoms for civil society movements interested in the 
public good. For instance, in the case of Michoacan, the hollowing of the state did not allow civil 
society to grow, but permitted criminal groups to expand their socio-political influence at the 
expense of society.  
On the other hand, the increasing levels of political depolitization and antagonism that prevail in 
Mexico have effectively allowed the richest and more educated groups to dominate the channels of 
political engagement with government. A case in point was the First Citizens Summit, an event 
labelled as a citizen initiative, but which was clearly constructed and dominated by members of the 
economic elite of Mexico’s metropolis who, notwithstanding their suffering as high-profile victims 
of crime, do not represent or understand the Mexican society, where 12.3 million people live with 
USD$1.3 a day. Nevertheless, the country’s progressive democratic openness, not necessarily 
favoured by government but promoted by a more educated and critical public sphere, is allowing 
unorthodox and bottom–up forms of citizenry to ‘gnaw at small cracks in the country’s semi–
clientelist system and exercise a more tangible influence on policy-making.’601 A case in point was 
the autodefensas movement, were a local expression of civil society proved itself capable of retaking 
control over its community and directly challenging the existence of – what Azuela would have called 
– ‘an incompetent paternalistic system’.602 
Political disengagement or civil society’s development and influence, though, are two conditions 
or processes partially dependant on the interactions that society and government have with and 
through the media, and the Summit and the autodefensas are cases-in-point. Far from being a one-
way relationship where the media agenda always defines the public agenda, in the case of Mexico, 
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both seem to be mutually influential. Neglecting this, Valera would argue, would be simply an 
exaggeration of journalistic autonomy.603 Although it might be accurate to state, as Winter, Eyal, 
Lazarsfeld and more do, that media influences the public agenda to a larger extent than vice versa, 
this thesis did not find any element to support or deny this statement in Mexico’s context. However, 
this thesis did find compelling evidence supporting those limited theoretical arguments, like 
Klapper’s minimal effects theory, ensuring that public agenda not only influences, but can dictate 
and define the agenda of the media. Clear examples of this were the Autodefensas’ capacity to time 
and frame the media coverage of its activities and those from the Caballeros Templarios (Chapter 
6), and the Summit’s – more limited – impact on the media agenda with regards to its proposals on 
the Law Against Human Trafficking (Chapter 5).  
Lastly and more importantly for this thesis were its findings regarding civil society’s capacity to 
transform citizenry generated demands into policies implemented by government. Being of the 
same opinion as Kingdon that ‘newspapers might trigger press conferences but might have little 
impact in determining the policy priorities of policymaking elites,’ this thesis did not look at symbolic 
achievements, as scholars of the agenda setting in Mexico tend to do, but focused on the civil 
society’s substantive accomplishments. 604  The analyses here conducted found that although 
institutionalised and government-sanctioned forms of OCS like the Summit have better access to 
the main corridors of power and are able to attract both media and governmental attention to their 
demands, they are not equally successful in influencing the policy agenda. In fact, due to their close 
collaboration with government and less radical approach towards policy change, evidence showed 
that the Summit was mainly made of discussion simulacrums of already agreed political 
negotiations. Whilst the Summit was extremely effective in achieving symbolic changes like the 
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candidates’ attendance to the event and their commitment to implement parts of the Summit’s 
agenda, it did not trigger or achieve substantive policy alterations in President Pena Nieto’s 
administration. Meanwhile, radical and single-issue movements like the autodefensas seem to be 
more efficient in achieving their short-term goals, even though they tend to disarticulate once the 
problem seems to be solved.  
7.2. Contributions to knowledge. 
 
McKee and Castells define the public sphere as the space of communication of ideas and projects 
that emerge from society and are addressed to the decision makers in the institutions of society.’ It 
is ‘the only channel by which citizens can shape the policies of the state and the development of 
society as a whole,’ they say.605 What these statements fail to address, though, is that not every 
public sphere is capable of evolving into an agent of political change, and in some cases not even of 
putting citizens in touch with each other. By looking at two very contrasting case studies, one acting 
in a democratic scenario similar to that found in Western nations and the other being immersed in 
one of the riskiest cities in the world, this thesis has evidenced the urgent need to develop context-
based studies that not only look at the initial phases of the generation of public demands or the last 
stages of policy definition, but that analyse them in an interconnected way. If this does not occur 
scholars might end up validating elite dominated initiatives as true representatives of civil society 
and triggers of political change. What is worse, isolated research could make citizens believe that 
they are getting what they want while effective power lies elsewhere. Cases in point are Azuela’s 
work describing the Summit as a politically relevant initiative just because of its symbolic 
achievements, or Olvera, Mattiace, Volpi and Smith’s works that fail to pinpoint society’s specific 
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policy achievements, even to explain how social movements negotiated with government.606 In this 
vein, this thesis has controverted theoretical paradigms presuming that public pressures over 
elected officials make them set to work to change policies and programs, and has empirically shown 
that society’s demands are not necessarily proceeded by policy changes.  
Different from Hall et al’s findings, this research has also demonstrated that media cannot be 
equated to the public agenda, as it simply does not reflect everything the public knows or is talking 
about. In this vein, the media was neither discussing all the topics part of the Summit’s agenda, nor 
informed society about the real socio-political scenario that prevailed in Michoacan during the 
autodefensas struggle for securing the effective provision of public security.  
Overall, there is no doubt that Mexico is moving forward in terms of its democratisation and 
bottom-up governance. In 2000, for instance, Mexico witnessed the largest development of civil 
society organisations in the country’s history. Previous disorganised social movements have been 
progressively transforming into established CSOs and now work in a multiplicity of areas, from 
freedom of information to public security. Society is also progressively seeing its involvement in the 
public sphere and political decisions as a right rather than a concession, it is awakening and 
demanding more social, economic and political rights. Nevertheless, with just over three CSOs per 
10,000 inhabitants, an increasingly depoliticised society, and non-inclusive CSOs acting in a 
dangerous public sphere, civil society is still more a mirage than a goal achieved. However, it is 
precisely the country’s increasingly dangerous context what has pushed social activists to get 
involved in the public security field and to aim to retake control of their communities.  
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With 2017 having been Mexico’s most violent year since records began, new self-defence groups 
sporadically emerging across the country and the possibility that a left-wing political party wins the 
presidency for the first time in Mexico’s history, this thesis provides a good starting point for the 
understanding and improvement of public-media-government relations in Mexico. Being one of the 
first studies that looks at the complete dynamic process by which public demands are created and 
then transformed into public policies, this thesis could inform the new government’s plans for 
gradually strengthening a collaborative public sphere as a strategy to minimise the risk of new 
radical and violent uprisings. Furthermore, by having empirically challenged dominant paradigms 
on both the correlation between democratic development and civil society expansion, and media 
effects over public and political decisions, this thesis has potentially opened new research agendas 
in Mexican studies that could fit in with the work of established research groups like the Escuela 
Veracruzana for public sphere.  
 
 
7.3 Policy recommendations and future research.  
 
This research represents one of the first attempts to empirically study civil society’s impact on 
policy-making in Mexico. Considering the limited available data on the topic, this thesis has 
produced new knowledge of the field, narrowing the divide between politics as theory and politics 
as practice in Mexico. Throughout the analysis of Mexico’s public sphere, civil society development 
(Chapter 4) and its influence on policy-making (Chapters 5 and 6), this thesis has also highlighted 
the need for government to work with and reach out to civil society. By doing so, it pinpointed the 
challenges for civil society–government policy co–creation, which not only increase societal 
depoliticization and hinder collaborative forms of OCS, they also trigger more politically radical 
manifestations of social discontent.  
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Building on this and intending to contribute to reduce social marginalisation and discontent that 
could lead to violent redistributions of power, the following recommendations are made:  
For government: 
v Access to information: Improving information–sharing practices between civil society 
organisations and facilitating their involvement in policy-making could increase 
accountability and transparency while reducing citizens’ distrust in CSOs. Databases like 
SEDESOL’s CSOs register and the Government reports on financial contributions to the third 
sector could be a good starting point. 
v Funding: Building on the U.K.’s Minister for Society model, transforming Mexico’s General 
Direction for Engagement with Civil society into an under secretariat could promote a better 
distribution of economic resources across the third sector, reduce CSOs’ co-optation by 
private interests and foster a more systematic coordination between government and civil 
society representatives.  
v Channels for participation: institutionalising the five permanent seats for civil society in the 
National Security Council is an important step for society–government collaboration. 
Providing voting rights, ensuring the non-re-election of its members and installing similar 
mechanisms in other ministries could increase citizens’ understanding and acceptance of 
controversial but necessary policies.  
v Representation and equality: CSOs located in Mexico City have better resources and 
possibilities to engage with government than its counterparts in the rest of the country. 
Establishing a regionalised model of interaction, including local offices for civil society 
engagement and delivering government sponsored Summits with society across the country 
could improve government legitimisation and minimise the possibility of radical and 
antagonist movements.  
v Elitism: As noticed in this thesis, there is limited alternation of power within the CSOs’ 
boards. Therefore, institutionalising government policies that request periodical changes in 
the CSOs’ boards (preferably elected than appointed) as a condition for public funding could 
avoid ‘groupthink’ and improve citizens’ involvement within them. More importantly, this 




For civil society:  
v Credibility. The lack of transparency within the third sector reduces citizens’ trust in social 
activists and perpetuates citizens’ disengagement in non–electoral political activism. 
Disseminating reliable information about the CSOs’ budgets, programmes and results could 
improve CSOs reputation. 
v Influence. Institutionalised CSOs continue almost entirely focusing on policy diagnosis, the 
policy-making area in which they are the most successful. However, they leave aside policy 
creation, approval and implementation, the three most important phases of the policy-
making cycle. Sharing lessons with others, rather than attempting to appropriate each 
other’s work, and ensuring institutional memory could allow civil society to better integrate 
and turn its collective expertise into actionable policy demands. 
v Communication. Developing a good media management strategy could permit civil society 
movements or organisations to better position their demands on the public and political 
realms, shape the debates around them and obtaining not only symbolic, but also 
substantive political responses.  
 
The above are general recommendations that could be worth a deeper analysis. However, their 
potential implementation needs to be accompanied by a detailed and in–depth study of their 
financial implications, expected political support and required negotiations.  
Future research agendas 
 
In addition to the recommendations previously made, this thesis has evidenced the fact that 
agenda-setting effects and policy-making processes cannot be understood in isolation, their analysis 
requires a more contextualised approach in which the acting of public and political individuals and 
institutions are carefully considered and comprehensively studied. By doing this, this thesis has also 
shed new light into seven broad areas for potential future research, particularly in relation to the 
Mexican case: 
v Government funding for social activism and its effect over civil society’s de–radicalisation. 
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v Relationship between political parties and CSOs: clientelism and the CSOs as electoral tools.  
v CSOs’ democratisation. 
v The hidden politics of social activism: using CSOs as a gateway for political influence.  
v CSOs’ negotiation strategies with the legislative and executive branches of government. 
v Are different policy fields more susceptible to CSOs influence?  
 
In many ways, the discussions and findings presented in this research highlight the need to devote 
more scholarly and practitioner attention to the analysis of civil society development and its 
involvement in policy-making outside the over studied cases of Western democracies. They also call 
for the contextualisation of studies on governance, public sphere and civil society: policies do no 
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Annex 1. Questions for semi–structured interviews 
 
Interview questionnaire: politicians 
 
Role 
a) What are your main functions within the Public Security Commission?? 
 
Law initiatives 
a) How do you decide which topic to bring into the Commission’s discussions?  
b) How to decide which is the most pressing one? 
 
Civil Society–Government 
a) Is Mexico living a ‘bottom–up’ democracy? 
b) It is often said: ‘Government that doesn’t respond to social demands is a tyranny, and that 
who responds to all is not a government.’ Your views?   
c) What does Civil Society mean for you? 
d) Which are the CSOs with which you work the most?  
 
Direct involvement 
a) How would you define your involvement in the autodefensas and Agenda Ciudadana topics? 
b) Any achievements, challenges? What would you improve? 
 
Media 
a) Is media impartial? Particularly on its reporting of public security.  
 
Interview questionnaire: media 
 
Media 
a) What is the main role of the Media in Mexico? 
 
Media, democracy and society 
a) What does Civil Society mean for you? 
b) Is Mexico living a ‘bottom–up’ democracy? 
c) Which are the CSOs with which you work the most? The top 5?  
d) Has CSO effective in the autodefensas and agendas ciudadanas?  
 
Media coverage 
a) How do you select the topics you cover?  
b) How to be impartial in covering the autodefensas and agendas ciudadanas topics? 
c) Do you consider that media coverage on the topic has been useful for government/civil 
society? 
d) Any challenges you have faced? 
e) Do you believe something can be improved in the media’s action towards a bottom–up 
democratic development and civil–society development? 
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a) What does Civil Society mean for you? 
b) Why was the organisation constituted?  
 
Civil society 
a) Is Mexico living a ‘bottom–up’ democracy? 
b) It is often said: ‘Government that doesn’t respond to social demands is a tyranny, and that 
who responds to all is not a government.’ Your views?   
c) Are there any effective mechanisms for OCS participation in public policy?  
d) Which are the government agencies and politicians you work with in public security making?  
 
Civil society in policy-making 
a) How would you define your organisation’s work with government in the Agendas 
Ciudadanas? 
b) How did you achieve the collaboration? 
c) How did you engage citizens and politicians with your cause?  
 
Media 
a) Did media play a role in your strategy?  
 
Annex 2. Sizeable media’s agenda–setting effects over public agenda 
‘Traditional’ news 
media. 
Number of accumulated weeks 
producing the maximum 
correlation from the media to 
public agenda. 
Number of weeks before the 
disappearance of a significant 
correlation from the media and 
public agenda. 
National TV news 1 8 
Local TV news 2 12 
Regional newspaper 3 26 
Local newspaper 4 26 
News magazine 8 26 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with data from  M. McCombs, Setting the Agenda: The Mass Media and 
Public Opinion (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008). 
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Annex 3. % of citizens participating in political actions (2001). 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from ENCUP 2001. 
Annex 4. Convenor CSOs for the First Citizens Summit for a Peaceful and Just Mexico. 
Adherence dates  Type of 
participation 
CSOs 
August 2011 Convenors Causa en Común * Centro de Estudios Estratégicos 
Nacionales * Centro de Colaboración Cívica * Mujeres por 
Mujeres * Dejemos de Hacernos Pendejos * Evolución 
Mexicana * Fundación NEMI * Iluminemos México * 
Mexico Unido Contra la Delincuencia * México SOS * 
Observatorio Nacional * Reelige o Castiga * Roy Campos 
* Toma Protesta* 
 
September 2011 New 
Participants 
Alto al Secuestro 
November 2011 New 
Participants 
INSYDE * Movimiento por la Paz con Justicia y Dignidad * 
January 2012 New 
Participants 
Alianza Civica * Centro de Investigacion y Estudios 
Superiores en Antropología Social * Fundacion Ethos * 
México Evalúa * Propuesta Cívica * Centro Mexicano para 
la Filantropía * Reforma Política YA*Puebla Vigila 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from Azuela, Primera Cumbre Ciudadana Para Construir Un México 
Pacífico y Justo.  












Usefulness A lot A little Not useful A lot A little 
Not 
useful A lot A little 
Not 
useful 
Unite with other people affected 11.77 9.00 2.53 22.35 33.35 19.71 0.00 0.04 0.00 23.30 34.12 22.24 
Publish letters in newspapers 1.31 0.89 0.74 18.40 42.85 34.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 2.93 19.71 34.75 
Complain with authorities 7.33 7.67 4.18 19.24 31.92 28.21 0.00 0.04 0.00 19.19 26.57 32.39 
Ask for support from an CSO 3.86 3.02 0.65 15.50 42.79 32.55 0.00 0.04 0.00 7.53 19.36 33.20 
Attend protests 3.97 2.76 0.91 14.95 39.43 36.55 0.00 0.04 0.00 7.63 18.92 37.45 
Request support from a political 
party 4.42 2.92 1.25 14.04 36.60 39.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.59 18.46 40.44 
Request support from Deputies 
or Senators 2.20 1.88 0.76 14.27 34.02 45.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.84 16.47 45.90 
Call a radio or TV programme 2.94 1.84 0.23 26.25 37.39 29.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.01 29.19 30.05 
Write to Mexico's President, 
gobernor or Municipal authority 3.03 2.14 0.86 21.42 35.13 35.71 0.02 0.00 0.00 6.03 24.47 36.57 
Protest in a peaceful manner 
with a distinctive 2.57 1.86 0.61 12.14 33.78 46.99 0.01 0.00 0.06 5.04 14.73 47.61 
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Annex 5. News reports on the Summit's original convening CSOs (per month, from 
January 2010 to December 2014). 
 
Norte Reforma Universal Total Norte Reforma Universal Total Norte Reforma Universal Total
Jan 10 1 3 4 1 2 3 2 3 1 6
Feb 10 1 1 1 1 1 3 4
Mar 10 4 6 1 11 1 1 6 8 14
Apr 10 1 2 3 1 1 2 3 3 1 7
May 10 5 7 3 15 1 1 3 7 2 12
Jun 10 4 6 1 11 1 1 3 3 6
Jul 10 1 2 1 4 2 8 5 15
Aug 10 7 11 8 26 1 1 2 8 12 13 33
Sep 10 1 4 1 6 5 5 3 13 4 5 9
Oct 10 8 8 1 1 2 2 1 2 5
Nov 10 2 1 1 4 1 2 3 2 3 3 8
Dec 10 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 4 4 4 5 13
Jan 11 1 1 3 5 1 1 4 2 4 10
Feb 11 3 6 7 16 1 1 2 2 3 7
Mar 11 7 7 5 19 3 4 7
Apr 11 2 5 5 12 1 2 3 3 5 1 9
May 11 3 8 3 14 4 1 5 5 5 1 11
Jun 11 1 3 11 15 4 7 3 14
Jul 11 3 6 6 15 3 5 3 11
Aug 11 10 16 6 32 2 2 3 7
Sep 11 6 7 6 19 1 1 2 4 6
Oct 11 4 4 3 11 1 2 3
Nov 11 1 3 3 7 1 1 2
Dec 11 4 5 4 13 1 1
Jan 12 3 5 1 9 1 1 1 2 1 4
Feb 12 1 2 3 4 9 3 16
Mar 12 2 1 3 1 1 1 4 1 6
Apr 12 5 10 2 17 2 2 4
May 12 4 9 2 15 2 5 7 2 6 8
Jun 12 6 8 4 18 1 2 3 1 1
Jul 12 3 2 2 7 1 1 3 3
Aug 12 6 15 2 23 1 1 2 2 5 3 10
Sep 12 1 1 2 4 2 8
Oct 12 2 2 1 5 2 3 2 7
Nov 12 2 1 3 4 7 2 13
Dec 12 11 11 2 24 1 1 2 2 3 5
Jan 13 1 1 6 8 1 4 5 2 5 7
Feb 13 6 6 12 2 2 4 4
Mar 13 1 4 1 6 1 4 1 6
Apr 13 4 8 2 14 1 1 2
May 13 1 3 3 7 1 1 5 10 15
Jun 13 1 3 4 1 1 2 2 7 9
Jul 13 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 2 3
Aug 13 9 12 2 23 1 3 1 5
Sep 13 4 4 8 5 5
Oct 13 1 2 3
Nov 13 2 2 4 4 1 5
Dec 13 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 4




Norte Reforma Universal Total Norte Reforma Universal Total Norte Reforma Universal Total
Jan 14 8 8 2 18 1 1 4 4 1 9
Feb 14 1 2 1 4 1 1 1 7 1 9
Mar 14 2 4 6 1 1
Apr 14 1 7 8 1 2 3
May 14 4 4 1 2 3
Jun 14 1 7 9 17 3 7 4 14
Jul 14 2 9 5 16 1 1 2
Aug 14 3 5 1 9
Sep 14 5 7 2 14 1 2 3
Oct 14 1 2 2 5 2 1 2 5
Nov 14 2 4 7 13 3 2 5
Dec 14 6 8 3 17 2 2
Total 301 541 264 1106 26 75 8 109 186 373 125 684
Causa en Comun/M. E. Morera Iluminemos Mexico/Elias Kuri MUCD/Josefina Ricaño
Norte Reforma Universal Total Norte Reforma Universal Total
Jan 10 1 3 4
Feb 10 4 9 13
Mar 10 3 5 2 10
Apr 10
May 10 11 13 7 31
Jun 10 6 6 6 18
Jul 10 3 7 3 13
Aug 10 3 14 8 25
Sep 10 5 10 2 17 1 1 1 3
Oct 10 5 9 10 24
Nov 10 2 1 1 4
Dec 10 1 4 6 11 1 1 2
Jan 11 5 5 7 17
Feb 11 4 10 10 24
Mar 11 8 3 11
Apr 11 8 7 9 24
May 11 14 17 9 40 1 1
Jun 11 4 10 5 19 1 1 2
Jul 11 7 3 1 11
Aug 11 4 13 9 26 1 1 1 3
Sep 11 4 8 4 16 2 2
Oct 11 4 14 4 22 1 1
Nov 11 2 2 3 7 1 1
Dec 11 1 2 2 5 1 1 2
Observatorio Nacional CiudadanoMexico SOS/Alejandro Martí
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Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from Lexis Nexis.  
 
Norte Reforma Universal Total Norte Reforma Universal Total
Jan 12 2 2 1 5
Feb 12 1 3 4
Mar 12 5 10 3 18 1 1
Apr 12 7 13 17 37 1 2 3
May 12 8 12 6 26 1 2 3
Jun 12 2 2 1 5 1 1
Jul 12 2 5 1 8 2 1 3
Aug 12 5 6 1 12 2 4 3 9
Sep 12 1 9 5 15 1 1 2
Oct 12 8 5 3 16 2 2 1 5
Nov 12 3 6 4 13 1 1 2
Dec 12 2 2 4 1 2 1 4
Jan 13 5 7 7 19 2 2 4
Feb 13 4 3 7
Mar 13 2 6 1 9
Apr 13 2 4 5 11
May 13 7 10 17
Jun 13 2 4 6 1 1 2
Jul 13 2 2 2 2 4
Aug 13 5 4 3 12 1 4 5
Sep 13 2 3 5 1 3 1 5
Oct 13 2 2 2 6 1 1
Nov 13 2 3 5 2 1 3
Dec 13 4 5 1 10 1 4 5
Jan 14 2 3 1 6 2 2 4
Feb 14 1 2 2 5 2 2 4
Mar 14 2 3 1 6 3 7 10
Apr 14 4 3 7 2 3 5
May 14 5 10 2 17 2 1 3
Jun 14 4 5 3 12 1 1 1 3
Jul 14 1 2 3 6 2 5 2 9
Aug 14 1 2 4 7 2 5 4 11
Sep 14 4 3 7 2 2 4
Oct 14 1 2 3 1 1 2
Nov 14 2 7 2 11
Dec 14 4 5 3 12 1 1 1 3
Total 144 383 95 371 33 64 23 120
Mexico SOS/Alejandro Martí Observatorio Nacional Ciudadano
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Annex 6. News reports on the First Citizens Summit (September 2011 – December 
2014) 
 
DATE HEADLINE PUBLICATION Discarded  
June 4, 2014 WednesdayPiden cesar dispendio del Gobierno federal Reforma (Mexico) Reason: Second Citizens Summit
June 3, 2014 Tuesday
Genaro García me amenazó cuando era secretario, 
señala activista El Universal (Mexico) Reason: Puebla Citizens' Summit
June 3, 2014 TuesdayUrge Morera fortalecer seguridad en estados Reforma (Mexico) Reason: Second Citizens Summit
May 22, 2014 Thursday
Reclaman ONG demoras de Peña; Convocan a 
Segunda Cumbre Ciudadana. Anotan retraso en 
juicios orales y profesionalización de policías Reforma (Mexico) Reason: Second Citizens Summit
August 29, 2013 ThursdayMéxico debe cambiar.- Narro Reforma (Mexico)
August 28, 2013 Wednesday
Pide Narro actitud prudente" ante protestas de 
maestros" El Universal (Mexico)
February 13, 2013 Wednesday
Fijan acciones para seguridad; Focalizan plan en 
100 municipios. Prevén destinar más de $118 mil 
millones durante el presente año Reforma (Mexico)
December 16, 2012 SundayRechazan ONG reparto de despensas El Norte (Mexico)
December 16, 2012 SundayRechazan ONG reparto de despensas Reforma (Mexico)
December 14, 2012 Friday
Ven ONG incompleto el Pacto por México; Urgen 
organismos a aclarar cómo impactarán medidas 
en vida de mexicanos El Norte (Mexico)
December 14, 2012 Friday
Ven ONG incompleto el Pacto por México; Urgen 
organismos a aclarar cómo impactarán medidas 
en vida de mexicanos Reforma (Mexico)
December 3, 2012 Monday
Ven primeros pasos con ley de víctimas; [NUEVA 
ERA 2012-2018] Reforma (Mexico)
November 3, 2012 SaturdayLos tuiteros de la transición El Universal (Mexico)
September 23, 2012 Sunday
Colaborador Invitado / Ciudadanía y república 
democrática; Los ciudadanos mantienen vigente 
ante Peña Nieto la agenda que presentaron a 
partidos y candidatos en la campaña electoral Reforma (Mexico)
August 31, 2012 FridayAsume el sol azteca propuestas de ONG Reforma (Mexico)
August 22, 2012 Wednesday
Peña Nieto ofrece apertura a organizaciones 
civiles El Universal (Mexico)
August 22, 2012 WednesdayEPN ofrece diálogo con la sociedad El Universal (Mexico)
July 26, 2012 ThursdayEligen a ciudadanos para integrar CNSP Reforma (Mexico)
July 25, 2012 Wednesday
ONG postulan candidatos a consejeros de 
seguridad El Universal (Mexico)
July 20, 2012 Friday Piden amarrar consejeros ciudadanos Reforma (Mexico)
July 1, 2012 Sunday
Se disputan Los Pinos; VOTO'12. Reportaje. 
Después de 90 días de campaña y tres de 
reflexión, llegó el día de elegir a un nuevo 
Presidente de la República Reforma (Mexico)
June 27, 2012 Wednesday
Avalan candidatos agenda ciudadana; VOTO'12. 
Suscriben aspirantes el 78% de los temas 
planteados por ONG's; algunos con reservas Reforma (Mexico)
June 19, 2012 Tuesday
Exigen al IFE ampliar pacto de civilidad; VOTO'12. 
Piden incluir, además de candidatos, a la IP, 
sociedad civil y medios de comunicación Reforma (Mexico)
June 18, 2012 MondayPRD exige que PREP no sea una reedición del 2006 El Universal (Mexico)
June 14, 2012 Thursday
Respetaremos posibles manifestaciones tras 
elección: Poiré El Universal (Mexico)
June 4, 2012 MondayJuan Ciudadano / Duopolio a debate El Norte (Mexico)
June 4, 2012 MondayJuan Ciudadano / Duopolio a debate Reforma (Mexico)
May 27, 2012 Sunday
Cumbre ciudadana: ¿qué sigue?; Crónica Sociedad 
organizada. Más de 300 organizaciones civiles 
generaron una agenda de más de 100 puntos para 
los candidatos a la Presidencia Reforma (Mexico)
May 24, 2012 ThursdayLos mexicanos tenemos que cambiar El Universal (Mexico)
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DATE HEADLINE PUBLICATION Discarded  
May 24, 2012 ThursdayJosé Woldenberg / Y sin embargo, se mueve Reforma (Mexico)
May 23, 2012 WednesdaySergio Aguayo / ¿Podemos creerle? El Norte (Mexico)
May 23, 2012 Wednesday
Garantizan agenda civil; VOTO '12. Entregan 
propuestas a los 4 candidatos y les dan 15 días 
para dar respuesta de su compromiso El Norte (Mexico)
May 23, 2012 WednesdayPide AMLO respaldo ciudadano; VOTO '12 El Norte (Mexico)
May 23, 2012 WednesdayOfrece EPN un diálogo abierto; VOTO '12 El Norte (Mexico)
May 23, 2012 WednesdaySolicita AMLO el respaldo de la sociedad; VOTO'12 Reforma (Mexico)
May 23, 2012 Wednesday
Ofrece JVM incrementar apoyos para 
asociaciones; VOTO'12 Reforma (Mexico)
May 23, 2012 WednesdayRegañan a Quadri en foro ciudadano; VOTO'12 Reforma (Mexico)
May 23, 2012 WednesdayTEMPLO MAYOR Reforma (Mexico)
May 23, 2012 WednesdaySergio Aguayo / ¿Podemos creerle? Reforma (Mexico)
May 23, 2012 Wednesday
Prometen candidatos cumplir agenda civil; 
VOTO'12. Dan ONGs beneficio de la duda a los 
aspirantes presidenciales. Entregan propuestas y 
les dan 15 días para dar respuesta de su 
compromiso Reforma (Mexico)
May 23, 2012 WednesdayGarantiza Peña diálogo con organismos; VOTO'12 Reforma (Mexico)
May 22, 2012 Tuesday
Vázquez Mota pide renovar sin claudicar" lucha 
antinarco" El Universal (Mexico)
May 22, 2012 TuesdayLa agenda de los candidatos El Universal (Mexico)
May 22, 2012 Tuesday...Y demandan comicios de calidad El Norte (Mexico)
May 22, 2012 Tuesday
Urgen a empoderar a la sociedad civil; Llaman 
ONG a marcar una agenda pública a gobernantes. 
Afirman que falta imponer consecuencias a las 
decisiones de los políticos por incumplimiento El Norte (Mexico)
May 22, 2012 Tuesday
Piden ciudadanos fijar límites a SNTE; Exponen 
organizaciones sus propuestas a candidatos. 
Plantean en cumbre reducir financiamiento a 
partidos políticos y obligar transparencia El Norte (Mexico)
May 22, 2012 TuesdayProponen replantear política contra drogas El Norte (Mexico)
May 22, 2012 TuesdayDemandan restringir monopolios en medios El Norte (Mexico)
May 22, 2012 Tuesday
Exigen ciudadanos fijar límites a SNTE; Exponen 
organizaciones sus propuestas a candidatos. 
Plantean en cumbre reducir financiamiento a 
partidos políticos y obligar transparencia Reforma (Mexico)
May 22, 2012 TuesdayDemandan restringir monopolios en medios Reforma (Mexico)
May 22, 2012 TuesdayProponen replantear la política contra las drogas Reforma (Mexico)
May 22, 2012 Tuesday
Urgen empoderar a la sociedad civil; Llaman ONGs 
a imponer agenda a gobernantes. Señalan que no 
se han cobrado costos a la clase política por 
incumplimiento Reforma (Mexico)
May 22, 2012 Tuesday...Y demandan comicios de calidad Reforma (Mexico)
May 22, 2012 TuesdayTEMPLO MAYOR Reforma (Mexico)
May 21, 2012 Monday
Woldenberg pide robustecer a la sociedad ante 
campañas El Universal (Mexico)
May 21, 2012 Monday
Ciudadanos: campaña paralela; Impulsan más de 
200 agrupaciones primera cumbre. Trabaja la 
sociedad civil organizada para fijarle una agenda 
al próximo Presidente El Norte (Mexico)
May 21, 2012 MondayJuan Ciudadano / Cumbre para construir El Norte (Mexico)
May 21, 2012 MondayJuan Ciudadano / Cumbre para construir Reforma (Mexico)
May 20, 2012 SundayLa Semana en Perspectiva El Universal (Mexico)
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Annex 7. News articles published on the topics of 'Guaranteeing universal access to 
broadband' and 'a law for the protection of journalists' (by month and newspaper). 
 
Reforma Norte El Universal Total Reforma Norte El Universal Total
Jan 10 11 6 17
Feb 10 8 2 4 14 1 1
Mar 10 6 7 3 16
Apr 10 3 4 2 9
May 10 6 2 4 12
Jun 10 7 7 2 16
Jul 10 6 3 2 11
Aug 10 12 9 6 27 3 3
Sep 10 9 7 5 21
Oct 10 7 2 12 21
Nov 10 11 1 6 18 1 1
Dec 10 10 4 7 21
Jan 11 8 6 2 16 1 1
Feb 11 8 1 8 17
Mar 11 7 4 11 1 1
Apr 11 6 7 7 20
May 11 6 5 5 16
Jun 11 6 2 7 15 1 1 2 4
Jul 11 11 3 6 20
Aug 11 2 2 4
Sep 11 5 3 8
Oct 11 6 3 4 13 2 2
Nov 11 5 2 9 16 1 1
Dec 11 10 2 5 17 1 1
Jan 12 7 4 11 1 1
Feb 12 14 1 4 19 2 2
Mar 12 12 3 6 21 2 2
Apr 12 3 1 5 9
May 12 8 7 12 27 2 2
Jun 12 13 7 2 22 1 1 3 5
Jul 12 8 7 15
Aug 12 12 5 5 22 2 2 4
Sep 12 8 3 13 24 2 2
Oct 12 6 3 3 12 1 1 2
Nov 12 15 3 6 24 2 2
Dec 12 22 13 10 45 1 1 2
Guaranteeing universal access to 
broadband




Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from El Universal, Reforma and Norte newspapers data from Lexis Nexis.  
Reforma Norte El Universal Total Reforma Norte El Universal Total
Jan 13 20 10 6 36
Feb 13 13 7 6 26 1 1
Mar 13 27 17 17 61 2 2
Apr 13 13 8 5 26 1 2 3
May 13 7 4 11 1 1
Jun 13 4 5 1 10
Jul 13 10 4 14 1 1 2
Aug 13 3 1 1 5
Sep 13 7 3 10
Oct 13 9 1 4 14
Nov 13 7 3 6 16
Dec 13 4 2 6 12
Jan 14 8 3 4 15 1 1
Feb 14 2 2 1 5 1 1
Mar 14 6 1 7
Apr 14 4 1 6 11
May 14 13 8 5 26 1 1
Jun 14 5 2 4 11 1 1
Jul 14 4 1 10 15 1 1
Aug 14 2 2 3 7
Sep 14 5 2 3 10
Oct 14 1 1 2
Nov 14 4 2 3 9
Dec 14 3 1 4 8
Total 448 217 260 925 12 6 31 49
Guaranteeing universal access to 
broadband
A law for the protection of 
journalists
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Annex 8. Media coverage given to the ‘citizens’ security’ topics included in the 






















Jan 10 1 1 2
Feb 10 2 1 3 1 1
Mar 10 1 1 2
Apr 10 4 3 1 8
May 10 1 1 2
Jun 10 3 2 5
Jul 10 2 2 4
Aug 10 5 2 3 10
Sep 10 2 1 3
Oct 10 3 3 1 1
Nov 10 3 3
Dec 10 2 1 1 4
Jan 11 1 2 3 6
Feb 11 3 2 5
Mar 11 14 1 15
Apr 11 4 3 1 8
May 11 3 1 1 5
Jun 11 5 1 4 10 1 1
Jul 11 2 2
Aug 11 1 3 4
Sep 11 7 2 2 11
Oct 11 15 7 8 30
Nov 11 1 2 3
Dec 11 4 1 4 9
Jan 12 5 2 4 11
Feb 12 4 3 3 10 1 1
Mar 12 3 3
Apr 12 4 1 5
May 12 1 1 2 4 4 3 11 2 1 3
Jun 12 2 2 4
Jul 12 2 1 3
Aug 12 3 3
Sep 12 3 2 2 7
Oct 12 2 1 3 6
Nov 12 4 3 7 1 1
Dec 12 8 2 2 12
Jan 13 9 3 9 21
Feb 13 34 20 21 75
Mar 13 10 6 6 22 1 1
Apr 13 32 15 6 53
May 13 14 4 5 23
Jun 13 14 6 1 21
Jul 13 5 2 7 1 1
Aug 13 5 2 7 3 3
Sep 13 6 1 7 1 1 1 3
Oct 13 7 1 2 10
Nov 13 1 1 2 1 1 2
Dec 13 4 4 3 11
Jan 14 6 2 1 9
Feb 14 2 1 1 4
Mar 14 4 1 5
Apr 14 6 4 2 12
May 14 4 1 1 6
Jun 14 3 1 4 8
Jul 14 1 1 2 1 1 1 3
Aug 14 2 1 2 5 1 1

























Sep 14 2 1 2 5 1 1
Oct 14 2 1 1 4
Nov 14 4 2 1 7
Dec 14 1 3 4
Total 1 1 2 306 124 139 569 16 5 2 23
Civil Auditor Amparo Law Policy on drugs




















Apr 10 2 2 4
May 10






Dec 10 1 1 2
Jan 11
Feb 11 1 1
Mar 11
Apr 11
May 11 1 1 2 1 1 2
Jun 11






Jan 12 1 1
Feb 12
Mar 12 1 1 2
Apr 12
May 12 2 1 1 4
Jun 12 1 1
Jul 12 2 1 3
Aug 12 1 1 1 1
Sep 12
Oct 12 1 1
Nov 12 2 1 3 2 1 3
Dec 12 1 1 1 1 1 1
Jan 13 2 2 1 1 1 1
Feb 13
Mar 13 1 1 1 1
Apr 13 1 1 1 1
May 13 1 1
Citizens' Representatives Centres of Justice for Women Public Ministry Office
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Jul 13 1 1
Aug 13
Sep 13 1 1 2
Oct 13 1 1
Nov 13
Dec 13 1 1 1 1 2
Jan 14
Feb 14






Sep 14 1 1 2
Oct 14
Nov 14 3 3 6 2 1 2 5
Dec 14 2 2 1 1
Total 9 8 3 20 12 5 6 23 13 7 7 27

























Feb 10 1 1 2
Mar 10 1 1 2
Apr 10
May 10
Jun 10 1 1
Jul 10
Aug 10
Sep 10 1 1
Oct 10
Nov 10
Dec 10 2 2
Jan 11
Feb 11 1 1
Mar 11 3 2 5
Apr 11 1 1
May 11
Jun 11 1 2 3
Jul 11 1 1
Aug 11 3 3 6
Sep 11 1 1
Oct 11 1 2 1 4
Nov 11 1 1
Dec 11 1 1 2 1 1
Jan 12 2 7 1 10 1 1
Feb 12 5 5 1 1 2
Mar 12 2 1 3
Apr 12 2 1 1 4 9 2 11 22
May 12 3 2 5 1 1 7 3 2 12
Jun 12 1 1 1 1
Jul 12 5 5 14 12 12 38
Aug 12 1 1 2 11 3 2 16
Sep 12 2 1 3 7 3 5 15
Oct 12 1 1 1 1
Nov 12 2 3 5
Dec 12 1 1 1 1 7 5 7 19
Disappearances Human trafficking General Law of Victims
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Jan 13 2 1 3 23 17 23 63
Feb 13 2 2 10 14
Mar 13 7 2 7 16
Apr 13 2 2 8 2 4 14
May 13 2 1 3 5 3 1 9
Jun 13 3 3 6 2 3 2 7
Jul 13 2 2 4
Aug 13 1 1 2
Sep 13 1 1 1 1 2
Oct 13 1 1 7 7 2 16
Nov 13 1 3 4
Dec 13 2 1 1 4
Jan 14 5 2 1 8
Feb 14 1 2 3
Mar 14 2 2 5 1 6
Apr 14 2 1 1 4
May 14 3 1 4
Jun 14 1 1 3 4 7
Jul 14 3 3 6
Aug 14 2 1 3 1 1 1 1 2
Sep 14 2 2
Oct 14 1 1 1 3 1 1 5 7
Nov 14 1 1 2 2 9 11
Dec 14 2 2 4 3 7
Total 29 51 22 102 4 2 6 152 81 119 352
Disappearances Human trafficking General Law of Victims
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Annex 9. Monthly coverage of the "Autodefensas VS Caballeros Templarios" conflict. 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with information from El Universal, El Norte, Reforma and Cambio de Michoacan 
newspapers’ archives.  









mar-11 0 0 0 0 9 5 1 2
abr-11 0 0 1 1 4 3 2 3
may-11 0 4 2 3 2 3 7 5
jun-11 0 2 5 3 14 13 30 27
jul-11 0 1 0 0 27 15 25 15
ago-11 0 1 0 0 27 19 16 5
sep-11 0 0 2 0 17 11 9 5
oct-11 0 1 1 0 11 8 13 8
nov-11 0 1 0 0 2 11 21 9
dic-11 0 0 0 0 9 14 6 4
ene-12 0 2 0 0 6 4 4 2
feb-12 0 1 1 0 3 2 10 7
mar-12 0 0 0 0 2 9 22 11
abr-12 0 0 0 0 7 1 4 1
may-12 0 0 0 0 4 3 4 3
jun-12 0 0 0 0 4 0 11 1
jul-12 0 1 0 0 6 6 7 2
ago-12 0 2 0 0 5 12 24 7
sep-12 0 0 0 0 3 9 13 5
oct-12 0 4 1 0 1 4 8 3
nov-12 0 0 1 0 11 8 16 3
dic-12 0 0 1 0 2 5 13 7
ene-13 0 40 34 5 1 7 13 4
feb-13 0 71 72 22 0 1 5 4
mar-13 3 46 59 32 3 4 14 6
abr-13 3 25 41 22 7 4 14 8
may-13 6 14 50 36 7 4 24 19
jun-13 6 14 25 14 7 4 9 8
jul-13 3 18 46 32 11 11 41 23
ago-13 13 31 95 62 10 5 22 12
sep-13 11 9 30 11 9 2 8 1
oct-13 11 9 36 18 8 2 18 8
nov-13 33 17 58 35 21 26 50 33
dic-13 30 12 54 35 6 1 35 18
ene-14 141 107 224 156 27 46 145 93
feb-14 77 61 166 116 28 45 85 60
mar-14 111 64 138 67 48 48 90 52
abr-14 140 55 96 59 98 56 94 56
may-14 104 61 102 76 45 23 43 33
jun-14 69 33 51 23 30 28 32 22
jul-14 71 46 69 35 42 40 37 26
ago-14 37 35 28 27 57 38 46 32
sep-14 24 10 16 9 52 18 29 13
oct-14 26 20 15 6 29 32 22 11
nov-14 19 13 13 6 9 19 16 7
dic-14 70 47 62 35 17 23 30 15
ene-15 36 38 53 30 32 28 35 11
feb-15 14 9 11 2 44 47 15 11
mar-15 49 24 14 5 37 40 31 16
abr-15 21 14 19 9 31 20 13 9
may-15 46 26 27 19 20 23 16 11
jun-15 40 19 15 8 32 17 14 8
Autodefensas [Caballeros] Templarios
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Annex 10. Correlations between homicides and local media coverage of 










mar-11 0 9 77
apr-11 0 4 62
may-11 0 2 85
jun-11 0 14 93
jul-11 0 27 88
aug-11 0 27 80
sep-11 0 17 56
oct-11 0 11 67
nov-11 0 2 56
dec-11 0 9 67
jan-12 0 6 73
feb-12 0 3 51
mar-12 0 2 72
apr-12 0 7 91
may-12 0 4 68
jun-12 0 4 57
jul-12 0 6 67
aug-12 0 5 76
sep-12 0 3 81
oct-12 0 1 54
nov-12 0 11 61
dec-12 0 2 69
jan-13 0 1 44
feb-13 0 0 38
mar-13 3 3 87
apr-13 3 7 94
may-13 6 7 76
jun-13 6 7 53
jul-13 3 11 70
aug-13 13 10 81
sep-13 11 9 79
oct-13 11 8 112
nov-13 33 21 93
dec-13 30 6 88
jan-14 141 27 99
feb-14 77 28 77
mar-14 111 48 74
apr-14 140 98 72
may-14 104 45 101
jun-14 69 30 85
jul-14 71 42 67
aug-14 37 57 64
sep-14 24 52 68
oct-14 26 29 87
nov-14 19 9 66
dec-14 70 17 65
jan-15 36 32 59
feb-15 14 44 35
mar-15 49 37 39
apr-15 21 31 59
may-15 46 20 94
jun-15 40 32 45
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Correlation between 'Homicides' and 'media coverage' of the Caballeros Templarios DTO and 
Autodefensas, prior to the autodefensas uprising (March 2011–Feb 2013). 
 
Correlation between 'Homicides' and 'media coverage' given to Caballeros Templarios DTO and 
Autodefensas, during the autodefensas uprising (March 2013–Feb 2014). 
 
Correlation between 'Homicides' and 'media coverage' given to Caballeros Templarios DTO and 
Autodefensas, after the autodefensas uprising (March 2014–June 2015). 
 
